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I would like to thank Professor Vejlko Vujačić for his unwavering support,  
and for sharing with me his incomparable sociological imagination.  
If I succeed as a professor of sociology, it will be because of him. 
 
I am also deeply indebted to Émile Durkheim, who first exposed the anomic crisis,  













 The term anomie has declined in the sociology literature. Apart from brief mentions, it has 
not featured in the American Sociological Review for sixteen years. Moreover, the term has 
narrowed and is now used almost exclusively to discuss deviance. This project explores 
Durkheim’s original use of the term, and whether modifications of his work—by Merton, 
Parsons, and others—are useful or muddling. We also present critiques of the term, evaluating 
them in light of Durkheim’s intentions. Possible explanations for the decline of anomie theory 
are given, including academic explanations (e.g., classical sociology was replaced by newer 
theories like symbolic interactionism) and political explanations (e.g., Durkheim’s functionalism 
became too “conservative” for the New Left). Finally, we argue that the United States is a highly 
anomic nation, with its focus on freedom, eternal striving, and self-advancement. We apply a 
Durkheimian perspective to contemporary issues like mental illness, exploring rising rates of 






Freedom, however, is not the last word. Freedom is only part of the story and half of the truth. 
Freedom is but the negative aspect of the whole phenomenon whose positive aspect is 
responsibleness. In fact, freedom is in danger of degenerating into mere arbitrariness unless it is 
lived in terms of responsibleness.  
—Viktor Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning 
 
Let us even recognize that in a general way liberty is a delicate instrument which one must 
learn to handle; and let us train our children accordingly.  










 Anomie. Over a century after the term was introduced, sociologists have yet to unravel its 
mystery. It is a concept inextricable from the field that produced it—tied to the very origins of 
sociology itself. Anomie has been much maligned, much misunderstood, but the assumptions it 
carries lie at the heart of the discipline. To broach the term anomie is thus to invoke all of 
sociology. And to ignore the term is to wipe our intellectual ancestors into the dust.  
 But sociologists have grown tired of anomie theory; indeed, they are embarrassed by it. 
The term implicates sociology in many academic movements we wish to put behind us: 
functionalism, positivism, and conservatism, among others. To study anomie is to remind us of 
our ignoble origins, which—we continue to insist—no longer represent the field. 
 Consequently, anomie theory has declined in recent decades. A search of the American 
Sociological Review finds that the term has not been used in sixteen years. What happened? 
Perhaps by tracing the genealogy of the term, we may begin to understand its downfall.  
 Yet before I begin with the birth of the concept, I would like to consider its death. 
The following is a quote from sociologist Philippe Besnard, an expert on anomie theory. 
Besnard writes:  
It is better to get rid of anomie. The time to register the death of this centenarian seems to 
have come. We have done more: we have built it a tomb which some will judge too 
monumental. But could one throw the “sociological concept par excellence” into the 
pauper’s grave? This tomb appears to us to be on the scale of the illusions that have 
surrounded and fed the use of this slightly magical vocabulary whose sorcery we hope to 
have dispelled, and which we would like to write for the last time: anomie (Besnard 
1987: 388, cited in Meštrović 1988a: 837).  
 
This quotation, I am amused to report, appears at the end of a 424-page book dedicated to 
anomie theory. Apparently Besnard felt the term so utterly useless that it deserved a weighty 
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tome all its own. This bizarre quotation illustrates how contentious anomie has become—at once 
magical and marginal, at times the “sociological concept par excellence” and at times an elder on 
its deathbed.  
 Anomie is a very old term. The word entered the English language in 1591, and in the 
next century became associated with a “disregard for divine law” (Midgley 1971: 37). Émile 
Durkheim himself became familiar with the term through philosopher Jean Marie Guyau, but 
“after reviewing Guyau’s work, Durkheim coined his own definition of anomie in exact 
opposition to Guyau’s” (Orrù 1990: 232). After a period of disuse, the term resurfaced in the 
1930s in the works of Elton Mayo, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton. The 1950s saw a heavy 
backlash against anomie theory, since it was associated with functionalism and therefore seen as 
conservative. But the term revived itself, again, in the work of criminologists and psychologists, 
who used anomie to explain deviance and “disaffection,” respectively (Borgatta & Montgomery 
2000: 165). Today, even those passionate movements are beginning to dissipate: the word has 
seen fewer and fewer mentions every year since 1993.1 Besnard’s death sentence may be entirely 
superfluous; anomie theory is dying of its own accord. 
 But as I will argue throughout this paper, anomie itself has only continued to rise. In the 
United States, where limitlessness is a cardinal virtue, rates of depression and anxiety have 
reached unprecedented heights. As the sociologist Jean Twenge observes, major depression has 
increased tenfold in the past century: only 1–2 percent of people born before 1915 in the U.S. 
had a major depressive episode; that number is 15–20 percent today (Twenge 2006: 105). In fact, 
the United States now has the highest depression rate in the world.2 Anxiety disorders are even 
                                            
1 Google Books Ngram Viewer, English language search. 
2 “Mild and Bitter” (2009). The Economist. http://www.economist.com/node/13899022 
 8 
more prevalent: affecting 40 million Americans (18 percent of the U.S. population), they 
constitute the most common mental illness in the nation.3  
 Anomie affects not only our mental health, but our behavior: as we shall see, rates of 
mass shootings, soldier suicides, and other disturbing practices are on the rise. While social 
constraint produces “happiness and moral health,” as Durkheim argued4, the anomic condition 
leads to a great deal of avoidable suffering.  
 It is my contention that anomie theory is declining at the precise moment it is most 
needed. Put another way, the term is losing its place in the literature just when its explanatory 
power is greatest. Indeed, I worry that as anomie worsens in the United States, anomie theory—
which presupposes a critique of freedom and individualism—will become increasingly 
unpopular. Ideas, as Marx would have it, are tied to dominant ideologies; as the cult of the 
individual gains strength, it is sure to infect academia as well as popular culture. 
 The goal of this paper is to revive anomie theory. Barring this lofty feat, I hope to at least 
suggest some contemporary uses for the term, including (as I have already said) mental illness, 
school shootings, and soldier suicide. I will begin with Émile Durkheim’s description of 
anomie—focusing particularly on The Division of Labor in Society (1893) and Suicide (1897). 
After this close reading, I will consider expansions of the term, especially Robert Merton’s 
famous essay, “Social Structure and Anomie” (1938). I will also consider critiques of anomie 
theory, evaluating them in light of Durkheim’s original analysis. Finally, I will explore why the 
term has declined, why it is still useful, and how it can be revived. I will end with Durkheim’s 
own solutions to the anomic crisis.  
                                            
3 Anxiety and Depression Association of America, Facts & Statistics: http://www.adaa.org/about-adaa/press-
room/facts-statistics. 
4 Cited in Lukes 1977: 83 
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Anomie in The Division of Labor 
 Durkheim’s first major work, The Division of Labor in Society, presents the most famous 
understanding of anomie. This fame is unfortunate, since Durkheim elaborated the concept in 
later works, and to read only this book gives a very narrow understanding of the term.5 In this 
book—which was also his dissertation—Durkheim focuses primarily on economic anomie. Here 
Durkheim “treats anomie as a consequence of economic upheaval, people not knowing what 
rules apply across the business cycle of boom-bust-boom-bust” (Sennett 2006: xix).  
 Durkheim is particularly concerned with the “anomic division of labor.” As society 
progresses, jobs become specialized, and individuals rely on each other for specific social 
functions. This mutual dependence creates a sense of shared destiny around which individuals 
can coalesce. (This is “organic solidarity.”) Normally, the division of labor produces a sense of 
collective identity, but at times the opposite occurs. The healthy division of labor requires what 
Durkheim calls “dynamic density,” which is not only density of population (an inevitable result 
of urbanization), but a high frequency of interaction. Without consistent interaction, individuals 
become atomized, performing distinct social functions but not acquiring a sense of mutual need. 
Durkheim writes: 
The division of labour progresses the more individuals there are who are sufficiently in 
contact with one another to be able mutually to act and react upon one another. If we 
agree to call dynamic or moral density this drawing together and the active exchanges 
that result from it, we can say that the progress of the division of labour is in direct 
proportion to the moral or dynamic density of society (Durkheim 1893/1997: 201). 
 
                                            
5 As Parsons (1937) and others have pointed out, Durkheim’s ideas change greatly as his work progresses. His 
understanding of constraint, for example, passes from an “external” force that dominates individuals to an 
internalized “discipline” that does not feel like domination at all. This kind of evolution is hardly rare among 
theorists: Marx (to name just one other) admitted later in life that the base–superstructure model was not as 
unilateral as he thought. As Nisbet (1965) notes, authors are complex individuals, and though their work is often 
inconsistent (or even contradictory), we can still gain tremendous insight from them.  
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 The anomic division of labor, Ritzer and Goodman (2004: 173) explain, “refers to the 
lack of regulation in a society that celebrates isolated individuality and refrains from telling 
people what they should do.” This must be stressed: anomie is not merely a lack of group 
identity (egoism), but the insufficient sense of constraint that results. For as Durkheim 
emphasizes, groups share not only a sense of purpose but a sense of mutual dependence, which 
restrains their desire and develops in them “a taste for altruism”, a “forgetfulness of self and 
sacrifice” (1893/1997: xxxiv). The anomic division of labor is one of the “pathological” forms of 
modernization; that is, it is not a normal result of specialization but an unfortunate malady that 
sometimes occurs. On the whole, the division of labor is a desirable process: it leads to a sense 
of empowered individualism, where each can pursue his passions and develop his talents 
(Durkheim 1898/1973).6 Those who claim Durkheim was “regressive” or anti-modern must take 
note of this blatant praise of modernity. “In the main body of this work,” he writes, 
we have been especially concerned to demonstrate that the division of labor can bear no 
responsibility for this [anomic] state of affairs, a charge that has sometimes unjustly been 
leveled against it. Nor does that division necessarily produce fragmentation and lack of 
coherence. Indeed, when its functions are sufficiently linked together they tend of their 
own accord to achieve an equilibrium, becoming self-regulatory (1893/1997: xxxiv, 
emphasis added). 
 
 While the division of labor sometimes produces anomie, this is not an inevitable result, 
but an aberration.7 Yet we have not properly examined what anomie is. “Anomie is prevalent,” 
Steven Lukes writes, “because of the rapid growth of the market and big industry, for since 
‘these changes have been accomplished with extreme rapidity, the interests in conflict have not 
yet had time to be equilibrated’; also there is the harmful existence of ‘the still very great 
                                            
6 This notion of specialization is not unlike that of Marx, who saw in the “kingdom of freedom” a highly 
individuated society.  
7 Even so, Durkheim admits that “the division of labour, by its very nature, may therefore exert a dissolving 
influence.” But he clarifies that specialization “is both useful and necessary” and we should not “return societies to 
what [Comte] calls the age of generality . . . that state of indistinctiveness and homogeneity that was their point of 
departure” (1893/1997: 295).  
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inequality in the external conditions of the struggle’” (Lukes 1977: 79, citing Durkheim). Here 
we can see anomie’s economic character: as modernization progresses, and more and more of 
society is subsumed under the economic sphere, constraints on individual desire become 
insufficient. External circumstances—wealth, industry, technology—are advancing at a startling 
rate, and social forces cannot keep up. Thus “anomie is due to a lag in growth of the relevant 
rules and institutions” (Lukes 1977: 80). This concept is not elaborated until Durkheim’s Suicide, 
but the basic notion is that when economic change outpaces the rate of social change, desires are 
not properly constrained by society. An individual who gains (or loses) a tremendous amount of 
money is beset with new desires, but society can no longer rein in those desires. Thus the 
individual feels a sense of moral confusion, not knowing how to properly behave in society.  
 The suffering the individual experiences is twofold: first, one is given the means to 
achieve new desires, so expectations dramatically increase. Since not all of these desires can be 
satisfied, a sense of frustration and anxiety results. Second, the individual lacks moral 
direction; she is forced to pursue a “chaotic utilitarian calculus”8 that seeks to maximize 
pleasure. It is the latter understanding that most theorists emphasize, which is why anomie is 
often translated as “normlessness” or “aimlessness.” The common refrain among American 
college students—What am I going to do with my life?—is indicative of this aimlessness. Such 
a question is not merely an existential quandary, but (as Durkheim believes) a failure of society 
to provide proper constraint for individuals. I say constraint, and not guidance, because 
anomie is above all a moral concern. It is not that society should tell us what to do9, but rather, 
that it should tell us what we must not do: it must constrain our desires. The “aimlessness” of 
                                            
8 This is a paraphrase of Merton 1938: 185. 
9 Historically speaking, this is an evolution: while premodern societies typically assigned functions to individuals 
(serf, priest, feudal lord), modernity in Durkheim’s conception requires that individuals pursue their own passions. 
If their roles are merely assigned, they will experience not anomie but its opposite: the “forced division of labor.” 
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the college student is problematic not only because she vacillates, but because her desires are 
aroused by far too many options. 
 That is, anomie is not merely disorienting, but painful. In times of economic 
depression, the reason is obvious: one must adjust to meager conditions, a difficult thing to do. 
But in times of prosperity, the suffering is the same! The individual must acclimate to new 
circumstances and forego a previous lifestyle. Indeed, “any change in human existence, 
whether sudden or prepared in advance, constitutes a painful crisis,” Durkheim writes,  
for it does violence to acquired instincts, which offer it resistance. All the past holds us 
back, even when the brightest prospects tempt us to go forward. It is always a laborious 
operation to uproot habits that time has fixed and organised within us (1893/1997: 186). 
 
This quotation is significant, for it reveals that even in his first book, Durkheim was not 
exclusively concerned with the economy. Any change, he wrote, is painful. This point is 
crucial, for many sociologists stop at Durkheim’s explanation of the economy10, and thus claim 
anomie is about economic dysregulation. That is false. As Durkheim stresses here and in other 
works, his focus on the economy is merely pragmatic, since in modern society, most activity is 
subsumed under the economy. Thus the anomic division of labor becomes a convenient 
platform through which to explore the anomic condition.  
 But as nuanced as his understanding of anomie may be, it is still simplistic compared 
with his later works. A more detailed understanding will come from his other writings, 
particularly Suicide and his second preface to The Division of Labor. 
 
 
                                            
10 See the work of Phyllis Puffer, for example: “The original concept [of anomie] was based on an analysis of the 
economy, more particularly the business cycle, and refers only to the structure of society and not to the mental state 
of the individual” (Puffer 2009: 200). As we shall see, this claim is incorrect.   
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Anomie in Suicide 
 In The Division of Labor, we observed, Durkheim “treats anomie as a consequence of 
economic upheaval, people not knowing what rules apply across the business cycle of boom-
bust-boom-bust” (Sennett 2006: xix). But in Suicide, the concept becomes far more 
philosophical. Here, Durkheim grounds his argument in an ontological claim about human 
nature. We are, Durkheim argues, vessels of endless desire. Unique among beings, we are 
blessed with tremendous intellect, but that blessing is also our downfall.  
 “When the hole that life has dug out of its resources is filled,” the animal is satisfied and 
asks for nothing more,” Durkheim writes (1897/2006: 269). Animals, being simple creatures, 
have simple needs—their flourishing depends on “purely material conditions.” We do not have 
that luxury: “most of [man’s] needs are not (or at least not to the same degree) dependent on his 
body” (1897/2006: 269). Here Durkheim’s argument differs from Freudian id—for desire is not 
merely biological, but a product of intellect. “Human intelligence is more aware and can suggest 
better conditions which appear as desirable ends and inspire activity” (1897/2006: 270). It is not 
our “drives” that produce desire, but our capacity for imagination: “Beyond the pleasures that we 
have experienced, we imagine and yearn for others, and if one should happen to have more or 
less exhausted the realm of the possible, one dreams of the impossible – one thirsts for what is 
not” (1897/2006: 299).11 
 There is nothing wrong with imagination, Durkheim writes. Indeed, it is the “spirit of 
progress” that drives society forward (cited in Meštrović 1988b: 543). Yet even in the best of 
                                            
11 To give a concrete example: Later in the chapter, Durkheim notes that sexual desire is very complex in humans. It 
is not merely about satisfying bodily needs, as it is for most animals. “Though this natural urge may have been the 
germ of all sexual evolution, it has been progressively complicated by many varied aesthetic and moral feelings and 
is now only the least element in the complete and densely woven process to which it has given rise. On contact with 
these intellectual elements, it was itself partly freed from the body and, as it were, intellectualized” (1897/2006: 298, 
emphasis added).  
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circumstances, not all of our desires can be achieved. This is the curse of imagination—we are 
drawn toward goals that cannot possibly be fulfilled, and we suffer as a result. In a passage 
reminiscent of Buddhist philosophy, Durkheim writes: 
No living person can be happy or even live at all unless his needs are sufficiently well 
adjusted to his means. In other words, if he demands more than can be provided for him, 
or even something other than can be provided, he will be constantly irritated and unable 
to function without suffering. And an action that cannot be accomplished without 
suffering tends not to be repeated. Aptitudes that are not satisfied atrophy and, since the 
aptitude for life is only the result of all the rest, it is bound to weaken if the others also 
slacken (1897/2006: 269). 
 
 To be sure, Durkheim reasons, most of us will accept “that appetites of this kind will 
sooner or later encounter a limit that they cannot pass.” But where is this limit located? “How 
can one assess the amount of well-being, comfort and luxury that a human being can legitimately 
seek? Neither in the organic make-up nor in the psychological make-up of the human being is 
there anything that marks the limit of such desires” (1897/2006: 270).  
 The individual may experience wondrous flights of imagination. But there is no 
mechanism that can shut imagination down. Our intellect brings us ever greater possibilities, 
ever higher horizons, until suddenly we wake from our illusions and begin a headlong plummet 
downward. “It is not human nature that can set the variable limit to these needs that they 
demand,” Durkheim warns. “Consequently, to the extent that they depend solely on the 
individual, they are limitless. In itself, setting aside any external power that governs it, our 
sensibility is a bottomless abyss that nothing can fill” (1897/2006: 270, emphasis added).  
 Individuals cannot self-regulate. Instead, they require the discipline of “an authority that 
they respect and before which they spontaneously bow.” That authority, Durkheim writes, is 
society. Society is “the only moral power superior to the individual whose superiority the 
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individual accepts. It alone has the necessary authority to state the law and to set the point 
beyond which the passions may not go” (1897/2006: 272).  
 Indeed, society exits chiefly as a regulatory force: it is the “arbiter appointed by nature for 
. . . assigning appropriate bounds” (1902/1997: xxxv). When social facts do not properly 
constrain desire, society has failed to perform its essential function. It was not by accident that 
Durkheim used “social” and “moral” interchangeably: he felt that only through shared moral 
constraints (the conscience collective) could individuals live together in a stable society. If 
morality is the set of constraints governing society, then society is the set of constraints 
governing morality; they are one and the same.12 
 Without normative constraints, Durkheim argued, individuals would be trapped in a 
utilitarian calculus, constantly trying to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. A healthy society 
forecloses this possibility; it provides individuals with a sense of moral direction.  
 So the pain of anomie is not merely that of unmet desire. It also comes from the 
profound confusion—Durkheim says dérèglement or “madness”—of living in a society 
without proper ethical rules (Meštrović 1987). When the rate of change in a society occurs 
faster than new constraints can form (“acute anomie”) or when those constraints simply do not 
exist (“chronic anomie”), the individual is literally unable to be moral. One’s moral character 
is no longer secure; suddenly all venues are open to pursuit, and desire and madness emerge 
in equal measure.  
                                            
12 “Society is the eminent end of all moral activity,” Durkheim writes (1906: 73/54, cited in Stedman Jones 2001: 
195). Or as Parsons puts it: “A society, as Durkheim expressed it, is a ‘moral community’ and only in so far as it is 
such does it possess stability” (Parsons 1937: 389). 
The two terms, though not “identical” per se, lead always to one another: “The few critics who have understood at 
all what Durkheim meant have generally laid the main stress on one side of the relationship—that morality is a 
social phenomenon. For present purposes, and in terms of Durkheim’s own scientific development, much the more 
important is the other side—that society is, at least in one of its principal aspects, a moral phenomenon in the strict 
sense that Durkheim has given the terms” (Parsons 1937: 391, emphasis in original) 
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 Anomie is often translated as “normlessness,” and this point is somewhat misleading. 
While it is true that acute anomie—which emerges from a sudden change in social state—may 
produce a disruption in norms, this is not true of chronic anomie. In some nations (especially, as 
I will argue, the United States), norms and values do exist, and they have quite a grip on society. 
But they are not what Durkheim called “social facts”: they do not provide moral constraints on 
individual will. Indeed, they may do the opposite. The emphasis of Western democratic nations 
on liberty, choice, and opportunity is a very real cultural phenomenon. But these values do not 
constrain individual will; they encourage it, and in doing so, they foster anomie. It is the absence 
of social facts specifically, not norms and values generally, that produces the anomic condition. 
Indeed, as we shall see, this is the primary difference between anomie and egoism: both entail 
poor integration, but the former implies poor regulation as well.  
 If there is any simple definition of anomie, this is it: the suffering caused by unrestrained 
desire. Everything else follows from this principle. All the symptoms of anomie—anxiety, 
weariness, disenchantment, unease, agitation, discontent, and groping, as Durkheim variously 
wrote—are linked to “frustrations of desire.”13 It is baffling to me that most sociologists fail to 
make this connection—instead, they describe the “lawlessness” of the anomic condition, or the 
breakdown of community, or the collapse of social order. But as Stjepan Meštrović reminds us, 
“anomie has meaning precisely in the fact that the incorrect arrangement of social 
representations produces distressing psychological symptoms which eventually produce 
physical, organismic pain” (1987: 571). It is desire that is painful—specifically, the overflow of 
desire that social facts have not properly constrained. When this desire becomes overwhelming, 
it leads us to take our own lives.  
                                            
13 This term is borrowed from the philosopher Peter Carruthers, who uses it in a very different context (Carruthers 
2005: 167). 
 17 
 Anomic suicide is thus the most dramatic example of the anomic condition—it is anomie 
taken to its furthest personal extreme (Sennett 2006: xix). While I do not wish to discredit the 
role of suicide in Durkheim’s work, it must be seen as only one point along the spectrum of 
anomie, an anomie which nearly everyone experiences. By normalizing anomie in this way, I 
hope to emphasize that suicide is not the pathological tendency of sick individuals14, but a 
gradual weakening of the “aptitude for life” (Durkheim 1897/2006: 269). 
 Durkheim’s emphasis on suicide was, it must be remembered, a strategic choice. Ever the 
social realist, Durkheim devoted his life to legitimizing sociology as a discipline. If he could 
show that even suicide—the most personal, private act available to human beings—had a social 
etiology, he would prove that society existed as a concrete force: “Sociological method, as we 
practice it, rests wholly on the basis that social facts must be studied as things; that is, as realities 
external to the individual. There is no principle for which we have received more criticism; but 
none is more fundamental” (cited in Nisbet 1974: 45).  
 As we explore anomic suicide, keep in mind that Durkheim’s discussion is far broader 
than the act of taking one’s life. The observations in this chapter can be applied not only to 
economic and domestic suicide, but to a miscellany of factors that strengthen the anomic 
condition. Do not be fooled: suicide is merely the mask through which all anomic suffering is 
presented.15 
 Durkheim begins his chapter with an analysis of economic crises. To be sure, he says, 
economic downturns cause suffering and increase the suicide rate. But they do not do so for the 
reason we suppose. It is not that life becomes more difficult during an economic crisis, but rather 
                                            
14 It is pathological, but the pathology is social, not individual. My point in making this distinction is to place blame 
on society rather than the individual psyche.  
15 Another important point: though anomie is difficult to measure, suicide rates provide a clear and consistent metric 
for which data is available. They are not, of course, the only symptom of anomie.  
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that life changes rapidly, and new norms cannot form fast enough. The moral chaos that 
ensues—the erosion of barriers on desire—is what causes suffering.16 Durkheim writes: 
In the event of an economic disaster, there is something like a ‘declassification’ which 
suddenly casts certain individuals into a situation below that which they previously 
occupied. They consequently have to lower their demands, to restrict their needs and 
learn to restrain themselves more. As far as they are concerned, all the fruits of social 
action are lost and their moral education has to be redone. But it is not possible for 
society to subject them to this new life instantaneously, and teach them to exercise this 
additional restraint on themselves when they are not accustomed to it. The outcome is 
that they are not adjusted to the condition that they occupy and the very prospect of it is 
intolerable to them. Hence the sufferings that detach them from a diminished form of life 
even before they have experienced it (1897/2006: 276).  
 
 In fact, this same chaos emerges when the economy does well. For the human psyche 
cannot tell what changes are good or bad—it sees all of them as rapid and painful. Durkheim 
provides several historical examples to support this claim. In 1870, he observes, Victor 
Emmanuel’s conquest of Rome helped to revive Italy. The country saw better transportation, 
improved communications, greater access to goods… But “in parallel with this collective rebirth, 
we find an exceptional growth in the number of suicides” (1897/2006: 265).  
 “If industrial or financial crises increase suicides,” Durkheim concludes, it is not because 
ether impoverish people, since critical increases in prosperity have the same result; it is because 
they are critical, that is to say, disturbances in the collective order. . . . Any disturbance, even 
when it results in greater wealth and an increase in general vitality, drives some to suicide” 
(1897/2006: 267). 
 This observation provides the framework for a theory of “acute economic anomie” (Pope 
1976).  From here, Durkheim immediately transitions to a discussion of chronic anomie: 
                                            
16 But couldn’t the suffering of, say, losing one’s livelihood also lead to suicide? Whitney Pope (1976) and others 
seem to think so, yet Durkheim does not acknowledge this point. It seems likely that a combination of effects—
anomie and sadness, for example—may be responsible.   
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analyzing the relationship between income and suicide.17 Making what is today one of his most 
famous claims, Durkheim writes: “One might even say that poverty protects” (1897/2006: 267). 
If anomie is caused by unchained desire, Durkheim reasons, it will be particularly prevalent 
among the wealthy. “Wealth . . . by the powers that it confers, gives us the illusion that we 
depend only on ourselves. By lessening the resistance that things put in our way, it persuades us 
that they can be constantly overcome. And, the less one feels limited, the more intolerable any 
limitation becomes” (1897/2006: 278). But the poor do not face this problem: their desires are 
already constrained by external circumstances—i.e., the inability to meet basic needs.  
 The analysis then becomes rather muddled—it is unclear whether Durkheim is describing 
chronic or acute anomie when he says: “So little is it the case that a rise in poverty leads to a rise 
in suicide that even fortunate crises, the effect of which is rapidly to increase a country’s 
prosperity, act on suicide in the same way as economic disasters” (1897/2006: 264). A rise in 
poverty should lead to suicide, by Durkheim’s own argument, since it is a sudden change in 
social state. Granted, that newfound poverty may “protect” once the individual becomes used to 
it, but the transition will cause suicide for some. It seems Durkheim is conflating chronic and 
acute anomie here.  
 Nonetheless, Durkheim’s economic observations are otherwise clear, and can be divided 
into two claims. First, sudden economic change produces anomie, whether that change is 
“fortunate” or not, because it disrupts social constraints. (This is the “acute” argument.) Second, 
wealth increases the risk of anomie, since (a) desires are more easily satisfied—and therefore the 
imagination grows and (b) the individual is accustomed to satisfaction, and cannot cope with 
frustrations of desire when they arise. (This is the “chronic” argument.) 
                                            
17 Chronic anomie is simply structural anomie—the suffering caused by a society that perennially fails to constrain 
desire. Acute anomie, meanwhile, is caused by a sudden change in social state, where constraints are torn asunder. 
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 Durkheim then explores the history of constraint, linking the decline of feudalism to a 
change in social hierarchy. Whereas birth formerly determined one’s status, “inherited wealth 
[and] merit” are now responsible (1897/2006: 274). It is not who you are, the old adage goes, but 
what you do. Yet as Tocqueville also observed, the emphasis on equality has obscured the need 
for constraint. Real meritocracy does not exist—“intelligence, taste, scientific, artistic, literary 
and industrial worth, courage and manual dexterity” are randomly distributed—but we believe 
that it does (1897/2006: 275). So it becomes difficult for individuals to accept moral authority: 
each of us strives to be “equal” to the most affluent, the most prestigious, the most powerful. “A 
spirit of anxiety and discontent is latent, and appetites which are only superficially contained 
break out” (1897/2006: 275). Equality is necessary, Durkheim warns, but also dangerous, and 
must be approached with caution.18 We will explore Durkheim’s approach to justice later in this 
work.19 For now, let us turn to Durkheim’s discussion of domestic, or “conjugal” suicide.  
 “What is marriage?” Durkheim asks, and then answers the question: “A regulation of 
sexual relations which extends beyond the physical instincts involved in such intercourse” 
(1897/2006: 298). Marriage provides “a rigorously defined object for the need to love,” and shuts 
off the possibility of other partners (1897/2006: 299). In young adulthood, men20 may benefit 
from an unconstrained state—to force them into an early marriage would be to “pitilessly 
                                            
18 In addition to Tocqueville, Friedrich Nietzsche also makes this point. In The Birth of Tragedy, he writes: 
People should not be surprised when the fruits of this optimism ripen, when a society that has been 
thoroughly leavened with this kind of culture, right down to the lowest levels, gradually starts trembling in 
an extravagant turmoil of desires, when the belief in earthly happiness for everyone, when faith in the 
possibility of such a universal knowledge culture gradually changes into the threatening demand for such 
an Alexandrian earthly happiness, into the invocation of a Euripidean deus ex machina! (1872/1999: 58). 
19 See my “Critiques of Anomie Theory.” 
20 Durkheim is very clear: domestic anomie is chiefly a problem for men, not women. Durkheim believes that 
women have fewer sexual desires than men because they are insufficiently socialized; thus, domestic anomie is less 
a concern for them. We will discuss this observation in the “critiques” section. 
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[confine]” their future, a recipe for fatalism (1897/2006: 306). But as men develop, so do their 
desires, until eventually the restraint of marriage becomes imperative.  
 “The bachelor . . . can legitimately attach himself to whatever he wants, he aspires to 
everything and nothing satisfies him,” Durkheim observes. “This disease of the infinite which 
anomie always brings with it can just as well attack that part of our consciousness as any other” 
(1897/2006: 299).21 Though individuals may get married for other reasons (kinship, economics, 
etc.), they benefit primarily from constraints on desire. It is these constraints that are lost in a 
divorce. When a couple decides to separate, “the moral calm and tranquility that made the 
husband strong are thus reduced, giving way, to some extent, to a state of anxiety that prevents 
the man from restricting himself to what he has” 1897/2006: 300).  
 The “endless new experiments” of the bachelor, “raising hopes that are dashed and 
leaving behind them a feeling of weariness and disenchantment,” cannot be endured for long. At 
times it is easier to take one’s life than to sustain this anomic tension (1897/2006: 299). Here we 
see several symptoms of anomie at once—the disappointment of unmet desire, the weariness of 
failed pursuits, and the moral chaos that drives the individual forward in spite of it all.  “Anomie 
is twofold,” Durkheim observes:   
Just as the subject never gives himself definitely, so he possesses nothing definitely. 
Uncertainly about the future, together with his own indecisiveness, thus condemns him to 
perpetual motion. Hence a state of unease, agitation and discontent that inevitably 
increases the possibility of suicide (1897/2006: 300). 
 
 In a nation with high divorce rates, argues Durkheim, even married men are susceptible. 
As the social fabric dissolves, it is hard to become truly invested in one’s marriage, since it too 
may fall apart: “One cannot be strongly attached to a bond that may, at any moment, be broken 
                                            
21 When Durkheim says “that part of our consciousness,” he means sexual desire. Here Durkheim confirms what I 
have argued throughout this thesis: anomie affects all aspects of our lives, not just the economic and domestic 
spheres, as Durkheimians sometimes argue.  
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on one side or the other. One cannot avoid looking outside the place where one is when one no 
longer feels the ground beneath one’s feet solid.” In such circumstances, marriage does not 
protect—the married man “cannot help losing some of his advantages. Consequently, the total 
number of suicides rises” (1897/2006: 300). 
 Durkheim originally theorized that widows would have higher suicide rates than 
divorcées, but his data proved otherwise (Pope 1976). Why—Durkheim allegedly wondered—
would divorce cause greater suicide risk than the death of a spouse? Surely divorce is both more 
gradual than widowhood and more desirable. Durkheim came to the following conclusion: the 
acute anomie of widowhood, though severe, did not match the chronic pain of bachelorhood. 
When one loses a spouse, the mourning period often shuts down romantic desire, sometimes 
indefinitely. But divorce, which is enacted willingly, does not foreclose desire. Indeed, divorce is 
often committed because one imagines better circumstances! If this logic is correct, it is not 
surprising that divorce produces more anomie, and more suicide, than widowhood.22  
 Durkheim concludes his chapter on anomic suicide with a small footnote on fatalism. I 
will reproduce it here for the sake of reference, since it completes the suicide typology:  
We can see by the preceding that there is a type of suicide which is opposite to anomic 
suicide, just as egotistical suicide and altruistic suicide are opposed. This is the one that 
results from an excess of regulation, the one committed by those whose future is 
pitilessly confined and whose passions are violently constrained by oppressive discipline. 
This is the suicide of married men who are too young and of married women without 
children. For the sake of completeness, we must therefore establish a fourth type of 
suicide. But it affects so few people today and, apart from the cases that we have just 
mentioned, it is so hard to find examples of it, that it seems unnecessary for it to detain us 
further. However, it could be that it has some historical interest. Is this not the kind of 
suicide of slaves that is said to be common in certain circumstances (see Corre, Le crime 
en pays créoles, p. 48)? In short, all those suicides which could be attributed to an excess 
of physical or moral despotism? To indicate the inescapable and inflexible character of 
the rule over which one has no power, and in contrast to the term ‘anomie’ which we 
have just used, we might call it ‘fatalistic suicide’ (1897/2006: 306).  
                                            
22 This paragraph is largely speculation on Pope’s and my part, but it does not seem entirely implausible. 
 23 
 As I have argued, this chapter is perhaps the most important of all Durkheim’s work on 
anomie. Here Durkheim defines the anomic condition, states the biological assumptions behind 
his claim, provides several wide-ranging examples of anomie, and hints at their solution. Here, 
too, Durkheim distinguishes anomie from egoism (the latter concerned with meaning, not 
constraint), and also from fatalism (in which constraint is excessive and cannot be internalized). 
Durkheim will continue with these themes throughout his work, most notably in Moral 
Education and his Second Preface to The Division of Labor in Society. We will discuss the latter 
work at the end of this thesis.  
 
Debate: The Causes of Desire 
 If anomie is the suffering of unbridled desire, it is crucial to understand where this desire 
comes from. To answer this question, we must look to Durkheim’s conception of human nature. 
But though the nature of man is a question nearly every theorist takes up, few have been as 
misunderstood as Durkheim. The following will attempt to reconstruct Durkheim’s argument; I 
will conclude that Durkheim understood both the social and biological underpinnings of desire, 
though no one—as far as I know—seems to recognize this.23  
 While some theorists (notably Foucault) have argued that all desire is socialized, 
Durkheim does not take this position.24 For him, desire is the product of man’s unique 
intellectual gifts. “Human intelligence,” he writes in Suicide, “is more aware and can suggest 
                                            
23 For example, I have been having a lively debate with Dr. Stjepan Meštrović over this topic. Meštrović believes 
that desire (for Durkheim) is entirely biological, but has admitted that “you make a compelling argument for your 
interpretation that the sources of desire are both social and psychological—so, by all means, go with it.” 
24 This is a crucial point, since Durkheim has often been accused of ignoring biological facts and explaining 
everything as a result of socialization.  
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better conditions which appear as desirable ends and inspire activity” (1897/2006: 270). But 
these very gifts become a source of frustration: 
One may accept that appetites of this kind will sooner or later encounter a limit that they 
cannot pass. But how can one assess the amount of well-being, comfort and luxury that a 
human being can legitimately seek? Neither in the organic make-up nor in the 
psychological make-up of the human being is there anything that marks the limit of such 
desires” (1897/2006: 270). 
 
That Durkheim distinguished between “organic” and “psychological” makeup is worth 
examining. Why did he make the distinction? As Stjepan Meštrović (1988a) has argued, 
Durkheim’s conception of desire is not the same as Freud’s. For Durkheim, desire does not 
simply emerge from a natural “drive” (id), but comes as a product of imagination. “The real 
seems worthless beside what is seen as possible by feverish imaginations, so they detach 
themselves from it, only later to detach themselves from the possible when that becomes real in 
its turn,” he writes (1897/2006: 281). He repeats this point later in the chapter: “Beyond the 
pleasures that we have experienced, we imagine and yearn for others, and if one should happen 
to have more or less exhausted the realm of the possible, one dreams of the impossible – one 
thirsts for what is not” (1897/2006: 299).  
 So it is imagination that separates us from the animals, not our social capacities, as some 
have argued (e.g., Besnard 1990). If that is the end of the discussion, we can safely conclude that 
Merton was right: Durkheim was unaware of the social etiology of desire. He saw society only as 
a constraining force, and could not have imagined—as Merton so artfully did—that culture itself 
might actually increase desire. 
 But was Durkheim really so ignorant? Hardly. The following passage from The 
Division of Labor tells a different story. Specialization not only satisfies desires, Durkheim 
argues, but produces them: 
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What confers value upon [the division of labor] is the fact that it meets certain needs. 
Later the proposition will be demonstrated that these needs are themselves consequences 
of the division of labour. It is because the division of labour is accompanied by an 
increase in fatigue that man is constrained to seek after, as a compensatory increase, 
those goods of civilization that otherwise would present no interest to him. Thus if the 
division of labour corresponds to no other needs than these, its sole function would be to 
mitigate the effects that it produces itself, one of binding up the wounds that it inflicts 
(1893/1997: 15, emphasis added). 
 
This “increase in fatigue,” it should be noted, is precisely the notion that Marx gives to the 
“production of new needs.” As Marx argues in The German Ideology (1846/1978), society grows 
ever more complex as it attempts to satisfy new needs, and the increasing difficulty of 
satisfaction produces even more needs. It is a vicious cycle, as Durkheim recognized, and one 
that can only be justified by accompanying advantages. (These include increased solidarity and 
moral direction.) The fundamental point is that being in society produces these new desires. This 
is not quite the same as Merton’s understanding—desire as culturally imposed—for here desire 
is a historical process, the result of social complexity. 
 Many have called Merton “revolutionary” for his notion that culture creates anomie (Orrù 
1990: 232, for example). But Durkheim preempted him by over forty years. A comprehensive 
analysis by Steven Lukes (1977), with citations from Suicide, Professional Ethics and Civic 
Morals, and other works, reveals: 
Anomie is the peculiar disease of modern industrial man, ‘sanctified’ both by orthodox 
economics and by extreme socialists. Industry, ‘instead of being still regarded as a means 
to an end transcending itself, has become the supreme end of individuals and societies 
alike.’ Anomie is accepted as normal, indeed ‘a mark of moral distinction,’ and ‘it is 
everlastingly repeated that it is man’s nature to be eternally dissatisfied, constantly to 
advance, without relief or rest, toward an indefinite goal.’ Religion, governmental power 
over the economy and occupational groups have lost their moral force. Thus ‘appetites 
have become freed of any limiting authority’ and ‘from top to bottom of the ladder, greed 
is aroused without knowing where to find ultimate foothold. Nothing can calm it, since its 
goal is far beyond all it can attain.’ The lives of ‘a host of individuals are passed in the 
industrial and commercial sphere,’ where ‘the greater part of their existence is passed 
divorced from any moral influence . . . the manufacturer, the merchant, the workman, the 
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employee, in carrying on his occupation, is aware of no influence set above him to check 
his egoism’ (Lukes 1977: 78). 
 
A few things to note here. Though desire may originally stem from the individual, it is 
“sanctified” by society, and encouraged as “a mark of moral distinction.” Industry has become a 
“supreme end,” not only for individuals but for societies. Greed does not just exist but is 
“aroused” by social forces. These conditions are precisely those Merton describes in his famous 
article, when he discusses the anomie of American culture.  
 If that is not enough to wrest Merton of his “revolutionary” title, consider this: Just one 
year prior to Merton’s article, “Social Structure and Anomie,” Talcott Parsons made an 
important observation. In Durkheim’s section on egoistic suicide, he notes that the Protestant 
obsession with freedom is not a break from social constraint, but a constraint in itself: “In so far 
as he is a Protestant in good standing he must assume this responsibility and exercise his 
freedom. It may be said that this exemplifies quite literally Rousseau’s famous paradox, as a 
Protestant man is, in certain respects, forced to be free” (Parsons 1937: 332, emphasis in 
original). This attitude, Parsons notes, applies not only to Protestantism but to modernity itself: 
Later in the book Durkheim generalizes this insight and puts forward the view that the 
leading common moral sentiment of our society is an ethical valuation of individual 
personality as such. This is the more general phenomenon of which the Protestant version 
of religious freedom and responsibility is a special case. . . . The fundamentals of the 
system of normative rules governing contract and exchange by virtue of which ‘organic 
solidarity’ is possible, are, in certain respects at least, an expression of the cult of 
individual personality. This is not a matter simply of freeing the individual from ethical 
restraints imposed by society, it is a matter of the imposition of a different kind of ethical 
restraint. Individuality is a product of a certain social state, of the conscience collective 
(Parsons 1937: 333–34). 
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Freedom is not merely allowed to exist: it is enforced. Here Durkheim reveals (à la Foucault) 
that power is a constitutive force, not merely a source of repression.25 It is easy to see how this 
“cult of individual personality” applies to anomie: modernity’s emphasis on the self—self-
improvement, self-advancement, self-determination—produces a whole host of desires that 
cannot be satisfied. This was certainly Merton’s point, and it was likely Durkheim’s as well. 
 In summary: I cannot agree with Merton’s accusations of biologism. It is clear that 
Durkheim was interested in psychological and social aspects of desire, not Freudian id. But nor 
can I agree with Philippe Besnard (1990), who reads in Durkheim only the social construction of 
desire. On balance, it seems that Durkheim advocated for social constraints on desire, but 
recognized that culture could also produce desires. 
 Indeed, this is probably why he distinguished between integration and regulation, a 
contrast many theorists have claimed not to understand.26 The latter refers only to social facts—
moral constraints on individual will—but not all norms and values are constraining. Some, as 
Protestantism shows us, actually demand the exercise of the will.  
 
A Sidenote on Dualism and Neuroplasticity: 
 Durkheim has sometimes been accused of dualism—not the mind/body dualism of 
Descartes, but the dual nature of man as both biological and socialized (see Pope 1976: 49). As 
Dennis Wrong and others have noted, this notion is reductionist. Biology and socialization 
interact in complex ways; indeed, it would be better to speak of “nature via nurture” (Ridley 
                                            
25 Though Durkheim and Foucault have basically opposite notions of the value of constraint, they share a nearly 
identical understanding of the nature of morality. Foucault’s use of the word “discipline,” as the internalization of a 
social fact, mirrors Durkheim completely.  
26 See Chapter 4, “Integration and Regulation: Different or Identical?” in Durkheim’s Suicide (Pope 1976).  
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2003, cited in Solomon 2012: 21). In his famous essay, The Oversocialized Conception of Man 
in Modern Sociology, Wrong writes: 
The drives or ‘instincts’ of psychoanalysis, far from being fixed dispositions to behave in 
a particular way, are utterly subject to social channeling and transformation and could not 
even reveal themselves in behavior without social molding any more than our vocal 
chords can produce articulate speech if we have not learned a language. To 
psychoanalysis man is indeed a social animal; his social nature is profoundly reflected in 
his bodily structure (Wrong 1961: 192). 
 
This complexity is, I think, reflected in Durkheim’s own writing. Although Durkheim believed in 
both social and biological causes of desire, he recognized that the former could influence the 
latter. In Durkheim’s view, desire was a vague, unchanneled force, ripe for social refashioning.27 
Indeed, Parsons writes, this is what distinguished him from the utilitarians, who conceived of 
desire as “concrete”: “It was just this tacit assumption Durkheim had to break down” (Parsons 
1973: 381n2).  
 But Durkheim’s conception of “nature via nurture” was more advanced even than 
Wrong’s. If it is not stretching things too far, we may argue that Durkheim believed in 
neuroplasticity (though of course he did not use the term). Consider his understanding of the 
human brain: In The Division of Labor, for example, Durkheim argues that women’s and men’s 
brains are continuing to grow apart to fulfill specialized functions. Why is this change occurring? 
Because of the division of labor. Durkheim cites the phrenologist Gustave Le Bon, who writes: 
“The volume of the skull of a man or woman . . . presents considerable differences in favor of the 
man, and this disparity likewise increases with the advance of civilization” (Durkheim 
1893/1997: 18, emphasis added). Here the development of the brain follows the development of 
                                            
27 This is comparable to Freud’s notion of the id, which does not attach to anything but finds itself drawn to 
everything. Again, the difference is that for Freud, desire is inherent in the human body, while for Durkheim, it 
comes from our capacity to imagine (which is why only humans experience anomie).  
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society (a Lamarckian point).28 Whether this bit of science is accurate is beside the point. It is 
merely useful in illustrating that for Durkheim, social realist above all else, even the human brain 
could be swayed by social forces. 
 This sidenote on dualism and neuroplasticity serves to bring Durkheim’s understanding 
into the twenty-first century, so that we may not consider his writing a mere historical artifact, 
but a useful, complex, scientifically viable understanding. It is not perfect, but it is much more 
sophisticated than even today’s common-sense assumptions.  
 
Merton vs. Durkheim 
 Nearly 80 years after Robert Merton’s work, “Social Structure and Anomie,” was 
released, the article remains the most popular contribution to anomie theory. Merton is credited 
not only with expanding the concept, but making it less philosophical and more empirical. The 
article connects Durkheim’s theory of unattainable desires with the American success ethic, and 
emphasizes the anomic character of the United States.  
 Although Merton claims to expand on Durkheim’s work, his article often pours scorn on 
the Durkheimian perspective. Merton begins by thoroughly ridiculing the notion that desire is 
biological. He rejects the Freudian notion of “man’s imperious biological drives,” and instead 
blames society for increasing our desire. “It no longer appears so obvious that man is set against 
society in an unceasing war between biological impulse and social restraint,” Merton writes 
(Merton 1938: 185). 
                                            
28 Alexander Riley confirms this interpretation. In an endnote to Suicide, he writes: “[Durkheim] had argued that one 
of the effects of the historically gendered division of labour was to create differences in brain size (and therefore in 
intelligence) between the sexes” (2006: 447, emphasis added). 
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 The article is, in my view, rather uncharitable. Merton continues to set up straw men—
weak arguments that vaguely resemble Durkheim’s—and then debunk them, leaving Durkheim’s 
original claims intact. Because Merton’s concept of anomie comes from Elton Mayo and not 
Durkheim, the claims Merton makes are often imprecise (Meštrović 1988a: 837).  
 Durkheim does not, for example, see man as an “untamed bundle of impulses” (Merton 
1938: 185). That view belongs to Freud.29 Rather, desire comes from the human capacity to 
imagine better circumstances. This capacity becomes more complex as the individual is 
socialized—it is aroused, expanded upon, etc. So Merton misrepresents Durkheim’s argument on 
two fronts: first, by claiming that desire is based on biological drives, and second, by asserting 
that desire has no social component.  
 Granted, Merton’s task is not simply to rehash Durkheim’s claims, but to challenge and 
refine them. Yet by failing to summarize Durkheim’s original argument, Merton’s “critiques” are 
not especially helpful: it is unclear which aspects of Durkheim’s argument he is rejecting. 
Merton seems to be quite concerned with deviance, for example; he rejects the notion that 
“conformity is the result of an [sic] utilitarian calculus or of unreasoned conditioning” (Merton 
1938: 185). “Our primary aim,” he says, “is to discover how some social structures exert a 
definite pressure upon certain persons in the society to engage in non-conforming rather than 
conforming conduct” (Merton 1938: 186, emphasis in original). But was deviance a chief 
concern of Durkheim’s? Not necessarily. Durkheim spent very little time discussing deviance—
he cared more about the anguish of anomie (i.e., its psychological effects) rather than its role in 
                                            
29 Of course, this is a simplification, and I do not intend to mock the Freudian perspective. See Civilization and Its 
Discontents for Freud’s original (and far more nuanced) argument.   
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crime.30 Yet Merton seems to accuse Durkheim of backwards Freudian thinking, embroiling both 
Durkheim and Freud in an academic tirade against biologism.  
 Nonetheless, Merton’s approach does have its merits. His use of the term “goals” (instead 
of desires or needs) is helpful, since it emphasizes the social compulsion to achieve valued 
goods. Our desires, Merton recognized, are often socially imposed—the will is transformed 
through social expectation. Merton also highlighted the goal–means discrepancy involved in 
anomie: the gap between social goals and the socially approved means of attaining them. In an 
anomic society, the goal becomes so important that individuals are quick to abandon the 
means—they become innovators, deviating from social norms so as to achieve social goods.31  
 These goods, namely wealth and prestige, are crucial indicators of success. But success is 
always vague, as both Durkheim and Merton recognized. There is no clear demarcation; as such, 
one can never be fully successful unless one is constantly advancing. This is particularly true in 
the United States, where—as Werner Sombart observed—“haste, restless striving, and ruthless 
competition” are the norm (Sombart 1906: 13). Merton writes: 
In the American Dream there is no final stopping point. The measure of ‘monetary 
success’ is conveniently indefinite and relative. At each income level, as H. F. Clark 
found, Americans want just about twenty-five percent more (but of course this ‘just a bit 
more’ continues to operate once it is obtained). In this flux of shifting standards, there is 
no stable resting point, or rather, it is the point which manages always to be ‘just ahead.’ 
(Merton 1938: 190, emphasis added) 
 
In Merton’s view, anomie is one of several forms of “malintegration.” It is characterized by “an 
exceptionally strong emphasis upon specific goals without a corresponding emphasis upon 
institutional procedures” (Merton 1938: 188). Individuals become dominated by “considerations 
                                            
30 Durkheim did devote much attention to crime—and its connection to the collective conscience—but he was not 
interested in “deviance” per se.  
31 They may also become ritualists, retreatists, or rebels—or remain conformists—according to Merton’s five modes 
of adaptation. I do not wish to explore this typology in detail; since my chief concern is how anomie works, 
individual adaptations to anomie are outside the scope of this thesis.  
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of technical expediency” (a weighing of pleasure and pain) rather than moral constraints (Merton 
1938: 189). In a rare reference to Durkheim, Merton explains:  
In this context, the sole significant question becomes: Which of the available procedures 
is most efficient in netting the culturally approved value? The technically most effective 
procedure, whether culturally legitimate or not, becomes typically preferred to 
institutionally prescribed conduct. As this process of attenuation continues, the society 
becomes unstable and there develops what Durkheim called ‘anomie’ (or normlessness) 
(Merton 1938: 189).  
 
This summary of Durkheim is largely correct, although the translation of “normlessness” may be 
misleading (as I will discuss momentarily). Yet Merton is right to describe the anomic condition as 
a painful utilitarian calculus, and he is even wiser in connecting this calculus with the American 
“cult of success” (Merton 1938: 189). And although he emphasizes the deviance rather than the 
suffering that anomie produces, he does recognize its emotional trauma: “Guilt feelings, a sense of 
sin, pangs of conscience” are each the result of moral unraveling (Merton 1938: 190n7). 
 The best aspect of Merton’s work is his description of anomic culture—the notion that 
not only goals, but goal-attainment, are socialized. “To say that the goal of monetary success is 
entrenched in American culture,” Merton writes, “is only to say that Americans are bombarded 
on every side by precepts which affirm the right or, often, the duty of retaining the goal even in 
the face of repeated frustration” (Merton 1938: 190–91). Institutions like family, school, and 
workplace—sources of latent pattern maintenance—“provide the intense disciplining required if 
an individual is to retain intact a goal that remains elusively beyond reach, if he is to be 
motivated by the promise of a gratification which is not redeemed” (Merton 1938: 191). Indeed, 
this last sentence is probably the closest Merton comes to a Durkheimian analysis—here, he is 
clearly borrowing from Durkheim’s chapter on anomic suicide, where Durkheim warns against 
walking toward a goal that “is infinitely far away” (1897/2006: 270–71).  
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 Although Merton is often blamed for misinterpreting Durkheim’s work, his contributions 
to anomie theory are not to be discounted. Above even Durkheim, Merton allows us to make the 
crucial distinction between social forces and social facts. Social forces may constrain or 
stimulate desire, confine or unshackle the will. But social facts—as Durkheim knew and Merton 
highlighted—are a particular type of force. They are the only norms that can constrain desire. 
Understanding this point is crucial to understanding Durkheim’s argument: it is not that we need 
“more norms,” but that we need more checkreins on desire.32 This is why “normlessness” is an 
inadequate translation of anomie.  
 I do not wish to spend too much time on Merton’s finer points—we will cover them in 
my chapter on anomie in the United States. Suffice it to say that Merton provides many other 
excellent examples of anomic pressures, and explores how Americans adapt to them. His 
description of anomie reflects his concern for deviance—the gap between goals and means, he 
says, produces “cultural chaos” in the form of crime—but his understanding is admittedly more 
broad than that (Merton 1938: 214). Although we will not explore deviance in this thesis33, we 
will return to Merton’s work throughout this essay.  
 
Critiques of Anomie Theory 
 I would not have written a thesis about anomie if I were not convinced of its explanatory 
power. That said, the theory is not perfect. In its 121-year history34, anomie has come under all 
kinds of attacks—some reasonable, some absurd, and many conflicting. Whenever possible, I 
will examine these critiques in light of what Durkheim actually wrote. When this is not feasible, 
                                            
32 Indeed, this may involve destroying norms like the success ethic!  
33 Except in our discussion of school shootings.  
34 Here I am referring to Durkheim’s 1893 dissertation. 
 34 
I will consider how Durkheim would have responded to these critiques. This approach, which we 
might call “imaginative reconstruction,” I carry out not because Durkheim is infallible, nor out of 
a special bias toward him, but in the spirit of charitable discourse.35 Charity demands that an 
author’s writings be respected and not simplified, and that they be treated with careful nuance; 
this is exactly what I intend to do.36  
 Yet Durkheim’s writings are diverse and at times contradictory; it is easy to misinterpret 
what he said. Moreover, Durkheim’s thoughts are elaborated across several works—his view of 
anomie in The Division of Labor is markedly different from how it appears in Suicide.37 While I 
promise to take each critique seriously, I will (gently) challenge these arguments by pointing to 
aspects of Durkheim’s work that contradict them. I will also raise critiques of my own, and 
evaluate them in the same way—examining how Durkheim might respond to them, and whether 
those responses are valid. 
 
FUNCTIONALIST? 
 First, it should be said that there is nothing inherently wrong with functionalism, just as 
there is nothing inherently wrong with conservatism or liberalism. To say that Durkheim is 
“functionalist” must not only be qualified, but problematized. Here, I will consider what seems, 
prima facie, to be a valid critique of Durkheim: that his functionalism serves to justify inequality. 
                                            
35 The philosopher Daniel Dennett writes: “As I tell my undergraduate students, whenever they encounter in their 
required reading a claim or argument that seems just plain stupid, they should probably double check to make sure 
they are not misreading the “preposterous” passage in question. It is possible that they have uncovered a howling 
error that has somehow gone unnoticed by the profession for generations, but not very likely” (Dennett 2014).  
36 In political philosophy, this is sometimes called the “Straussian” approach, after political theorist Leo Strauss. 
Strauss demanded very close readings of the text, paying special attention to authorial intent. (I am indebted to 
Harlan Wilson for this point.) 
37 It is crucial, as John Rawls notes, to consider a whole theory rather than its constituent parts. We must be “mindful 
of Rawls’ reiterated point that a theory cannot be evaluated by focusing upon a single feature or part of it; instead 
the whole theory must be assessed . . . and a perfect theory is not to be expected” (Nozick 1974: 230). Similarly, it 
would be unfair to criticize Durkheim’s theory while only reading one of his books, especially since his later works 
expand upon (and clarify!) earlier claims.  
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 One of the most common criticisms of functionalism is that it tries to explain, and thus 
explain away, the problem of hierarchy. Durkheim is certainly guilty here. In Suicide, he argues: 
“We should still need a moral discipline to make those whom nature has least favored accept the 
more lowly position that they owe to the chance of their birth” (1897/2006: 275). Durkheim’s 
view is comparable to that of Ithiel de Sola Pool, who writes: 
In the Congo, in Vietnam, in the Dominican Republic, it is clear that order depends on 
somehow compelling newly mobilized strata to return to a measure of passivity and 
defeatism from which they have recently been aroused by the process of modernization 
(cited in Wolin 1969: 1065). 
 
To be fair, Durkheim’s justification of hierarchy is linked to his understanding of well-being: 
hierarchy serves as a structural constraint on desire. Though modernization promised many 
delights—equal rights, formally free labor—the lower classes had to wait many centuries to 
receive these benefits. Like Tocqueville, Durkheim worries that the promise of equality will 
inflate expectations and produce desires that are impossible to satisfy. His concern here is not 
just social order, but human suffering (Tocqueville 1835/2003; Bendix 1996). 
 It is not unreasonable, Durkheim thinks, for individuals to try to achieve equality; the 
problem is that equality might have a “flattening out” effect that some would find unacceptable: 
Would anyone go so far as to demand that shares should be equal for all and that no 
advantage be accorded to the most useful and most deserving? In that case, we should 
need a very energetic regime to make the latter accept treatment that made them simply 
equal to the mediocre and incapable (1897/2006: 275).  
 
This passage may strike the modern reader as excessively harsh. Today, we recognize that talent 
is largely a matter of luck—a “morally arbitrary” category (Rawls 1999). And most of us agree 
that our peers deserve fair treatment no matter how “mediocre” they are. But the problem of 
getting some to settle for less is a very real one. As Robert Nozick (1974) argues in a famous 
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critique of Rawls, the notion of mutual responsibility is probably not strong enough for the 
luckier among us to give up their advantages.   
 Durkheim is not arguing here that equality is undesirable—quite the opposite! But he 
sees equality as a practical problem, since it involves tremendous constraints on desire. 
Hierarchy, he thinks, may be temporarily necessary, but the ultimate goal—his grand vision as 
established in the religion of humanity—is a just, humane society (Lukes 1977: 80). How we 
move from our current reality to Durkheim’s ideal is unclear, and again a critique of 
functionalism may be justified (since it cannot explain social change). Yet as Susan Stedman 
Jones observes, Durkheim did see room for change: “The tension between public expectations 
and reality,” Durkheim felt, “is fertile ground for changes through contrary forces” (Stedman 
Jones 2001: 104).  
 “The task of modern societies is a work of justice,” Durkheim wrote. We seek “to put 
more equity into our social relations so as to ensure the free deployment of our socially useful 
forces” (cited in Stedman Jones 2001: 105). Not only is justice useful in itself, but it poses a 
challenge to anomie. If anomie is contingent on an unjust world—tempting us with hierarchical 
advancement—equality provides the solution38. “So there is an ‘only if’ in Durkheim’s 
thinking,” Stedman Jones writes. “Only if there is a transformation towards equality and justice, 
can economic differentiation finally and fully realize solidarity” (Stedman Jones 2001: 110). And 
with solidarity comes moral restraint. 
 But restraints do not form automatically. Just as equality can lead to feelings of 
mutuality, so too can it produce status anxiety and competition (Tocqueville 1835/2003; de 
Botton 2004). Although he certainly supported equality, Durkheim knew that equality itself 
                                            
38 Or seems to. As we shall see, this is not quite the case.  
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would not end the suffering of egoism or anomie. Even if “the overriding consideration of ideal 
justice had finally been realized, that men begin their lives in a state of perfect economic equality 
. . . . the problems with which we are now grappling would not thereby have been resolved.” 
Equality does not produce constraint: society will not “become regulated as if by magic as soon 
as it becomes useful to do so” (1902/1997: lv–lvi). So although equality is an important part of 
Durkheim’s vision, it is not the most important. If we may criticize Durkheim here, it is not on 
the grounds of injustice. Rather, Durkheim may have placed too much emphasis on desire and 
not enough on fairness: perhaps he felt that anomie was more painful than inequality.  
 Either way, Durkheim’s work reveals a deep concern for individual well-being. An entire 
section of Suicide is devoted to the personal consequences of anomie: the sense of anxiety, 
weariness, disenchantment, unease, and agitation it engenders.39 His approach is psychological, 
and intentionally so: “We see no objection to sociology being described as a form of psychology, 
provided one is careful to add that social psychology has its own laws” (1897/1993: 346). 
Though anomie is ultimately a social problem40, it is not exclusively social. As Stjepan Meštrović 
writes, anomie affects us at the level of “body, mind and society” (Meštrović 1987: 568). 
 In summary: yes, Durkheim employs functionalism in his account41, as most 
sociologists continue to do today. His functionalism may lead him to justify hierarchy, but he 
never abandons the struggle for justice. Stratification is a functional requisite: since “man . . . 
is made for life in a determinate, limited environment,” hierarchy accomplishes not only social 
stability, but human flourishing.  
 
                                            
39 These are all words Durkheim used to describe anomie.  
40 I.e., it has a social cause and a social solution (Pope 1976). 
41 In fact, Durkheim essentially invented functionalism.  
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TOTALITARIAN?  
Durkheim’s chapter on anomic suicide includes this frightening passage:  
What is necessary for the social order to prevail is that the generality of men be content 
with their lot. But what is necessary for them to be content is not that they have more or 
less, but that they be convinced that they do not have the right to have more. And for this 
to be, it is absolutely necessary that there be an authority whose superiority they 
acknowledge, and which lays down the law (cited in Aron 1967: 81). 
 
Even a charitable reader of Durkheim might be understandably disturbed by this passage: it 
sounds like something out of Stalinist Russia. Durkheim’s emphasis on stability, contentment, 
and submission to authority may strike us—and not unreasonably—as a recipe for 
totalitarianism. The phrasing is unfortunate, I think, because Durkheim’s conception is quite 
humanitarian: concerned with justice and equality, as we saw above. What, then, is this nonsense 
about kowtowing to authority? 
 Durkheim’s understanding of authority is quite different from our own. It is not the 
coercive authority of a Hobbesian sovereign, but rather the moral authority of society. As 
Durkheim argues in his chapter on anomic suicide, society is the only force that can constrain 
our desires. To be sure, “it is the concept of authority rather than freedom that looms largest in 
Durkheim’s thought,” Robert Nisbet writes, 
but it is for him the authority alone of the kind of conscience, or consensus, that is 
produced within the social group, the association, or community that is required. It is 
emphatically not the kind of authority that goes with the coercive machinery of the large 
scale association, whether economic or political. Authority for Durkheim is something 
inseparable from family, local community, school, occupation, and other of the 
associations within which man normally lives. It is the breakdown of authority in these 
areas that results in, not only estrangement and isolation of individuals but the 
intensification of coercion and power (Nisbet 1974: 274, emphasis added). 
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Moral authority, as Nisbet hints, is not only uncoercive, but provides a buffer between the 
individual and the coercion of the state42. The weaker the moral authority of a society, the easier 
state coercion becomes. This was, in fact, the core of Erich Fromm’s argument in Escape from 
Freedom. Fromm worried that the loss of communal ties in the modern age would result in a 
kind of “moral aloneness” (1941/1966: 34). The individual would do anything to cure his 
isolation—he would choose to “escape from freedom” and toward “any custom and any belief 
however absurd and degrading” (1941/1966: 34–35). Totalitarianism, then, was not the coercion 
of moral authority, but its very absence!  
 That is all well and good, our critics might say, but it does not free Durkheim from 
blame. Insofar as he encourages us to be “content with [our] lot,” Durkheim hints at a kind of 
Marxian ideology—seeking to justify or mask inequality. Indeed, the whole notion of anomie 
may be said to encourage submission: just accept what you’ve been given and don’t 
complain, or else you’ll suffer from your own desire! As Raymond Aron (1967) and others 
have pointed out, improving one’s condition requires us to strive for more than we have, 
even if that means temporary discomfort. In fact, that discomfort could be a sign that 
circumstances need to change!   
 Durkheim by no means denied this claim. As Stjepan Meštrović notes, “the ‘will to life’ 
is beneficial when restrained but destructive when unrestrained. Thus, Durkheim argued in 
Suicide that a little anomie, like a little poison, was good for society. Moderate amounts of 
anomie are the source of society’s ‘spirit of progress,’ creativity, and innovation” (Meštrović 
                                            
42 This argument can be found in Durkheim’s Second Preface to The Division of Labor. Consider this summary from 
Nisbet: “Durkheim was also aware of the dangers which lay in any nationalism that could expand in the allegiances 
of its citizens unchecked by the existence of other, social, economic, and cultural associations lying intermediate to 
man and the nation” (Nisbet 1974: 274).  
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1988b: 543). Granted, the implications of this point are never made clear—Durkheim never 
tells us at what point our desires become unreasonable; the boundaries are nebulous and  
self-determined.43  
 There are some who will still be unsatisfied with this explanation. Why limit desires at 
all? If it is our ambition to aim high, who is to stop us? “To limit man, to place obstacles in the 
path of his free development, is this not to prevent him from fulfilling himself?” Durkheim asks. 
“But . . . this limitation is a condition of our happiness and moral health. Man, in fact, is made 
for life in a determinate, limited environment” (cited in Lukes 1977: 83). I can already hear the 
screams of protest from my libertarian readers: made for a determinate life? Made to be limited? 
What nonsense! What an utter castration of human freedom! But the research bears him out: the 
more freedom we have, the more overwhelmed and less happy we tend to be (see, e.g., Schwartz 
2005). Durkheim is not merely spouting off conservative propaganda: his work on anomie is a 
“far-reaching empirical observation that since individual wants are in principle unlimited, it is an 
essential condition of both social stability and individual happiness that they should be regulated 
in terms of norms” (Parsons 1937: 382).  
 But even when confronted with the research, some will have a hard time accepting 
Durkheim’s argument. The notion that constraint is desirable is so anathema to American culture 
that it is literally incomprehensible to some minds. Many Americans would rather give up their 
mental health than their freedom—in fact, they make this choice every day. But constraint does 
not (really) deprive us of freedom: it is a constitutive rather than coercive force. Social facts do 
not hold us at gunpoint: in the end, we choose to adhere to them. As Talcott Parsons writes in a 
brilliant passage: 
                                            
43 Yet what could he possibly say? It seems to me that this is always an individual decision: balancing potential 
gains, current limitations, and the painful gap between the two.  
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Individualistic modes of thinking are so deeply imbedded in our culture that such 
confusion is very difficult to avoid. For the usual distinction between voluntary 
adherence and constraint carries the connotation of the utilitarian dilemma. Yet this is just 
what Durkheim has transcended. He has precisely distinguished, as the utilitarians did 
not, between voluntariness and arbitrariness. While, on the one hand, adherence is 
voluntary, on the other hand, that adherence is binding on the individual. But it is binding 
not from physical necessity but from moral obligation (Parsons 1937: 384).  
 
Constraint is a choice, but it is not our choice: it is the collective decision of society. And the 
purpose of constraint is not domination, but human flourishing. Only “vulgar Durkheimianism 
sees duty as submission to order in terms of stability of the whole,” Susan Stedman Jones writes: 
Against such readings we must understand Durkheim’s conception of duty as central to 
practical reason. We must locate its dynamics within the logic of representation and 
practical force. As fundamental to the action which constitutes social worlds and to a 
morality of co-operation (Joas 1993), it is central to his interest in coherent, effective 
action within the limitations of the milieu and to his interest in the viability of significant 
human life within society (Stedman Jones 2001: 191).  
 
But the issue is not quite resolved. We must now ask the Foucauldian question: to whose 
constraints are we really adhering? Whose version of “society” triumphs in public discourse, 
and whose is marginalized? For though society is a collective process, it is not true that each 
of our voices are equally represented.44 Durkheim seems to ignore the potentially corruptive 
force of power here; in privileging the social over the individual, he forgets that society is a 
constellation of individual forces. Indeed, his writings would have us believe that social facts 
blossom out of thin air.  
 “Moral or legal rules essentially express social needs which society alone can identify,” 
Durkheim writes. But how exactly are these rules formed? 
They rest upon a climate of opinion, and all opinion is a collective matter, the result of 
being worked out collectively (1902/1997: xxxv).  
 
                                            
44 For an extended discussion of this problem, see Iris Young (2000), Inclusion and Democracy. 
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Is opinion really a collective matter? Certainly, we can each attempt to shape public opinion, but 
we delude ourselves if we think we will be equally successful. A whole host of factors—
including class, gender, and occupation—may limit our influence (cf. Young 1990/2011; Young 
2000). Since these forms of stratification appear in Durkheim’s own work, we cannot say that he 
was unaware of them. But he may not have seen them as problematic. As Michael Walzer, a 
Durkheimian social scientist, explains: 
Aren’t social meanings . . . nothing other than ‘the ideas of the ruling class,’ ‘the 
dominant material relationships grasped as ideas’? I don’t think that they are ever only 
that or simply that, though the members of the ruling class and the intellectuals they 
patronize may well be in a position to exploit and distort social meanings in their own 
interests. . . . A people’s culture is always a joint, even if it isn’t an entirely cooperative, 
production; and it is always a complex production (Walzer 1983: 9n). 
 
This quote—an excellent summary of Durkheim’s position—does little to quell our anxiety. No 
one, not even Marx, claims the collective conscience is only the product of dominant forces. To 
try to dispel that myth (which, again, no one believes) is to set up a straw man and knock him 
down. Sure, culture is joint and society is complex, but that does not solve the question of power.  
For our concern is not that the powerful have complete control, but that their control is 
disproportionate and monopolizing. 
 Durkheim attempts to solve this problem by appealing to socialist self-governance. “The 
republican aim of replacing duty to Church, monarchy and established hierarchy emerges in 
Durkheim’s thought as duty to society,” Stedman Jones writes. “If society can be self-governing, 
it will prescribe rules to itself and be stable in its moral relations” (Stedman Jones 2001: 192). 
But even if hierarchy were destroyed and power were distributed fairly, would we really be out 
of the woods? Equality can promise a great many things, but not homogeneity of thought. If 
collective opinion is a battle for recognition, what happens to the losers? We are all victims of 
the social fact, bowing beneath the yoke of society (Durkheim 1897/2006: 276). But submitting 
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to norms one did not create seems profoundly unjust. We may escape the rule of the despots, but 
if Durkheim has his way, we may find ourselves facing the tyranny of the majority.  
 For Durkheim, society always holds the best values for individuals (Nisbet 1965). If 
society is the sacred expression of shared understandings, how could it err? As Parsons writes: 
“A moral rule . . . is not truly moral unless obedience to it is held to be desirable, unless the 
individual’s happiness and self-fulfillment are bound up with it” (Parsons 1937: 387). I am not 
convinced by this argument: there are many reasons to adhere to social norms, and desirability is 
only one of them. Durkheim rightly refers to social facts as choses [things]: constraints act upon 
us and we can feel their influence. When we cede to them, it is not usually because they improve 
our well-being, but because we feel the weight of duty upon us. Whether that duty really benefits 
us is another question entirely. 
 Stedman Jones attempts to explain, or rather explain away, this problem: “For 
Durkheim,” she says, “not all constraint is ‘normal’ – that which is founded on wealth or power 
is not normal, and ‘can be maintained only be violence’” (Stedman Jones 2001: 140, citing 
Durkheim). I believe Stedman Jones and Durkheim are both wrong on this front. As Foucault 
argues in Discipline and Punish, modern society forces us to internalize the demands of power, 
so that violence is no longer necessary. That discipline has largely replaced punishment is the 
triumph of the modern age. But this triumph is insidious, and not at all tied to the well-being of 
individuals. It is tied, instead, to the power exercised by dominant forces.  
 Though Durkheim addresses this problem, his answer is wholly unsatisfying. To be sure, 
he writes, excessive regulation might produce “physical or moral despotism.” But this situation  
“affects so few people today and . . . it is so hard to find examples of it, that it seems unnecessary 
for it to detain us any further” (1897/2006: 305n). The era of “oppressive discipline,” Durkheim 
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seems to think, has passed—it is now merely a question of “historical interest.” This passage is 
startling in its optimism, and I cannot defend it here.45 
 With its praise of a “society” that always holds the individual’s best interests at heart, 
Durkheim is giving tacit consent to powerful entities. The potential for totalitarianism in 
Durkheimian thought must be further explored. 
 
SUBJECTIVE? 
 The notion of the “neutral” social scientist is a modern phenomenon. For much of 
European history, most theorists were simply educated citizens who cared greatly about the 
direction their society was headed. Deeply situated in the communities they described, these 
citizens carried no pretense of neutrality; the demand that they be “objective” would be nonsensical 
to them (cf. Strauss 1959). Yet in the past few centuries, the “public intellectual” has largely 
disappeared, replaced by the accredited professor. Émile Durkheim, poised at the fulcrum of this 
social shift, belonged to both groups. Though he strove for empirical rigor in his work, he never 
abandoned his moral beliefs, and his perspective is (unabashedly) colored by his own values.   
 Nevertheless, academia has grown more and more hostile to Durkheim’s approach. While 
I do not disagree that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence46, the trend toward 
empirical “objectivity” (whatever that might mean) is disturbing. Weber’s famous dictum that 
science be “value-free” has been utterly contorted by modern sociologists (Dahrendorf 1968). 
Before we begin dissecting Durkheim’s own work, I would remind the reader of Dante’s 
                                            
45 Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to point out that this passage describes fatalistic suicide, not fatalism itself. Perhaps 
Durkheim recognized the danger of fatalism, but felt that fatalistic suicide was uncommon. Yet he provides very 
little support for this claim.  
46 This popular phrase is attributed to Carl Sagan, though I discovered it in the work of philosopher Sam Harris.  
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warning: “The hottest places in hell are reserved for those who, in times of great moral crisis, 
maintain their neutrality.”  
 Anomie has sometimes been called an “ideological” concept: rather than describing a real 
social problem, it simply illuminates Durkheim’s obsession with order and stability. As Boudon 
and Bourricaud write in the Critical Dictionary of Sociology: 
Durkheim wanted to see . . . a society in which individuals would be guided by a system 
of values and norms – in other words a morality – which would encourage and invite 
them to be satisfied with their position in the system of the division of labour: the idea of 
anomie evokes, at its base, Durkheim’s attachment to the arguable and simplistic model 
which assimilates society with organization, and even society with organism” (Boudon & 
Bourricaud 1989: 35–36) 
 
Durkheim’s vision, the authors worry, implies that society possesses “some supposed ends” that 
we know in advance (Boudon & Bourricaud 1989: 37). These ends include—according to 
Durkheim’s critics—social stability, hierarchy, complacency, and submission. Even stability, 
which seems the least objectionable, may be harmful at second glance. Why place such a 
premium on order? Why must we be perennially quelled and satisfied, like infants? As Raymond 
Aron puts it: “Is not frustration part, not only of the human condition, but also specifically of the 
condition proper to the society in which we live?” He goes on: 
Perhaps, as social reforms increase, men do remain just as unsatisfied as they were 
before; but perhaps they do not. Even if they do, it is conceivable that frustrations or 
demands are the mechanism of historical movement. One need not be a Hegelian to 
believe that human societies are transformed through men’s refusal to accept their 
situation, whatever it may be. In this sense, frustration is not necessarily pathological; it 
certainly is not in societies like ours, where the authority of tradition is growing weaker 
and the accustomed mode of life no longer seems to impose itself upon men as a norm or 
an ideal. If each generation aspires to live better than the preceding one, the permanent 
frustration described by Durkheim will be inevitable, the sieves of the Danaïdes or the 
labors of Sisyphus; these myths are representations of modern society (Aron 1967: 78, 
emphasis added). 
 
This perspective, which draws from conflict theory, is absolutely crucial to a critique of 
Durkheim. Yet it is also rather hard to address. For what Aron is asking here gets down to some 
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of the most basic questions of the human condition: Why should we ever settle? Why not seek 
out the greatest possible happiness for ourselves and others? In the final calculus, this passage 
implies, the gains of self-advancement may outweigh the pain of anomie.  
 Regardless of where we stand on the utilitarian debate (Durkheim himself was anti-
utilitarian)47, Aron makes an important point: the discomfort of anomie could be a sign that our 
situation needs to change. Sometimes, one shouldn’t be satisfied with one’s circumstances, and 
to assume otherwise is to give up on the possibility of a better life. As we mentioned earlier, 
Durkheim recognized this “spirit of progress,” and found it justified within limits (Meštrović 
1988b: 543). Yet his acknowledgement was perhaps too lukewarm. As Aron notes, Durkheim’s 
depiction of anomie as “pathological” has a judgmental tone: is it so wrong that we should strive 
for more? Rather than a sickness, anomie might better be described as a natural human tendency 
(cf. Merton 1938; Orrù 1990).  
 But this is, I think, a misreading on Aron’s part. While he is certainly right that anomie 
could be a motivating force (a fact Durkheim downplays), his view of the “pathology” of anomie 
is imprecise. It is not that the individual experiencing anomie suffers pathologically, but rather 
that society does. Pathology does not lie in the individual’s unreasonable desires, for these are an 
inevitable aspect of human imagination (1897/2006: 299). Rather, society is ill in that it cannot 
provide sufficient moral regulation.  
 When Aron says that “frustration is not necessarily pathological,” he is missing the point. 
Of course frustration is not pathological; it is a product of human intellect. What is pathological 
is society’s failure to address this frustration and fulfill one of its chief functions: regulation. 
While both theorists agree that frustration of desire is “natural,” Aron commits the is/ought 
                                            
47 “Social science must resolutely renounce the utilitarian comparisons to which it has too often assented” 
(Durkheim 1893/1997: 194). 
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fallacy by extending “natural” to “desirable.” If humans inevitably seek advancement, he says, 
that is well and good, and we should not try to change it.48 But Durkheim argues that anomie is 
deeply harmful, and society must soothe this unfortunate aspect of the human condition. It is 
society’s job to impose itself on human biology, for only social facts can quell our anomic 
frustrations (Stedman Jones 2001: 49).  
 But the notion of pathology is still troubling, for it implies a kind of “normal” state of 
being, and how are we to know what that is? If anomie is a sign of social illness, who is to 
provide the definition of health? As Steven Lukes warns, concepts like anomie and alienation are 
more normative than analytical. They are “only identifiable if one knows what it would be not to 
be alienated or anomic,” in other words, 
if one applies a standard specifying ‘natural’ states of institutions, rules and norms and 
individual mental states. Moreover, this standard must be external. That is, neither the 
individual mental states nor the social conditions studied can provide the standard, for 
they themselves are to be evaluated for their degree of alienation and anomie. Thus, 
despite recent attempts to divest these concepts of their non-empirical presuppositions, 
they are in their original form an inextricable fusion of fact and value, so that one cannot 
eliminate the latter while remaining faithful to the original concepts. The standard 
specifying the ‘natural’ condition of the individual in society involves, in each case, a 
theory of human nature (Lukes 1977: 82, emphasis added) 
 
So much for value neutrality! But again, Durkheim’s project never intended to be devoid of 
value. (Nor did Marx call alienation an “objective” concept.) Social theory is always tied to 
notions of the good, and to ask that the two be separated is nonsensical. As the Frankfurt 
School rightly asked, what is the purpose of all our theorizing if it does not bring us toward a 
better society?  
                                            
48 On a related note, William Connolly argues that terms like anomie and alienation seek to blame society for the 
pain of human existence. Citing Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment, Connolly writes: “Sociocritique tends to 
conceal the strain of resentment against the human condition” (Connolly 2002: 191). Rather than challenge anomie, 
Connolly argues, we must learn to accept it as an inevitable aspect of human life; only then will our suffering 
become tolerable.   
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 That Durkheim relied on his own theory of human nature is no strike against him; indeed, 
Durkheim did better than Marx in providing a great deal of data for his claims. So while 
Durkheim’s vision draws on his own beliefs, it is not lacking in empiricism. In fact, the notion that 
constraint is necessary and desirable is an empirical observation, and has been proven again and 
again to be true (Parsons 1937: 382; Schwartz 2005). Lukes is not wrong to ask, “How plausible is 
the theory of human nature which each [theorist] presupposes? What does the evidence from past 
and present societies . . . . predict and advocate?” (Lukes 1977: 85). For as we shall see in a later 
section, contemporary research provides great support for Durkheim’s theory. 
 But his approach is value-laden, and I worry that he takes his position too far. As Talcott 
Parsons notes, we may grant “the correctness of his general analysis of the role of moral 
obligation in action” and still remain skeptical. Further questions trouble our conscience: 
Does it follow that the norms to which persons either in fact do subscribe from 
disinterested moral motives (or with ethical legitimacy may) must be social norms, must 
be those shared with even the majority of the other members of the community? After all, 
the leading modes of moral action admired by philosophers are often those involving 
defiance of the general code of the community. The identification of the moral and the 
social seems in danger of elevating social conformity into a supreme moral virtue. . . . 
Above all to deny the possibility, importance or even desirability of resistance to social 
pressure on moral grounds is surely dangerous (Parsons 1937: 390). 
 
 In assuming that all of society shares his values, Durkheim is perhaps too confident in his 
vision of political community. His approach takes us to a “mythic promised land” in which the 
collective conscience is entirely uniform and competition has ceased to exist (Orrù 1990: 240). 
In an impressive summary of Durkheim’s work, Lukes writes: 
Durkheim’s picture of a healthy society in modern Europe is of a society that is organized 
and meritocratic, with equality of opportunity and personal liberty, where people are 
attached to intermediary groups by stable loyalties rather than being atomized units 
caught in an endemic conflict, and where they fulfill determinate functions in an 
organized system of work, where they conform in their mental horizons, their desires and 
ambitions to what their role in society demands and where there are clear-cut rules 
defining limits to desire and ambition in all spheres of life. There should be “rules telling 
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each of the workers his rights and duties, not vaguely in general terms but in precise 
detail [and] each in his sphere vaguely realizes the extreme limit set to his ambitions and 
aspires to nothing beyond . . . he respects regulations and is docile to collective authority, 
that is, has a wholesome moral constitution” (Lukes 1977: 83). 
 
While there is nothing wrong with having a clear vision of the good society (most theorists do), 
Durkheim hides behind a veil of objectivity. “It was Durkheim’s feat,” writes Robert Nisbet, “to 
translate into the hard methodology of science ideas and values that had made their first 
appearance in the polemics of [those] opposed to reason and rationalism, as well as to revolution 
and reform” (Nisbet 1965: 25). In a brilliant move, Durkheim combines positivism and 
conservatism, turning traditional values into a “science” by arguing for their necessity.  
 Some have gone so far as to argue that the entire theory of anomie is an attempt to 
legitimize traditional authority and glorify the premodern era. In an illustrative passage, Paul 
Willemen writes, “The often heard jeremiads about the ravages of alienation or anomie merely 
signal regret at the passing of the pre-modern and actively seek to discredit the advance of an 
individuated subjectivity” (Willemen 2007: 496). In such a view, the “atomization” of society is 
merely Durkheim’s critique of individuation, his fear that marginalized people are finally 
speaking for themselves. At the risk of boring the reader, I will repeat that Durkheim prized 
individualism: his “religion of humanity” is a highly individuated society that rejects the 
“conformism of former times” (1897/1973: 52).  
 Nonetheless, Parsons is right that Durkheim may have placed undue emphasis on 
conformity. Susan Stedman Jones’ claim that “anomie is a critical concept,” not a “conservative 
one indicating failure of adaptation to the social order,” is not fully convincing (Stedman Jones 
2001: 102). For Durkheim warns that a “healthy moral constitution” requires that the individual 
“respects the rules and submits to the collective authority” (1897/2006: 273). Personal agency in 
this framework is sorely lacking.  
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 I do not believe, as Paul Willemen and others do, that anomie is an ideological notion. 
Anomie theory rests on two claims: (1) that frustrations of desire exist and are painful, and (2) 
that society can curb these frustrations through moral constraint. Both are empirical claims, and 
both (I will argue) have been confirmed through research. Yet the implications of anomie theory, 
and Durkheim’s proposed solution, do present some concerns: Is it ever acceptable to challenge 
social norms, especially if one has compelling moral reasons to do so? Can social constraint exist 
in a pluralistic, complex society like our own? Do social facts demand too much conformity from 
us? Does the motivating force of anomie outweigh its pain? These are difficult questions, and to 
answer them would require a rigorous moral analysis that is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
TELEOLOGICAL? 
 We saw in the previous section that Durkheim’s concept of anomie presupposes a certain 
vision of society: well-integrated, sufficiently regulated, and stable. But Durkheim’s theory is not 
merely a snapshot analysis of a given society: it assumes a historical trajectory, from the 
“healthy” premodern community to a “pathological” modern society, and again to an ordered 
future. “Even in its most analytic versions,” Boudon and Bourricaud worry, “the notion of 
anomie may still retain some traces of teleology” (1989: 37). 
 Given how vehemently Durkheim opposed the progress narrative of the Enlightenment, 
the charge of teleology—a forward march toward predetermined values—is rather ironic 
(Meštrović 1988a: 838). Durkheim devotes an entire section of The Division of Labor to a 
critique of progress. “Is it true,” he asks, “that the happiness of men increases in proportion as 
men progress? Nothing is more doubtful” (Durkheim 1893/1997: 186). Later in the chapter, he 
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goes further: compared to the savage, “we are prone to much suffering that is spared them, and it 
is by no means sure that the balance is in our favor” (1893/1997: 186–87).  
 Indeed, as Robert Nisbet (1965) notes, Durkheim’s work constituted a unique turn against 
the Enlightenment thinking of his day. While many theorists were delighted at the direction 
society was taking, Durkheim (along with a few contemporaries) was startled and disturbed by 
what he saw. His project was largely—though never exclusively—a return to sacred tradition, 
couched in the objectivity of science.  
 But even his rejection of the Enlightenment49 has a teleological element. If Nisbet is 
correct, Durkheim’s work demonstrates a “burning sense of society’s sudden, convulsive turn 
from a path it had followed for millennia” (Nisbet 1965: 20). The notion of an interrupted path, 
of course, implies that society had once been moving in an “appropriate” direction before it was 
diverted. So even in his critique of progress, Durkheim cannot escape accusations of teleology. 
Either there is a path and we are dutifully following it, or else we are blundering in the dark, 
trying to retrace our footsteps.  
 Both claims appear in Durkheim’s work. The notion that we are dutifully following a 
path is evident in Durkheim’s praise of specialization: We must not, he writes, interrupt the 
“unceasing progress of the division of labor,” or the “tendency for societies to become always 
more extended and more centralized” (1898/1973: 52). For when social functions “are 
sufficiently linked together they tend of their own accord to achieve an equilibrium, becoming 
self-regulatory” (1902/1997: xxxiv).  
 The connection to functionalism is obvious: if society “naturally” tends toward certain 
ends, it is because those ends are functional requisites, providing stability and coherence. But if 
                                            
49 Which, we should point out, was never quite complete: if “positivism in the lineal descendant of the 
Enlightenment” (Nisbet 1965: 23), Durkheim was certainly influenced by Enlightenment thinking. Particularly, he 
praised the Enlightenment emphasis on rationality and scientific rigor.  
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modernization were entirely benign, the theory of anomie could not exist. Anomie is, above all, a 
modern dilemma, resulting from the atomization of society into poorly integrated (and thus 
poorly regulated) parts. Durkheim’s attitude toward specialization, then, is actually somewhat 
lukewarm: although the division of labor is necessary, it has a “dissolving influence” (Durkheim 
1893/1997: 295). 
 So we are both straying from the path (abandoning old institutions, communal structures, 
etc.) and following it (becoming more individuated, moving towards justice and away from state 
coercion). This complex attitude toward modernization parallels Marx’s concept of the dialectic: 
the very factors that cause suffering also set the stage for liberation. And indeed, the teleology of 
Marx’s approach is also present in Durkheim. As Nicholas Timasheff notes, “Durkheim’s work 
from the vantage point of today was marred by his acceptance of certain evolutionary doctrines. 
Evolutionism appears, for example, 
in his theory of growth from mechanical to organic solidarity, in the assumption of 
necessary stages in social organization, in the view that contemporary primitive societies 
represent earlier periods in evolutionary development (Timasheff 1961: 117). 
 
Precisely the same critiques have been made of Marx. Yet as Marxian scholar Robert Tucker 
points out, the notion that societies move along a similar path—from traditional to transitional to 
modern—has yet to be disproven (Tucker 1969: 92–94). Indeed, most sociologists still “attempt 
to conceptualize all societies in developmental terms” (Tucker 1969: 92). While this approach 
can surely be totalizing, it is not inherently so.  
 Durkheim and Marx, we must remember, were writing at a time when Charles Darwin’s 
work was explosively popular. It is no surprise that they were greatly influenced by his 
evolutionary approach. In fact, if we are to criticize Durkheim and Marx for their teleology, we 
must also criticize Darwin, and I suspect that most academics would be loathe to do so. For what 
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all three intellectuals have in common is simply an understanding of what organisms (whether 
singular or social organisms) tend to do over time. Neither Darwin nor Durkheim would have 
said that every society moves in the same direction, always, in every circumstance. 
 In fact, Durkheim’s description of anomie as “pathological” reveals his 
acknowledgement that not all societies develop in the same way. Some produce conditions of 
tremendous happiness, and others produce tremendous suffering. To be sure, the dichotomy 
between “healthy” and “unhealthy” societies implies that some ways of being are better than 
others. But how could this not be the case?50 Far from a normative claim about the “good 
society,” Durkheim’s point here is simply that anomic nations are miserable ones: “If anomie is 
an evil it is above all because society suffers through it” (1902/1997: xxxv). This is an empirical 
rather than ideological assertion.51 
 Is Durkheim’s analysis “marred” by evolutionary thinking? Perhaps, but “it must be 
stressed . . . that evolutionism did not dominate or obscure Durkheim’s thought. Had Durkheim 
removed the evolutionary scaffold, the structure of his theory would have remained” (Timasheff 
1961: 117). Granted, Durkheim’s theory of development may have extrapolated more than his 
evidence provides.52 But given the Enlightenment fervor that dominated his era, his attitude 




                                            
50 This is not a rhetorical question. I cannot think of any reason to assume that all societies provide equal paths to 
well-being (cf. Harris 2010b). 
51 I will provide evidence for this claim when I discuss anomie in the United States. 
52 Though we should point out that, writing in the late 1800s, Durkheim had far fewer resources at his disposal than 




 Although Durkheim rejected the optimism of the Enlightenment, he was deeply 
influenced by its positivist emphasis. Durkheim spent much of his life working to legitimize 
sociology, and this could only be done, he felt, by converting it into a positive social science. His 
effort to apply biological principles to the social realm appears throughout his work, particularly 
in his Rules of the Sociological Method (1895).  
 Positivism of the Comtian variety treats society as an organism that is just as predictable, 
just as measurable, as a single cell. Since each part of the social body is seen to perform a special 
purpose, positivism is tightly linked to functionalism. Just as the Golgi apparatus transmits 
proteins in a cell, the family transmits values throughout the social organism (cf. Parsons 1937).  
 The following passage, from the Second Preface to The Division of Labor, illustrates the 
positivist conception of anomie: 
We therefore lack a whole system of organs necessary to the normal functioning of social 
life. Such a structural defect is plainly not some local affliction limited to one segment of 
society: it is a sickness totius substantiae, one that affects the entire organism. 
Consequently any venture whose purpose is to effect a cure cannot fail to have the most 
far-reaching consequences. The general health of the body social is at stake (Durkheim 
1902/1997: lv).  
 
If the notion of social health strikes us as strange, that is because we are not thinking 
sociologically. “Individualistic modes of thinking” have so dominated intellectual discourse that 
it is difficult to think in functional terms (Parsons 1937: 384). But are we not sociologists? Is not 
the purpose of sociology to think outside of the individual? Sociology, Durkheim writes, 
implies that collective tendencies like collective thoughts are different from individual 
tendencies and thoughts, with characteristics not to be found in the latter. So, you may 
ask, how is this possible since there are only individuals in society? But in that case, we 
should have to say that there is nothing more in living nature than in inanimate matter, 
since the cell is made up exclusively of atoms that are not alive (1897/2006: 344). 
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Association, Durkheim continues, “produces special effects: it is in itself something new” 
(1897/2006: 344). I do not know of any sociologist who would deny this fact, and yet it is 
unequivocally a positivist claim. It assumes that society is a unit in itself—a “psychic being of a 
new kind”—with its own investigable properties (1897/2006: 344).  
 In Durkheim’s view, “‘health’ for man in society is a state where ‘a regulative force’ 
plays ‘the same role for moral needs which the organism plays for physical needs’” (Lukes 1977: 
83). I fail to see why this perspective is troubling. Certainly, it implies that our well-being is 
contingent on moral authority, which some liberals will find repugnant. That does not make it 
false. As the psychologist Norman Doidge observes, “The brain . . . is fundamentally an organ of 
socialization, and so there must be a mechanism that, from time to time, undoes our tendency to 
become overly individualized, overly self-involved, and too self-centered” (Doidge 2007: 121). 
Moral understanding allows us—in the words of neuroscientist Walter Freeman—to “surmount 
the solipsistic gulf” and build trust (cited in Doidge 2007: 121). If society did not constrain our 
individualism, we not could cooperate, and our species would perish. So it is empirically true 
that social constraint saves us from extinction. The “general health of the body social,” as 
Durkheim says, really is at stake.  
 Still, we may wonder whether Durkheim could have framed things better. His description 
of social facts as things [choses]—suggesting that constraint is a tangible force—“has led to 
accusations not only of Durkheim’s fallacious objectivism and mechanism, 
but also of his positivism and materialism; that he overlooked the difference between 
natural and social phenomena (Parsons 1937: 399); and the continuing and widespread 
claims that he founded his science on a science of nature. It has inspired the view that his 
account of reality makes conscience a dull reflection of things, rather than the constitutive 
force it is. It has been taken as evidence of a positivist attempt to reduce the human to the 
non-human (Walsh 1972: 37) (Stedman Jones 2001: 141).  
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This last point is rather perplexing. Though Durkheim does not explain in detail the origins of 
social constraint, he does not assume they simply fall upon us like manna from heaven. “Of 
course,” he writes in Suicide, “the germs of the elementary properties from which the social fact 
derives are contained in individual minds.” But constraints themselves can only be formed 
through interaction: “When consciousness, instead of remaining isolated from other 
consciousnesses, combines with them in a group, something in the world has changed” 
(1897/2006: 344). Though social facts cannot be explained by individuals, they are absolutely 
human in character. Walsh’s claim that Durkheim “reduce[d] the human to the non-human” is 
nonsensical. Is religion non-human? Is language non-human? Certainly not. 
 At best, Walsh’s statement reveals his fear at the loss of individual agency to collective 
forces.  At worst, it is a kind of dogmatic insistence that humans really are “unencumbered 
selves” (to borrow Michael Sandel’s phrase53), constrained only by obligations of our choosing. 
Critiques of Durkheim parallel those made of contemporary neuroscientists, who argue that our 
“free” will is the product of brain states beyond our control. In each case, the attack is made on 
ideological rather than empirical grounds.  
 Robert Nozick, for example, argues that the Durkheimian argument54 “can succeed in 
blocking the introduction of a person’s autonomous choices and actions (and their results) only 
by attributing everything noteworthy about the person completely to certain sorts of ‘external’ 
factors” (Nozick 1974: 214). A lack of free will, he says, presents an “unexalted” view of 
humanity that “denigrates a person’s autonomy” (Nozick 1974: 214).  
                                            
53 Democracy’s Discontent (1996).  
54 Let me be clear: Nozick does not mention Durkheim in his work, but he critiques those philosophers—particularly 
John Rawls—who try to deny human agency.  
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 Nozick’s view is all too common, and I do not wish to belittle it here. To discover that we 
are not the free, autonomous selves we imagined—that we are shaped by social forces—can be a 
terrifying thought. Am I just a puppet of society? Do I have any say over who I am? These are 
urgent, disturbing questions. But to allay these fears by claiming they are “unexalted” is false 
comfort. There are many aspects of our experience that are unpleasant and even undignified, but 
that does not make them untrue.  
 What Nozick and others hope to deny is precisely what positivism seeks to emphasize: 
the separation between “society” and the individuals within it. Durkheim spent his life trying to 
prove this separation existed: he hoped to show that society was not merely the product of 
voluntary contracts, but a force that stood against individuals as from above. Marx, who agreed 
with Durkheim’s analysis but feared its consequences, put the problem clearly: 
How does it come about that personal interests continually grow, despite the person . . . 
into common interests which win an independent existence over against the individual 
persons, in this independence take on the shape of general interests, enter as such into 
opposition with the real individuals, and in this opposition, according to which they are 
defined as general interests, can be conceived by the consciousness as ideal, even as 
religious, sacred interests?” (cited in Lipset 1963/1981: 6).  
 
For Marx, “social constraints did not fulfill socially necessary functions but rather supported 
class rule” (Lipset 1963/1981: 6.). Nonetheless, he shared Durkheim’s view that society is a form 
somewhat separate from the individual. To borrow a Marxist phrase, we might say that society 
has “relative autonomy” from individuals: it is always the product of individual forces, but 
cannot be explained by any of them alone. “Social life,” Durkheim writes, “having as it were 
crystallized itself . . . and fixed itself on material props, is by that very fact exteriorized and acts 
upon us from outside” (1897/2006: 348). 
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 Social realism lies at the core of sociology. We may reject Durkheim’s claim that 
sociology is the study of social facts (moral constraints on individual will), but one cannot deny 
that society is a reality external to individuals.55 Even Erving Goffman, whose work is 
considered a respite from functionalist thinking, wrote of the “little worlds sustained in face-to-
face encounters” (Goffman 1957: 49). 
 The point is that sociology constantly relies on positivist assumptions, while 
simultaneously denying its positivist influences. Today, we speak of “interpretive social 
science,” which is supposedly more sophisticated than positivism, but it is just a different kind of 
positivism (it takes more variables into account).56 Positivism need not be reductionist; in its 
ideal form, it is anything but. Indeed, in his Moral Education, Durkheim wrote that sociology 
students should be trained in biology, so as to understand the complexity (not the simplicity!) of 
social life (Durkheim 1925).57 Given that sociologists employ positivist thinking every day, their 
critiques are not only hypocritical: they are self-defeating.58 
 
                                            
55 By this statement, I mean only that constraints act upon as forces. Society is not merely a collection of voluntary 
contracts, but a moral force that exerts pressure upon us. Given the extensive research by social psychologists in the 
past century—the Asch conformity experiments, the Milgram experiment, etc.—it is no longer (empirically) feasible 
to deny this claim.  
 
56 For example, interpretive social science emphasizes cultural and historical context, but these are certainly 
variables that positivists could explore. The uniqueness of a culture does not make it unamenable to positivist 
research.  
57 I am grateful to Harlan Wilson for this point.  
58 One final note: Talcott Parsons actually argues that Durkheim’s work “constitutes a radical break with positivistic 
social theory” (Parsons 1937: 382). Durkheim argues that humans are not merely a part of society, but contain the 
whole of society within themselves: “Each of us incarnates something of humanity, each individual consciousness 
contains something divine” (1898/1973: 52). According to Parsons, this observation throws the positivist conception 
into disarray. For if we carry society within us, we are not merely pieces of a functionalist whole, but something far 
more complex. 
I do not know what to make of this claim. Certainly, it complicates Durkheim’s positivism, and makes the analogy 
to biology more difficult. But I do not consider this a “radical break” with positivist theory. In fact, the notion that 
the whole is greater than its parts appears in the natural sciences, too: if it didn’t, Durkheim notes, “we should have 
to say that there is nothing more in living nature than in inanimate matter, since the cell is made up exclusively of 
atoms that are not alive” (1897/2006: 344). 
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INCONSISTENT? 
 What does anomie actually mean? The various (mis)translations of term—normlessness, 
rulelessness, powerlessness, derangement, madness—indicate that there is hardly a consensus. 
Though I have struggled throughout this thesis to make Durkheim’s work clear, I confess that the 
term is often nebulous and contradictory. Below, Steven Lukes considers a few prominent 
understandings of anomie:  
Is it a lack of a specific type of industrial organization (technical or administrative?), or the 
absence of appropriate occupational groups, or an economy geared to the pursuit of profit, 
or the cultural imperatives of a ‘success ethic’, or the fact of social mobility, or the erosion 
of a traditionally stable framework of authority, or social change, or industrial society, or 
the human condition, that is the major factor leading to anomie? (Lukes 1977: 89).  
 
Probably all of these contribute to anomie; deciding which of them is most prominent is a 
difficult endeavor. Philippe Besnard argues that anomie is popular precisely because it is vague: 
it can be used to confirm or deny basically any proposition we like. It can be conservative or 
progressive, advocating tradition or transformation, critiquing social forms or embracing them. 
Sociology, Besnard writes, must do away with “this slightly magical vocabulary,” which no 
longer serves a clear purpose (cited in Meštrović 1988a: 837).  
 But do we really know nothing about anomie? Is it so formless that we can say nothing 
useful about it? Emphatically not. As Richard Sennett (2006) observes, anomie is a broad 
organizing concept—comparable to Marx’s alienation—but its breadth should not imply that it is 
devoid of content. So what, then, is anomie? 
 In a phrase: anomie is the suffering caused by unrestrained desire. Specifically, it is a 
situation in which social facts do not adequately constrain our will: our imagination wanders off 
“without knowing where to find ultimate foothold” (1897/2006: 78). All other questions are 
secondary—the source of desire (biological or socialized?), the historical conditions that produce 
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anomie (capitalism? urbanization?), etc. Any project that seeks to employ the term anomie must 
address two points: (1) the suffering of unmet desire and (2) society’s role in directing (either 
arousing or constraining) desire.  
 Even the notion of normlessness—a “sense of confusion, a loss of orientation”—is 
ultimately related to desire (Parsons 1937: 335). When people are confused, it is not (chiefly) 
their confusion that is painful. Rather, “People no longer have the sense that they are ‘getting 
anywhere’” (Parsons 1937: 335).  
 Parsons clarifies that our “sense of security, of progress toward ends depends not only on 
adequate command over means, but on clear definitions of the ends themselves” (Parsons 1937: 
335, emphasis added). So the moral chaos Durkheim often describes is maddening not because 
our lives are without clarity, but because they are without direction. As Durkheim emphasizes in 
later works59, we need a sense of movement in our lives, a feeling that we are advancing toward 
some transcendent end. The individual seeks “a collective existence which precedes him in time, 
which survives him, and which encompasses him at all points” (cited in Nisbet 1965: 66).  
 If my analysis has been simplistic, that is intentionally so: anomie is a complex term, and 
it will take more than one thesis—let alone the 120 years of analysis it has received—to tease out 
its implications. Nonetheless, I hope to have shown that the term does have consistent meaning, 
despite its varied appearances throughout the literature.  
 To say that anomie is useless simply because it is complex is an act of academic 
indolence. Yet this is exactly the view taken by Marco Orrù in his book, Anomie: History and 
Meaning (1987). As Stjepan Meštrović writes in an excoriating review of that work:  
Orrù’s treatment of anomie is analogous to a world traveller who returns from his exotic 
journeys only to tell his friends that he can’t make any generalizations about all his 
                                            
59 See especially Durkheim 1898/1973.  
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experiences. Such a conclusion is bound to be disappointing and difficult to accept. The 
point of scholarship is to find connections where none had been suspected, not to close 
off avenues of inquiry. If anomie has no ultimate meaning, not even a reasonable or 
useful meaning, what are the reasons for choosing one meaning rather than another in 
research? Politics? Ideology? (Meštrović 1988b: 544). 
 
 Scholars like Orrù and Besnard have, in my view, failed to grasp the thrust of 
Durkheim’s work. To be sure, there are some complexities in Durkheim’s analysis. “But the 
contradictions in Durkheim’s thought are neither sharper nor more numerous than those of 
creative thought in general and, with Whitman, Durkheim might have said: ‘I contradict myself? 
Very well, I contradict myself!’” (Nisbet 1965: 28). Mindful of these contradictions, we must do 
what we can to synthesize anomie theory across Durkheim’s work. The task is difficult but not, I 
think, insurmountable.  
 
METHODOLOGICALLY UNSOUND? 
 Though Durkheim’s work is often considered “classical theory,” he would have 
emphatically rejected the label of theorist.60 Durkheim’s work—positivist, precise, empirical—
was a sharp turn from the vague philosophizing of his day. Indeed, in his time at the École 
Normale, he expressed perennial disappointment with the “spirit of dilettantism” at the school, 
which “tended to reward elegant dabbling . . . rather than solid and systematic learning.” More 
than anything, Durkheim yearned for “earnest scientific instruction” in the positivist tradition 
(Coser 1971: 144).  
 Given Durkheim’s penchant for empirical rigor, an analysis of his data on anomie seems 
crucial. Yet here we encounter the weakest point of Durkheim’s argument. Despite his best 
intentions, Durkheim often committed egregious empirical errors, a fact that nearly all major 
                                            
60 At least insofar as it implies a disinterest in empirical questions. I suspect Durkheim would have been happiest 
with the term “theoretical scientist” or something of that nature—reflecting both his philosophical and his empirical 
leanings.  
 62 
anomie theorists (including Parsons and Merton) have pointed out. Before we examine these 
critiques, I would like to remind the reader that Durkheim was writing in the late 1800s. While it 
is easy to challenge Durkheim’s work from our comfortable spot in the twenty-first century, we 
must remember the limitations of his research. These limitations include not only access to data, 
but knowledge of empirical approaches. With those caveats in mind, we proceed to the critiques.  
 In his Structure of Social Action, Talcott Parsons writes:  
There are the well-established realms of nature, roughly to be termed heredity and 
environment, to which [Durkheim] adds the third, the social. He is continually arguing by 
elimination—such and such a thing cannot belong to either of the first two categories, 
therefore it must belong to the third” (Parsons 1937: 393).  
 
These assumptions, Parsons says, are unqualified and leave Durkheim’s theory somewhat 
incomplete. He has laid out the theory, but he has yet to supply adequate empirical (and rational) 
grounds for it. But Durkheim is not alone in this regard: “The fact that in this science, as in any 
other at a given stage of their development, certain facts about the phenomena it studies are left 
unexplained . . . is not a valid reason to deprecate its scientific achievements or potentialities”  
(Parsons 1937: 393). That may be, but if the empirical basis of Durkheim’s argument is so 
constrained, perhaps our conclusions must be similarly limited.  
 Durkheim makes several assumptions throughout his work, and fails to ground them in 
anything more than speculation. He claims, for example, that the division of labor occurs as 
individuals struggle for greater happiness. The primary motivating force of specialization, he 
says, is the pleasure that comes from individuation itself. (And this is why modernization is both 
necessary and desirable.) Durkheim provides no evidence for this claim; he simply says that all 
other explanations are unsound (Merton 1934/1965).  
 Robert Nisbet goes further: above all, he says, Durkheim sought to “translate into the 
hard methodology of science” his own beliefs about the benefits of traditional society (Nisbet 
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1965: 25). That is, Durkheim’s empiricism was colored by his own agenda; he hoped to borrow 
empirical principles to make claims whose content he knew in advance.  
 Such an approach is bound to encounter difficulties. For how can one remain objective 
when the data are merely pillars for an ideological fortress one has already built?61 Such is the 
concern of Whitney Pope in his excellent book, Durkheim’s ‘Suicide’: A Classic Analyzed. 
“However imaginative,” Pope writes, Durkheim’s chapter on anomie “has all the earmarks of an 
ad hoc, post-factum attempt to salvage the theory in the face of empirically embarrassing results” 
(Pope 1976: 139). Let us consider those results in detail. 
 Durkheim begins with the surprising claim that economic prosperity leads to an increase 
in suicide rates, just as an economic crisis would. Sudden wealth is just as destabilizing as 
sudden poverty, and perhaps more so, since poverty provides external constraints on desire. This 
claim, Pope finds, is in fact supported by the data. In nine out of twelve years of prosperity, the 
suicide rate rose—an average increase of 7.3 percent. Unfortunately, the small sample size 
“prevents the analysis from being anything more than suggestive” (Pope 1976: 119). And even 
this small victory for Durkheim begins to break down on closer analysis. If prosperity induces 
suicides, we should expect dramatic prosperity to dramatically increase the suicide rate. Yet this 
is not the case. Prosperity increases the suicide rate by about 4.6 percent, but extreme prosperity 
increases it only 3.4 percent. “The greater the disturbance,” Pope observes, “the smaller the 
impact upon suicide rates!” (Pope 1976: 119).  
 So much for a direct correlation between prosperity and suicide. But what about 
Durkheim’s corollary theory: that poverty protects against anomie? This claim, Pope says, is 
similarly weak. Durkheim mentions only two countries (Ireland and Spain) along with an Italian 
                                            
61 This is, perhaps, putting the case too strongly. But as much as I admire Durkheim’s work, I do have concerns 
about his ability to remain objective, as we shall see.  
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province (Calabria) that confirm his theory. “The data are limited both in neglecting to exercise 
any controls and failing to show whether wealthier individuals are more likely to commit suicide 
than the less wealthy” (Pope 1976: 122).  
 Pope concludes his discussion of economic crises with the following observations: 
Durkheim successfully rejects some explanations of suicide, but does not adequately defend his 
own theory. He fails to cite his sources or explain why he picked them. His data often appear 
cherry-picked rather than representative, and his sample sizes are too small. His conclusions 
often contradict his data, and even when they do not, the findings are less impressive than he 
frames them. Finally, he fails to show an inverse relationship between regulation and suicide 
(Pope 1976: 123).  
 The paragraphs above relate to “acute anomie,” the suffering caused by a sudden change 
in social state. What about more chronic forms of anomie, like the shift from agricultural to 
industrial society? In agricultural work, Durkheim says, “the old regulative forces still make their 
appearance felt most and [the] fervor of business has least penetrated” (cited in Pope 1976: 123). 
We should therefore expect agricultural societies to have much lower rates of suicide. But the 
data show that there is just too much variation even within industrial societies—some have high 
rates of suicide and others, very low rates—to make a substantive comparison. The standard 
deviation is so great that one cannot claim industrial society is inherently more anomic.  
 Chronic anomie is based on the notion that some societies are inherently more regulated 
than others; social facts have a greater hold on individual will. But the agricultural–industrial 
pairing is the only evidence Durkheim provides for this claim, and it turns out to be false (or 
muddled, at least). Given this failing, Pope claims, “Durkheim provided no empirically-based 
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analysis using objective indicators of regulation to support his contention that in modern society, 
suicide varies proportionately with chronic economic anomie” (Pope 1976: 124). 
 Durkheim’s work on domestic anomie is no better. His choice of statistics is “highly 
selective” and relies on “arbitrary decisions” throughout. It is difficult to say anything 
substantive about domestic anomie, since “Durkheim’s case is neither convincingly sustained nor 
completely falsified by the data” (Pope 1976: 125). Has Pope simply failed to draw conclusions 
from Durkheim’s analysis? Hardly. As he points out at the end of the chapter, one cannot draw 
conclusions, because Durkheim’s argument is a logical paradox. 
 Consider: domestic anomie requires either divorce or widowhood. Divorce, Durkheim 
says, produces chronic anomie: although there is a sudden change in social state, what is more 
important is that the husband has no constraints on his sexual desire. (This is a permanent 
condition until he finds a new partner.) Widowhood, however, produces acute anomie, because 
the involuntary loss of a spouse is swift and dramatic (and therefore destabilizing). But there is a 
problem with this reasoning: 
If the widowed display higher suicide rates than divorced persons, the applicability of 
acute anomie is proved; if divorced persons turn out to have higher suicide rates62, then 
chronic and not acute anomie is operative. Whatever the comparison, whatever the 
outcome, the theory ‘explains’ it. Because suicide rates themselves are used to 
determine which portion of the theory is applicable, the theory itself cannot be falsified 
(Pope 1976: 136).  
 
                                            
62 It is indeed the case that divorced persons have higher suicide rates (according to Durkheim’s data). Pope claims 
that this was initially a shock to Durkheim—who expected the acute anomie of widowhood to be more dramatic—
and that Durkheim had to rewrite his theory to account for the data. In other words, the notion that divorce produces 
“chronic anomie” (for the bachelor who is now exposed to sexual desires) was a way of saving Durkheim’s theory 
from inconvenient data.  
  
That may be, but was Durkheim so wrong to have done so? Aren’t we always adjusting our theories based on data—
in fact, isn’t that our job as social scientists? That Durkheim used to believe one thing, and revised his theory based 
on new data, seems evidence of his strength as a sociologist.  
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 The observations Pope makes, both here and above, pose “considerable embarrassment” 
for Durkheim’s theory. Or so Pope claims.63 Certainly, there are flaws in Durkheim’s 
methodology, but the weakness of his data does not disprove his argument. Though Pope’s 
analysis should be taken seriously, three caveats are worth mentioning: first, we must remember 
Durkheim’s lack of access to good data. It is all too easy to sit on our high horse and say what 
Durkheim should have done, what resources he should have used, but whether those resources 
were available is another question entirely. Second, Durkheim’s data rarely contradict him—for 
the most part, as Pope readily admits, the data are simply inadequate or inconclusive. Again, that 
is simply a sign that more research must be done; Durkheim’s argument remains unchallenged. 
Finally, Pope’s critiques are paradoxical: he cannot simultaneously say that Durkheim’s data 
“disprove” him, or “embarrass” him, while pouring scorn on the data itself. One can criticize the 
source of the data Durkheim chose, or the “arbitrariness” of the selection, or the questionable 
representativeness, or the poor sample size, but this means the data are illegitimate—one cannot 
draw any conclusions from them! Pope cannot have it both ways: either Durkheim’s sources are 
flawed, and must be discounted, or they are strong enough to challenge Durkheim’s theory. 
Since the former seems more likely, all we can conclude is that further empirical research is 
required. That is hardly an embarrassment for anomie theory.  
 Though instructive, Pope’s approach to Suicide is somewhat shortsighted. Pope forgets is 
that the social fabric is tremendously complex and difficult to quantify. Indeed, in the act of 
quantification, something may be lost in translation. As the philosopher Sheldon Wolin64 writes, 
“Political life does not yield itself to terse hypotheses, but is elusive and hence meaningful 
statements about it often have to be allusive and intimative” (Wolin 1969: 1070). Social life, 
being far more nebulous, is even more difficult to categorize. 
                                            
63 Pope 1976: 119. 
64 Wolin himself is a scholar of Durkheim.  
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 Wolin rejects the oft-made claim that “theoretical models should be tested primarily by 
the accuracy of their prediction rather than the reality of their assumptions” (Wolin 1969: 
1073).65 Yet this is precisely what Durkheim’s critics have done. Even if humans are vessels of 
endless desire, even if society fails to constrain that desire and it causes great suffering, critics 
have wielded the same battle cry: Show me the data! This obsession with data over substance, 
empiricism over creative thinking, gives rise to what Ralf Dahrendorf calls the “fallacy of 
empirical research” (Dahrendorf 1968: 121).  
 “Sociological theory,” Dennis Wrong writes, “concerns itself with questions arising out 
of problems that are inherent in the very existence of human societies and that cannot therefore 
be finally ‘solved’ in the way that particular social problems perhaps can be” (Wrong 1961: 184). 
Such questions as Durkheim is asking 
do not lend themselves to successively more precise answers as a result of cumulative 
empirical research, for they remain eternally problematic. Social theory is necessarily an 
interminable dialogue. “True understanding,” Hannah Arendt has written, “does not tire 
of interminable dialogue and ‘vicious circles’ because it trusts that imagination will 
eventually catch a glimpse of the always frightening light of truth” (Wrong 1961: 184). 
 
This is Durkheim’s task, and ours as well: to peer beyond the veil and see what, if anything, we 
can discover. We may never pin down the truth of anomie, but we may one day approximate it.  
 Are there problems with Durkheim’s methodology? Absolutely. Do these problems cast 
great doubt on Durkheim’s argument? Not necessarily. Further research must be done, but it 
should evaluate and expand Durkheim’s work rather than simply attempt to debunk it. Anomie is 
a powerful explanatory concept, and it should be tested against our greatest social problems—
depression and anxiety, soldier suicide, and school shootings, to name just a few. Then and only 
then can we decide whether the term is “useless,” as so many sociologists claim.  
 
                                            
65 Here, Wolin is citing Anthony Downs in An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957), p. 21.  
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SEXIST? 
 Several scholars have noted the sexism in Durkheim’s thinking. Writing in the late 1800s, 
Durkheim employed many of the predominant gender assumptions of his day. Though I do not 
think his sexism is uniquely egregious—similar comments have been made of Marx66—it does 
merit attention, especially since it has implications for his theory of anomie.  
 Gender essentialism can be found in much of Durkheim’s work. In his dissertation, 
Durkheim cites the phrenologist Gustave Le Bon, whose measurement of brains “presents 
considerable differences in favor of the man” (cited in Durkheim 1893/1997: 18). The division of 
labor, Durkheim concludes, must take these differences into account. In the fifth chapter of 
Suicide, Durkheim applies these views to his theory of anomie. After a divorce, he observes, men 
are much more likely to commit suicide than women. Why is this? To answer this question, we 
must first consider what marriage is:  
This is the function of marriage. It regulates all this life of the passions, and monogamous 
marriage more strictly than any other. By obliging the man to attach himself to only one 
woman, and always the same, it supplies a rigorously defined object for the need to love, 
and closes its horizon (1897/2006: 299). 
 
 When divorce occurs, men are subject to a painful “disease of the infinite” and commit 
suicide.  But why do only men need their desires restricted? Does Durkheim believe women have 
no sex drive? Not quite. Rather, the argument is that women—having a lesser role in the (male-
dominated) social realm—are less socialized. Deprived of opportunities for intellectual 
development, the woman is “a more instinctive creature than the man,” and “she has only to 
follow her instincts to find peace and quiet” (1897/2006: 301). Men, being oversocialized, have 
more complex sexual desires than women, which are thus more difficult to satisfy.67  
                                            
66 See Heidi Hartmann’s excellent work, “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism” (1979).  
67 There is something laughable about this proposition, since today the assumption is quite the opposite: Women are 
seen as overly intellectual in their attitude toward sex, and men are the ones who seek easy gratification. To be fair 
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 The corollary to this point is fascinating: if men typically benefit from the constraints of 
marriage, women suffer. Durkheim writes:  
The freedom which [the husband] has given up [by marrying] could only be a source of 
torment for him. The woman did not have the same reasons to renounce it and, in this 
respect, one can say that, by submitting herself to the same regime, she is the one who 
makes the sacrifice (1897/2006: 305). 
 
Since women have little need for checkreins on desire, constraint becomes a burden rather than a 
reprieve. Women make a sacrifice when they enter into marriage. Their experience is one of 
fatalism, and it is this feeling that leads them to divorce. This is hardly a sexist position! If we 
extend Durkheim’s argument just a bit, we reach a proposition that is quite radical68: marriage 
does constrain desire, even for women, but that constraint goes too far because it requires many 
other constraints that men do not face: having to take care of children, prepare meals for the 
husband, and do the majority of housework. No wonder women have lower rates of suicide after 
divorce—they are escaping from what is often an oppressive situation!  
 Sadly, I do not believe Durkheim was actually implying all of the above. But if we were 
to employ his argument in a modern-day analysis, it might be incredibly useful. The hypothesis 
is easy to formulate: in countries with more equitable marriages (e.g., an equal share of 
housework), divorce leads to equal rates of suicide. In countries with greater inequality, divorce 
leads to greater male suicide, since wives benefit from the act of divorce.   
 Though Durkheim’s theory of domestic suicide appears sexist, it is far less offensive 
when properly understood. Durkheim did not argue that women are inherently less anomic than 
men. Although he subscribed to phrenology, his argument was not a phrenological one. Rather, 
                                                                                                                                             
to Durkheim, men were far better educated than women in the 1800s, whereas women are more educated today. 
Perhaps he is right! Maybe intelligence makes sexual satisfaction harder, since it stimulates our imagination and 
arouses greater desire!  
68 Or would have been in Durkheim’s time, anyway. I would like to think it is commonplace today.  
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he claimed that because women “participate less in social life than men”—certainly true in his 
day!—their desires are less aroused: 
Women are therefore characterized by less sociability, less complete socialization, less 
development of mental and intellectual life, and less development of the relatively more 
complex needs that can only be fulfilled by collective life, particularly in its most 
complex forms (Pope 1976: 49).  
 
 If Durkheim had claimed that women were naturally less intelligent than men, we 
might raise objections. But here, he only makes the empirical claim that women participate less 
in social life. Given that women were largely excluded from social participation (and still are, 
to an extent), his argument stands to reason. Even his subsequent claims—that less 
socialization means less development, and possibly less complexity of desire—are empirical 
questions, not patriarchal statements. They may be dubious, but saying so requires more than 
an accusation of sexism. 
 Nonetheless, Durkheimian scholars must respond to feminist critique. If any part of 
Durkheim’s work is to be taken seriously, it must address the limitations of his analysis. Rather 
than defend Durkheim at every moment, we must reject outdated views for the patent nonsense 
they are. Phrenology, in particular, deserves no place in a theory of anomie. But we must also be 
charitable, demonstrating (as I have tried to) that Durkheim’s approach was far more nuanced 
than one might suppose. Sexism is just one of many allegations leveled at Durkheim, but it is a 
particularly brutal one: it confirms the notion that Durkheim was an old-fashioned, chauvinist, 
elitist conservative who can tell us nothing about life in the twenty-first century. Only by being 





 Anomie relies on the notion that humans are vessels of endless desire—comparable to 
(though distinct from) Freudian id. Our desire stems from our unique intelligence, which 
distinguishes us from other animals: “When the hole that life has dug out of its own resources is 
filled, the animal is satisfied and asks for nothing more. . . . [But] human intelligence is more 
aware and can suggest better conditions which appear as desirable ends and inspire activity” 
(Durkheim 1897/2006: 269). Or so Durkheim claims. But are humans really vessels of desire? 
Or is desire socialized, as Merton (along with Marcuse, Foucault, and others) has argued?  
 Merton is eager to pour scorn on “man’s imperious biological drives.” Far from a 
scientific fact, he writes, “the image of man as an untamed bundle of desires begins to look more 
like a caricature than a portrait” (Merton 1938: 185). Having no background in biology, Merton’s 
speaks with a conviction that he fails to justify. Not once in his famous essay, “Social Structure 
and Anomie,” does he provide any evidence for his critique.  
 As Dennis Wrong writes in a brilliant essay69, sociologists like Merton are all too quick 
to reject biological reality. “As soon as the body is mentioned,” Wrong writes, the specter of 
‘biological determinism’ raises its head and sociologists draw back in fright” (Wrong 1961: 191). 
We either assume that biology does not exist, or else that socialization somehow overrides it. But 
as Wrong rightly points out, our rejection of biology is just as presumptive as the biologist’s 
rejection of sociality: 
I do not see how, at the level of theory, sociologists can fail to make assumptions about 
human nature. If our assumptions are left implicit, we will inevitably presuppose of a 
view of man that is tailor-made to our special needs; when our sociological theory over-
stresses the stability and integration of society we will end up imagining that man is the 
disembodied, conscience-driven, status-seeking phantom of current theory. We must do 
better if we really wish to win credit outside of our ranks for [a] special understanding of 
man (Wrong 1961: 192–93). 
                                            
69 “The Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern Sociology” (1961). American Sociological Review.  
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This passage, essentially a critique of functionalism, may strike us as an attack on Durkheim. But 
it is in fact the opposite. Wrong praises Durkheim throughout his essay; it is Merton he criticizes. 
On balance, this is not surprising: Durkheim did a far better job than Merton at weighing both 
biological and social considerations.  
 But there is something ironic in Wrong’s praise of—and Merton’s scorn toward—
Durkheim’s view of biology. “Above any thinker of his age,” Robert Nisbet observes, 
“Durkheim was responsible for burying the utilitarian distortion of man’s nature and for 
highlighting the social basis of consciousness” (Nisbet 1965: 59, emphasis added). As I have 
argued throughout this essay, Durkheim’s work was a turn away from the biologism of his day. 
Much of Suicide, for example, is dedicated to debunking biological explanations of mental 
health. Suicide has three aspects, he wrote. One of them is biology—the “nature of individuals 
who make up the society.” But more important are the “nature of the social organization” and the 
disturbances of collective life” (1897/2006: 357).  
 If Durkheim’s views on biology are remarkable, they are remarkably balanced. He 
recognizes, as his contemporaries did not, that “in the beginning, there is the body” (Wrong 
1961: 191). Social forces may superimpose themselves on biological reality70, but they never 
destroy that reality. Contemporary science is beginning to discover what Durkheim already 
knew: that biology and socialization are not dichotomous realms, but two sides of the same 
coin. As the emerging fields of neuroplasticity and epigenetics have taught us, society affects 
biology just as biology influences socialization. We must heed Dennis Wrong’s warning: if 
sociology cannot take biological explanations into account, it will lose legitimacy as well as 
explanatory power.  
                                            
70 This phrasing is borrowed from Whitney Pope (1976), p. 49. See also Durkheim’s Second Preface to The Division 
of Labor (1902), pp. xliii–xliv. 
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IDENTICAL TO EGOISM? 
 Durkheim’s conceptions of anomie and egoism have often been confused. Sheldon 
Wolin, for example, writes that anomie is a “riot of egoism” (cited in Pope 1976: 30). Susan 
Stedman Jones, in a more recent work, claims that “anomie in its most important sense means 
lack of solidarity” (Stedman Jones 2001: 102). These assertions are disappointing, for any close 
reading of Suicide would clarify the misunderstanding. At the beginning of Durkheim’s chapter 
on anomic suicide, he writes: “Society, however, is not only an object that draws toward itself 
the feelings and the actions of individuals, with more or less intensity. It is also a force that 
directs them” (Durkheim 1897/2006: 262).  
 If egoism cannot be conflated with anomie, then what does it actually mean? Durkheim 
uses “egoism” in a very special sense, distinct from our contemporary conception. Egoism is not 
the arrogance of an individual who only cares about himself, but a more pitiable condition 
described by a lack of social belonging. This must be qualified, for Durkheim does not mean 
“loneliness.” Rather, the term is closest to Erich Fromm’s conception of moral aloneness: the “lack 
of relatedness to values, symbols, [and] patterns” (Fromm 1941/1966: 34). To be a part of society 
is not only to participate in social interaction, but to experience the essence of society—the rituals, 
traditions, and customs that allow the individual to transcend her personal circumstances. Stjepan 
Meštrović (1988a) rightly claims that it is impossible to understand Durkheim without engaging in 
philosophy; here we must see “transcendence” in a very real sense. Each of us longs to be part of 
something greater than ourselves, Durkheim writes.71 By relating to social forms, one transcends 
the pain of individual existence; one becomes greater than what one is. In a beautiful passage on 
the problems of modernity, Durkheim writes,  
                                            
71 As the French philosopher Pierre Hadot puts it, “The true self of each individual transcends each individual” 
(cited in Halperin 1995: 75). 
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The only remedy for the ill is to restore enough consistency to social groups for them to 
obtain a firmer grip on the individual, and for him to feel himself bound to them. He must 
feel himself more solidary with a collective existence which precedes him in time, which 
survives him, and which encompasses him at all points. If this occurs, he will no longer 
find the only aim of his conduct in himself and, understanding that he is the instrument of 
a purpose greater than himself, he will see that he is not without significance. Life will 
resume meaning in his eyes, because it will recover its natural aim and orientation (cited 
in Nisbet 1965: 66, from pp. 373–4 of Suicide). 
 
 Egoism, then, is not just a lack of social integration—being unable to fit into a group. It is 
something far more perilous. Egoism deprives the individual of social purpose, the kind of 
transcendent meaning that allows one to feel eternal even in the face of death. This may be what 
theorists are getting at when they (mistakenly) describe anomie as “meaninglessness” or 
“emptiness.” Without society as a source of meaning, the individual must turn toward himself for 
transcendence, but how can transcendence ever come from oneself? The task inevitably leads to 
failure, and failure to self-destruction. Without a socially given purpose, the individual is beset 
with nihilism; he might as well not be alive. 
 What a far cry from our modern conception of egoism—the arrogance of the individual! 
In Durkheim’s view, one does not choose to be obsessed with oneself; one is forced to do so. 
And the consequence is tremendously painful.  
 What about anomie? Insofar as social solidarity leads to constraint, egoism and anomie 
are tightly linked.72 Durkheim writes in The Division of Labor that the greater the density of 
interaction—that is, the greater the population and the more frequent the contact—the faster 
organic solidarity can develop. As long as the division of labor proceeds in a healthy fashion, 
shared norms imply increased constraint on individual desire. But this does not always occur. In 
the anomic division of labor, specialization leads to the atomization of society, wherein 
individuals pursue their own work and do not feel a sense of mutual dependence (Stedman Jones 
                                            
72 “Both come from the fact that society is not sufficiently present for individuals” (Durkheim 1897/2006: 284).  
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2001: 102–104). Thus egoism and anomie emerge in equal measure: not only are there few social 
forms tying individuals together, but the lack of mutual obligation means there are no proper 
reins on desire.  
 As Whitney Pope notes, egoism and anomie have the same origin: the historical shift 
from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, and the subsequent weakening of social bonds. In each case, 
society has lost its grip on the individual. “Noting their ‘peculiar affinity,’” Pope writes,  
[Durkheim] (288) observed that egoism and anomie “are usually merely two different 
aspects of one social state.” Again, he (382) referred to the ‘identical cause’ producing 
them. . . . Consistent with the theme that they are caused by the same social state, 
Durkheim (323) referred to “the hypercivilization which breeds the anomic tendency and 
the egoistic tendency.” . . . Suicide (288) even indicates why the egoist is likely to be 
anomic and vice versa: “It is, indeed, almost inevitable that the egoist should have some 
tendency to non-regulation; for, since he is detached from society, it has not sufficient 
hold upon him to regulate him. . . . Inversely, an unregulated temperament does not lack a 
spark of egoism; for if one were highly socialized one would not rebel at every social 
restraint” (Pope 1976: 45). 
 
 This is not to say that egoism and anomie are inextricable. It is perfectly conceivable to 
imagine a society in which one exists without the other. As I have argued, not all norms and 
values constrain desire. If the social fabric is largely held together with cultural goods—music 
and literature, for example—the society may be anomic but not egoistic. That is, culture may still 
exist to bind individuals together (albeit superficially), but constraints on desire will be absent. 
“We can bring to society everything in us that is social,” Durkheim writes, “and yet not know 
how to limit our desires; without being an egotist, one can live in a state of anomie, and 
conversely” (1897/2006: 284).  
 Conversely, indeed, a society may impose harsh demands on the individual, insisting on 
conformity and severely curtailing desire. But if the members of that society feel merely 
dominated, and do not internalize those norms, they may enter a condition we might call 
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“egoistic fatalism.”73 Unable to achieve their desires, they will feel no anomie, but they may 
still feel morally alone. 
 To review: while egoism is caused by a lack of social solidarity, anomie is caused by a 
lack of social constraint. Egoism is about poor integration (weak bonds), while anomie is about 
insufficient barriers on desire. Those who suffer from egoism need purpose, meaning, 
transcendence; those who suffer from anomie need barriers, directions, harnesses. 
Egoism: atomization of society à low density of social interaction à lack of group 
membership à lack of social purpose à meaninglessness à “depression, melancholy, 
or sheer apathy”74  
 
Anomie (chronic): atomization of society à low density of social interaction à lack of 
norm formation à lack of social constraints à gradual increase in desires à inability to 
satisfy those desires à disenchantment, unease, agitation, discontent, groping, anxiety 
 
Anomie (acute):  sudden change in social state à disruption of social 
constraints/barriers on desire à sudden increase in desires à inability to satisfy those 
desires à disenchantment, unease, agitation, etc. 
 
 As these trajectories illustrate, anomie and egoism are clearly related. Both start from the 
atomization of society (a product of modernization), and both lead to feelings of tremendous 
discomfort. But to confuse the two terms, or claim they are identical, is sloppy scholarship. 
                                            
73 Actually, one wonders whether egoistic fatalism is possible, since the despotic character of fatalism usually 
engenders resistance and social solidarity. Still, we can conceive of a society in which fear of punishment precludes 
collective identity. But even acting alone and in secret (or wishing one could act) might be enough to prevent 
egoism: “The monk in his cell who believes in God and the political prisoner kept in isolation who feels one with his 
fellow fighters are not alone morally,” Erich Fromm writes (1941/1966: 34). Perhaps there is an inherent tension 
between fatalism and egoism, and the two cannot coexist. If fatalism is the product of overbearing moral constraint, 
it means that morality exists. And no matter how ugly this morality may be, it provides a social core around which 
individuals can coalesce. Egoism, then, may not be possible under these circumstances. If this is so, we have yet to 
prove that egoism can exist without anomie.  
One final thought: Foucault (1975) distinguishes between premodern societies (which relied in punishment) and 
modern societies (which rely on discipline). The main distinction is that discipline is internalized by those it 
oppresses, so force is largely unnecessary. Perhaps only in the latter case can despotic morality can be considered 
“social,” whereas punishment, whose purpose is never internalized, provides no social glue. If this is the case, then 
egoistic fatalism can exist only in punishment-based societies. Modern genocides may provide an example, but even 
these provide solidarity to the persecuted. The issue is unresolvable! For egoistic fatalism to work, those punished 
cannot form a social identity around their punishment. But since persecution always provokes resistance, a 
resistance shared by those punished, one wonders whether this is possible.  
74 Pope 1976: 31 
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 This is not to say that the distinction is obvious, only that a close reading—which any 
theorist deserves—reveals the difference. Still, a survey of brilliant scholars shows there is 
hardly consensus on this front. Whitney Pope observes:  
Given the logical structure of Durkheim’s theory, the relationship between integration 
and regulation is crucial. Yet commentators have not agreed on what, if anything, 
distinguishes them. Parsons (1949: 327–38) maintained that integration refers to value 
content; regulation, to the strength of social control. Nisbet (1966: 94; see also 1974: 233) 
suggested that anomie is a breakdown of moral community; egoism, of social 
community. Coser (1971: 134–35) defined the difference in terms of structural 
integration versus normative regulation. Agreeing with Coser on the meaning of 
regulation, Wallwork (1972: 48–53) saw integration as a matter of attachment to group 
morals. Giddens (1971b: 84–85) has argued that Durkheim linked egoism with moral 
individualism, whereas anomie referred to a lack of moral regulation. Finally, although 
Lukes (1967: 139n) initially denied the existence of any difference, he (1972: 206) later 
concluded that integration referred to the social bonds tying the individual to socially-
given ideals and purposes; regulation, to those that regulate the individual’s desires.75 
 
Others, however, noting the overlap between integration and regulation, have stressed the 
difficulty of identifying any sociological distinction (Sainsbury 1955: 22; Gibbs and 
Martin 1964: 6–7; Smelser 1971: 18–19; Poggi 1972: 200). Some have implicitly 
acknowledged the overlap by coupling egoism and anomie or by attributing to one 
concept characteristics that Durkheim linked with the other (Homans 1950: 336–37). 
Wolin (1960: 339) characterized anomie as a ‘riot of egoism,’ and LaCapra (1972: 145) 
referred to an ‘anomic absence of meaning in experience.’ Many other authors have 
ignored the problem altogether, simply restated the distinctions Durkheim enumerated, or 
otherwise failed to clarify a viable difference (i.e., Alpert 1961; Hendin 1964: 8–9; Henry 
and Short 1964: 132–33; Aron 1967: 30–33; Douglas 1967: 3–76) (Pope 1976: 30, 
emphasis added).  
 
Nonetheless, Durkheim was very precise in his terminology, as Pope makes plain: 
Though both entail the absence of society in the individual, the sphere of this absence 
differs. ‘In egoistic suicide it is deficient in truly collective activity, thus depriving the 
latter of object and meaning. In anomic suicide, society’s influence is lacking in the 
basically individual passions, thus leaving them without a check-rein’ (258, see also 287). 
The contrast between the meaninglessness resulting from lack of integration and the 
uncontrolled passions resulting from lack of regulation is clear (Pope 1976: 31). 
 
                                            
75 Lukes (1972) provides the most accurate distinction in my view.   
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 If egoism is a crisis of meaning, anomie is a crisis of desire. Many scholars complain that 
the terms have similar causes and solutions, but that is exactly the point: strength of community 
is a human necessity, and without it we will satisfy neither purpose nor desire.  
 
IN CONCLUSION: 
 Of the classical sociologists, only Marx has faced more criticism than Émile Durkheim.76 
Durkheim’s critics include Talcott Parsons (1937), Robert Merton (1934/1965; 1938), Nicholas 
Timasheff (1961), Robert Nisbet (1965), Raymond Aron (1967), Whitney Pope (1976), Steven 
Lukes (1977), Marco Orrù (1990), and Susan Stedman Jones (2001), among many others. Nearly 
every major sociologist has had something to say about Durkheim’s work. As such, the 
allegations made against him are wide-ranging and sometimes conflicting. Durkheim has been 
accused of biological and historical determinism, functionalism and positivism, sexism and 
subjectivism. His theory has been called incoherent—conflating anomie and egoism, failing to 
give a consistent definition of anomie —as well as ideological. He has been charged with placing 
too much emphasis (and not enough emphasis) on biology, too much emphasis (and not enough) 
on socialization. 
 Though many of these critiques are indeed concerning, not one of them (in my view) 
topples the theory of anomie. Perhaps the strongest critique was made by Raymond Aron when 
he asked: “Is not frustration part, not only of the human condition, but also specifically of the 
condition proper to the society in which we live?” (Aron 1967: 78). The critique is impossible to 
challenge, because it broaches a fundamental moral question: Why should satisfaction be our 
goal? If anomie is a motivating force, then we have very little to say against it even despite its 
                                            
76 I have yet to read a critique of Max Weber.  
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discomfort.  No one, not even the boldest sociologist, can justify “settling for less” rather than 
“striving for more.” For where do we draw the line? When is settling a kind of giving up—what 
Merton calls retreatism—and when is it a healthy, logical decision?  
 To accept anomie theory is, in some sense, to accept that progress has its limits. There is 
something tragic in admitting that we may never achieve what we most deeply desire. But the 
consequences of not doing so are even more disturbing. “No living person can be happy or even 
live at all unless his needs are sufficiently well adjusted to his means,” Durkheim reminds us. 
In other words, if he demands more than can be provided for him, or even something 
other than can be provided, he will be constantly irritated and unable to function without 
suffering. And an action that cannot be accomplished without suffering tends not to be 
repeated. Aptitudes that are not satisfied atrophy and, since the aptitude for life is only 
the result of all the rest, it is bound to weaken if the others also slacken (1897/2006: 269). 
 
The final consequence of unregulated desire is not dissatisfaction. It is death. Death is the price 
of human imagination, aroused and unrestrained in an anomic society. And that is precisely our 
situation, today, in the United States. 
 
The Decline of Anomie Theory 
 If, as I will attempt to show, the United States is rife with anomie, we should expect a 
great number of sociologists to be writing on the topic. But in the past few decades, the opposite 
has occurred: anomie theory has precipitously declined among sociologists. A search of the 
American Sociological Review finds that the term has not been used in sixteen years.77 
 What has happened? Though my explanation is somewhat speculative, it follows two 
major veins: the academic and political. Anomie theory has been hit twice—not only by 
academics who call the term obsolete, but by a shifting political climate that rejects structural 
                                            
77 Certainly, the word anomie appears in the occasional article, but it has not been included in a title or abstract since 
the year 1998. Anomie is not, therefore, the central concern of recent articles, but occurs only incidentally.  
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functionalism. These two threads cannot be disentangled: political views shape academic 
discourse, and that discourse restructures the political climate.  
 Anomie, James Davis writes, is one of many ideas deemed “old-fashioned and 
outmoded” by sociologists. But are such ideas actually wrong, he asks?  
I doubt it. The only sociological ideas that ever turned out to be demonstrably wrong are 
‘status consistency’ and ‘relative deprivation,’ and both pop up regularly as true ideas.78 
We neither refute nor confirm and expand ideas; we just become bored with them and 
move on to some ‘cutting edge’ novelty (Davis 2001: 101). 
 
In this view, anomie theory declined simply because it was too old and newer theories replaced 
it. If Davis is correct, this is a highly ironic thing to have happened. Durkheim himself disliked 
his time at the École Normale because it “tended to reward elegant dabbling and the quest for 
‘novelty’ and ‘originality’ of expression rather than solid and systematic learning” (Coser 1971: 
144). Yet here we see Durkheim’s own theory relegated to the dustbin of history, only because it 
is no longer novel!79  
 Davis is likely correct to an extent, but as we have said, there were far more factors at 
play. Knowing that anomie theory was largely replaced, we must ask, why was it replaced? 
What academic climate encourages the defenestration of old theories? As Sheldon Wolin 
argues, it is our obsession with scientific empiricism. “The defining characteristic of a 
scientific revolution is to break with the past.” It is an “animus against tradition” which, 
seeking to eschew ideology, is ideological in itself (Wolin 1969: 1068). “This anti-
traditionalist bias,” he goes on, “cultivated in the name of the elimination of bias, has 
                                            
78 Davis has since recanted his views on relative deprivation, according to a personal correspondence.  
79 As the theoretical physicist Max Planck (1858-1947) wrote, “A new scientific truth does not triumph by 
convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new 
generation grows up that is familiar with it.” (Cited in the Edge.org 2014 contest, “What Scientific Idea Is Ready for 
Retirement?”) 
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manifested itself on numerous occasions during the past decades as the effort to diminish the 
significance of ‘traditional political theory’” (Wolin 1969: 1070).80  
 Before we explore which theories replaced anomie (there were several of them), we must 
consider the so-called flaws in the concept that made it so easy to overthrow. As we saw earlier 
in the last section, Durkheim’s theory faced a whole host of accusations—poor methodology, 
sexism, and authoritarianism, among others. These concerns, combined with poor scholarship by 
Durkheim’s (and Merton’s) followers, wounded the reputation of anomie theory:  
The popularity of strain/anomie theory declined in the late 1960’s due to the lack of 
empirical evidence put forth by researchers and the political climate of the decade 
(Agnew and Passas, 1997: 4-5). The lack of supporting data can be attributed to several 
flaws in the original research methods employed by the researchers (Agnew and Passas, 
1997: 5). Inappropriate methodology, oversimplification of theory, and a neglect of the 
previous revisions resulted in a body of work that misrepresented the original purpose of 
anomie/strain theory (Agnew and Passas, 1997: 5-7).81 
 
 But anomie theory may have been victim of a larger movement—the fight against 
functionalism. “Just as it was gaining theoretical hegemony,” George Ritzer and Douglas 
Goodman observe, “structural functionalism came under attack, and the attacks mounted until 
they reached a climax in the 1960s and 1970s” (Ritzer & Goodman 2004: 59). Though Durkheim 
certainly employed functionalist thinking, it was the work of Talcott Parsons and Robert Merton 
that turned anomie into a functionalist concept. (Parsonian sociology, in particular, was conflated 
with the worst kind of conservatism.) Challenges to functionalism came from both politics and 
academia: “Structural functionalism was accused of such things as being politically conservative, 
unable to deal with social change because of its focus on static structures, and incapable of 
adequately analyzing social conflict” (Ritzer & Goodman 2004: 61).  
                                            
80 If one has any doubt that Durkheim is included in this statement, consider that Wolin himself was a scholar of 
Durkheim.  
81 “Robert Agnew’s General Strain Theory.” http://www.criminology.fsu.edu/crimtheory/agnew.htm 
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 This last point is crucial, for it was the emergence of conflict theory that posed perhaps 
the greatest challenge to functionalism. The revival of Marxian sociology in the late 1960s (via 
Tom Bottomore and others) brought widespread scorn for functionalist ideas. Though Marx 
himself employed functionalist logic—describing the structural contradictions of capitalism, for 
example—his emphasis on social change became far more salient, especially as the New Left 
movement gained ground.   
 Indeed, the New Left may have been largely responsible for the rejection of anomie 
theory. The movement, which challenged patriarchy, imperialism, and heterosexism, sought 
freedom from all constraints and the collapse of traditional authority structures. Naturally, a 
theory like anomie, which preached the merits of constraint, could not remain popular.  
 Anomie theory, once highly esteemed, began to pose a challenge to the narrative of 
freedom emerging in the United States.82 The rise of individualism rendered Durkheim’s concept 
not only unpopular, but incoherent. The notion that constraint could be both necessary and 
desirable was so anathema to 1960s American culture that it could not be properly understood. 
As Talcott Parsons warned in 1937, “Individualistic modes of thinking are so deeply imbedded 
in our culture that such confusion is very difficult to avoid” (Parsons 1937: 384). Even if a theory 
is true, it will not be accepted unless it matches our ideological paradigms. This is not a minor 
point: the cognitive linguist George Lakoff observes that one literally cannot understand certain 
information unless it fits one’s own framework. Individuals will reject true statements, again and 
again, in favor of false ones that match their understanding of the world (Lakoff 2004). 
                                            
82 Of course, freedom was already a central concept in American life, so “emerging” is perhaps a misleading term. 
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 We mentioned earlier that Marx provided great inspiration for the New Left movement 
and the decline of functionalism. As Steven Lukes observes, Marx and Durkheim hold opposite 
views of human nature, such that the triumph of Marx spells the death of Durkheim: 
In large measure, Durkheim sides with Hobbes and Freud where Marx sides with 
Rousseau and the Utopians. For the former, man is a bundle of desires, which needs to be 
regulated, tamed, repressed, manipulated and given direction for the sake of social order, 
whereas, for the latter, man is still an angel, rational and good, who requires a rational 
and good society in which to develop his essential nature – a ‘form of association in 
which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone.’ For the former, 
coercion, external authority and restraint are necessary and desirable for social order and 
individual happiness; for the latter, they are an offense against reason and an attack upon 
freedom (Lukes 1977: 84, emphasis added).  
 
These frameworks, one can quickly grasp, are diametrically opposed. Roughly speaking, the 
former represents communitarian constraint, while the latter champions individualist liberty. 
“For Marx,” Seymour Lipset notes, social constraints did not fulfill socially necessary functions 
but rather supported class rule” (Lipset 1963/1981: 6). No wonder, then, that academics steeped 
in Marxian ideology might be wary of employing anomie theory. To do so would be to admit 
that our well-being is contingent on authority, a dangerous claim indeed. 
 But while conflict theory was influential, it was not the only paradigm to emerge in the 
sixties. Exchange theory—the work of George Homans and others—also played a crucial role. 
While functionalists cared about social institutions, exchange theorists were far more concerned 
with the individual: “Homans’ basic view was that the heart of sociology lies in the study of 
individual behavior and interaction. He was little interested in consciousness or in the various 
kinds of large-scale structures and institutions that were of concern to most sociologists” (Ritzer 
& Goodman 2004: 62). Responding to the rise of individualism, academics created a whole host 
of theories that celebrated the individual: phenomenological sociology (Schütz), dramaturgical 
analysis (Goffman), ethnomethodology (Garfinkel), and symbolic interactionism (Mead).  
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The 1970s, expanding on the themes of pluralism and identity, gave rise to feminist theory, 
poststructuralism, and multiculturalism. Classical ideas like anomie could not compete; they 
“went down with the functionalist ship.”83 
 This is the story given to us by Ritzer and Goodman. But it is, I fear, a little too neat. It 
tells us about the collapse of functionalism, but does not say much about anomie in particular.84 
As I warned at the beginning of this chapter, the decline of anomie theory is a speculative tale; 
little has been written about it, so we have to engage in imaginative reconstruction. We now turn 
to Stjepan Meštrović, an expert on Durkheim and, in my estimation, one of the best Durkheim 
scholars in the United States. To understand the trajectory of anomie theory, Meštrović argues, 
we must begin with Durkheim himself:  
First, most of Durkheim’s graduate students, colleagues, and followers were killed in 
World Wars I and II.85 Really, only Marcel Mauss was left to carry the Durkheim cause, 
and Mauss was assimilated by anthropologists more than by sociologists. Second, 
Durkheim is still regarded today as one of the several founding fathers of anthropology.  
. . . But anthropologists are most interested in Durkheim’s ethnographic approach in The 
Elementary Forms, and not in anomie, which applies more to modern societies. Third, it 
was Parsons and Merton who really injected Durkheim into American sociology, and 
they did so with the wrong interpretation of ‘normlessness.’ When functionalism was 
pretty much jettisoned in the 1960s, anomie was thrown out with the bathwater of 
Parsonian functionalism.86 
 
In fact, Meštrović writes, “Durkheim’s original understanding of anomie never really entered 
American discourse.” In the 1920s, the Chicago School approximated Durkheim’s intentions, but 
their approach “was displaced by symbolic interactionism, which has no room for pathology.” 
Even European sociologists neglected Durkheim, focusing their energies on Marx and Weber. 
                                            
83 Aaron Howell, personal correspondence.  
84 To be fair, that was not the authors’ intention—the information comes from a chapter about the history of 
sociology, not the history of anomie theory.  
85 In another essay, Meštrović observes that “all of Durkheim’s papers and lectures were destroyed in the war. Thus, 
no one will ever really know the extent of Durkheim’s usage of anomie” (Meštrović 1988a: 836).  
86 Personal correspondence.  
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Finally, Durkheim’s work was largely inspired by Schopenhauerian philosophy, which was 
extremely popular in his day. But Schopenhauer is no longer discussed. “My overall take,” 
Meštrović concludes,  
is that Durkheim’s theory overall and his concept of anomie were never really 
assimilated, in all these years. I think Durkheim was right, and is more relevant today 
than ever, but his theory cannot be grasped because the “collective consciousness” in 
academia and sociology is not open to his ideas or the philosophers he used.87 
 
 Though we now have a crucial piece of the story, several questions remain. Why has 
anomie declined in the past few decades? What happened to it after the New Left waned and the 
sociological paradigms of the sixties and seventies were no longer novel? Although the term 
never quite disappeared, it became highly specialized—relegated to the fields of criminology and 
psychology. 
 Just as Durkheim’s work lost prominence, “Merton’s version of anomie, too, almost died, 
but was miraculously resurrected, this time in the vast literature on delinquency and deviance” 
(Meštrović 1988a: 837). Even today, the few articles that do discuss anomie are almost 
exclusively concerned with deviance. A quick search of recent articles brings back titles like 
“Why Do People Engage in Corruption?” and “Deciding to Bribe: A Cross-Level Analysis of 
Firm and Home Country Influences on Bribery Activity.”88 As Marco Orrù (1990) points out, it 
is not surprising that Merton’s interpretation of anomie has triumphed over Durkheim’s: most 
prominent sociologists are American, and Merton frames anomie as a particularly American 
issue. But while Orrù sees this a sign of Merton’s superiority, the French sociologist Philippe 
Besnard considers it a shameful ideological victory:  
Sociologists must accept the idea that sociological works, like all products, are subject to 
the effects of fashion, and that their career depends in good part on the marketing 
                                            
87 Ibid. 
88 Via Jstor.org, searching articles that use “anomie” in either the title or abstract.  
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strategies of their promoters. They must also admit that the cognitive power of a theory is 
not to be measured by its notoriety. Like other celebrated theories, the Mertonian theory 
of anomie, despite the brilliant intuitions of its author, is like an overinflated balloon 
which bursts when one tries to seize hold of it. If one believes in sociology and its future, 
it is not on foundations such as these that one should build (Besnard 1990: 383). 
 
 Nonetheless, anomie has largely survived because of its contemporary use in 
criminology. For those of us who prefer Durkheim’s original definition, that observation is 
bittersweet. We may be grateful to Merton for keeping anomie theory alive, but also frustrated 
that the term has become so distorted over time. The word “anomie” is now applied to 
individuals rather than societies, describing the “anomic” pathology that leads one to, say, rob a 
bank or cheat on tests. Here anomie has little to do with frustrations of desire, and everything to 
do with loneliness, emptiness, and other terms that are irrelevant for Durkheim.  
 In an ironic twist that not even Durkheim could have predicted, anomie is now used to 
stigmatize the individual rather than diagnose social problems. It has been divested of its 
grounding in social realism, ascribed to the very psychological forces Durkheim wished to 
debunk. What a tragic fate for the “sociological concept par excellence”!89 
 In a fascinating essay called “What Ever Happened to Anomie?”, David McCloskey 
writes: “Durkheim’s famous sociological concept, so often heralded as the first massive and 
irrefutable demonstration of the autonomy of social facts, has become thoroughly 
psychologized” (McCloskey 1974: 498). Not only has the term been co-opted by criminologists, 
but it has been converted into a psychological diagnosis: anomia (Srole 1956; Lamnek 1996). 
Anomia is defined as “a social psychological derivation used to represent a state of disaffection 
or disconnectedness” (Borgatta & Montgomery 2000: 165). The term, coined by Leo Srole, has 
                                            
89 Besnard 1987: 388, cited in Meštrović 1988a: 837. 
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turned Durkheim’s complex theory into a delightfully empirical scale, easy to employ. Surely 
Durkheim would have been thrilled at the scientific rigor of Srole’s approach!  
 Except that anomia has almost nothing to do with anomie. Although the anomic condition 
sometimes produces “disenchantment,” feeling disconnected is a symptom of egoism. Egoism 
“tend[s] to be characterized by a state of apathy, an absence of attachment to life,” while anomie 
is “a state of irritation or disgust, irritation resulting from the many occasions of disappointment 
afforded by modern existence, disgust being the extreme form of perception of the disproportion 
between aspirations and satisfactions” (Aron 1967: 34).  
 As McCloskey notes, nearly all anomie theorists have failed to connect their own views 
with those of Durkheim. “I challenge Professors Lee and Clyde, Dean and Reeves, De Grazia, 
Srole (and yes, even Merton and Parsons!) to demonstrate by systematic exegesis that their 
various versions of anomie enjoy any necessary and significant relation to Durkheim’s original 
ideas” (McCloskey 1974: 498, emphasis added). To be fair, intellectual thought does not and 
should not demand loyalty to any one theorist. Durkheim himself would have wanted his theory 
expanded upon (and even challenged) in light of empirical research. “It seems fruitless,” Marco 
Orrù writes, “to attempt to resolve issues of conceptual legitimacy in sociology—and specifically 
in anomie theory—by referring to the Durkheimian texts” (Orrù 1990: 232). He goes on: 
If anything, the vicissitudes of the concept of anomie in sociology show that departing 
from earlier definitions is not a drawback, but an asset. After all, Durkheim was 
acquainted with the earlier definition of anomie of the social philosopher Jean Marie 
Guyau, and after reviewing Guyau’s work, Durkheim coined his own definition of 
anomie in exact opposition to Guyau’s (Orrù 1990: 232, emphasis added).  
 
Even so, theorists like Merton and Srole do commit a disservice when they claim to derive their 
theories from Durkheim. It is one thing to say, I have received my inspiration from Durkheim, 
but will now depart from it. It is quite another to depart from Durkheim while claiming one has 
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followed his path all along! Such an approach, McCloskey writes, is an indefensible attempt at 
“charisma-on-deposit” (1974: 498).90 One cannot have it both ways, citing Durkheim for 
credibility while also attacking his approach (and then denying it).  
 Given how muddled anomie theory has become in recent decades—no one seems to 
agree upon a definition—it is perhaps unsurprising that the term has declined. But has the 
concept itself disappeared? Hardly. As Steven Lukes explains in a personal correspondence:  
I would draw a distinction between ‘anomie theory’ and the concept of anomie. I think 
that the latter (not always accompanied by the term) has entered the bloodstream of 
sociological thinking and more generally social and political discourse. Thus a 
Durkheimian diagnosis of the ills of capitalism citing multiplying, insatiable wants and 
the absence of restraining normative expectations has surely become something of a 
commonplace.  
 
 Lukes cites the 2012 book How Much Is Enough? by Robert and Edward Skidelsky. 
Though anomie is not mentioned in the book, the theme is clearly present. A summary by the 
publisher reads: “Though income has increased as [Keynes] envisioned, our wants have 
seemingly gone unsatisfied.”91 Another notable work (which I cite in this thesis) is Peter Stearns’ 
Satisfaction Not Guaranteed: Dilemmas of Progress in Modern Society (2012).  
 In fact, the problem of unreasonable desires has probably seen increasing academic 
interest in recent years. Much has been written of the millennial generation—our unwillingness 
to settle, our thirst for advancement, and our quixotic expectations. As anomie continues to 
worsen in the United States, we should expect a great plethora of social critiques.  
 So does it even matter whether academics use the word anomie? Isn’t it far more 
important that the concept is employed? Yes and no. Though insisting on the term itself may 
seem a matter of academic pride, it has several advantages. First, it frames the problem as a 
                                            
90 In philosophy, this is called the “appeal to authority” fallacy.  
91 How Much Is Enough? (2012). http://www.amazon.com/How-Much-Enough-Money-Good/dp/1590515072 
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social rather than individual one. Anomie is above all (pace Srole) a social condition, caused by 
the failure of society to constrain desire. When our children experience unreasonable desires, we 
can remind ourselves that they are victims of a social problem rather than their own greed (or our 
failed parenting). By focusing on society, we can disburden the individual of blame and stigma.92 
Second, using the word itself gives us a more nuanced understanding of the problem: by reading 
The Division of Labor, for example, we can understand that the problem is not unique to our own 
society, but grounded in the historical shift from feudalism to capitalism.93 Finally—and this is 
no small victory—using the term “anomie” may help to legitimize the sociological perspective 
among academics. By linking well-being with social regulation, it may even change American 




                                            
92 This will be particularly crucial in our discussion of mental health. 
93 Or Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft, agriculture to industry, Catholicism to Protestantism, functionalist to 
plebiscitary representation, etc.  
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II. WHY ANOMIE STILL MATTERS 
 
 
The Anomic Nation 
 We have now reached the core of this thesis. Here I will argue that the United States is an 
anomic nation—that is, its collective conscience produces rather than constrains desire. This 
chapter will be divided into two portions: the first will explore the historical basis of anomie, and 
the second will examine anomie in light of contemporary research. Though not exhaustive, the 
combination of cultural and historical considerations should give us a very accurate picture of 
anomie today.  
 
ANOMIE IN AMERICAN HISTORY: 
 Robert Merton was not the first to explore the uniquely anomic character of the United 
States. The French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville had suggested as much over a century 
prior to Merton. In his 1835 work, Democracy in America, Tocqueville noted with concern that 
Americans are enthralled with political liberty, but lack the necessary restraints that accompany 
it. “The less coercive and dictatorial the political institutions of a society become,” Tocqueville 
felt, “the more it needed a system of sacred belief to help restrict the actions of both the rulers 
and the ruled” (Lipset 1963/1981: 9). But this system—which some have called traditional 
reciprocity94—was absent from American culture. Having founded itself on the notion of 
religious freedom, and having never experienced the constraints of feudal society, America was 
in a perilous place. Its citizens had “neither the instinctive patriotism of a monarchy nor the 
reflective patriotism of a republic”; they were comforted neither by traditional restraint (noblesse 
                                            
94 See Reinhard Bendix (1996), Nation-Building and Citizenship. 
 91 
oblige) nor the fraternity of democratic allegiance (Lipset 1963/1981: 65, citing Tocqueville). 
Ironically, the emphasis on freedom and equality had deprived Americans of community. They 
had become isolated, competitive individuals, with nothing to hold them together but their shared 
pitiful condition: 
As in periods of equality no man is compelled to lend his assistance to his fellow men, 
and none has any right to expect much support from them, everyone is at once 
independent and powerless. These two conditions, which must never be separately 
considered or confounded together, inspire the citizen of a democratic country with very 
contrary propensities. His independence fills him with self-reliance and pride among his 
equals; his debility makes him feel from time to time the want of some outward 
assistance, which he cannot expect from any of them, because they are all impotent and 
unsympathizing (cited in Bendix 1996: 59, emphasis added). 
 
The focus on equality, Tocqueville found, produced a tremendous degree of anxiety. If 
individuals were truly equal, they could no longer blame social conditions for the direction their 
life took. Whereas in feudal times, one was largely consigned to a certain kind of destiny, 
democracy promised equal opportunity for all. Suddenly, one’s successes were a matter of 
utmost importance; they became an indicator of personal merit (cf. Weber 1905/2005). The more 
equality individuals possessed, the more damning their failures.  
 To be sure, real equality has never existed in the United States or anywhere else.95 But 
the myth of the meritocracy has been enough to ensure a high degree of competition. Since 
personal success has been conflated with self-worth, it is no wonder that individuals compete for 
increasingly unreasonable aims. Anomie, it seems, is the inevitable result of a battle for status 
and superiority. 
 But status alone cannot account for our obsession with advancement. For a more 
complete explanation, we turn to the historian Frederick Jackson Turner. In an essay published 
the same year as Durkheim’s Division of Labor, Turner argued that advancement was embedded 
                                            
95 For an elaboration of this point, see John Rawls’ (1999) A Theory of Justice.  
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in America’s founding. The promise of manifest destiny, Turner claimed, was stamped into the 
minds of colonial Americans; the journey West shimmered as a symbol of freedom and 
possibility. The colonists of early America literally “pushed the frontier”; we do so 
metaphorically today, seeking constant growth and refusing to settle (Turner 1893). In fact, 
Americans seem to eschew stability in favor of an amorphous, chaotic, and ever-changing way of 
life. We may be moving westward, but we are walking toward a goal that is “infinitely far away” 
(Durkheim 1897/2006: 270).  
 Werner Sombart, a German sociologist, expanded on Turner’s analysis. In his masterful 
work, Why is there no socialism in the United States?, Sombart writes:  
If the American prays before the god of Success, he strives to lead a life acceptable to his 
god. . . . Neither the enjoyment of life in comfort to the full nor the final harmony of 
personality at peace with itself can be the American’s ideal in life; instead, this ideal is 
constant self-advancement” (Sombart 1906/1976: 13) 
 
Success is not only a cultural desire, Sombart notes, but a social imperative: “We therefore see in 
every American—beginning with the paperboy—restlessness, yearning, and compulsion to be 
way and beyond other people” (Sombart 1906: 12–13). This notion of “compulsion” is 
particularly crucial, for it mirrors Durkheim’s own understanding. In his chapter on egoistic 
suicide, Durkheim (1897/2006) observes that Protestants are compelled to pursue their own 
desires. Talcott Parsons explains: 
The essential point is that the Protestant’s freedom from group control is not optional. It 
is not a freedom to take his own religious responsibility or to relinquish it to a church as 
he sees fit. In so far as he is a Protestant in good standing he must assume this 
responsibility and exercise his freedom. He cannot devolve it on a church. The obligation 
to exercise religious freedom in this sense is a fundamental feature of protestantism as a 
religious movement. It may be said that this exemplifies quite literally Rousseau’s 
famous paradox, as a Protestant a man is, in certain respects, forced to be free” (Parsons 
1937: 332, emphasis in original). 
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 As Max Weber (1905/2005) observed, freedom and success are tightly linked. One is not 
truly free—that is, free from social demands; rather, “freedom” is simply the opportunity to 
prove oneself in competition, to assert dominance over one’s peers and demonstrate superiority. 
This plays out most obviously in the economic sphere. In the United States, Sombart notes, the 
emphasis on self-advancement has translated into an emphasis on profits. It is easy to see how 
one’s personal validation becomes tied up with the capitalist system: for success is, above all, a 
financial compulsion, prescribing the acquisition and consumption of valued goods.  
 Though class boundaries are actually quite rigid (more so than in Sombart’s time), 
advancement is sometimes possible. But the glimmer of hope present in American culture—the 
underdog entrepreneur who becomes a Steve Jobs or the industrious immigrant who earns a spot 
in the White House—is the exception rather than the rule. Steeped in the doctrine of upward 
mobility, but unable to attain it, the American finds himself forced to justify his failure; that is, to 
disprove it. Again, capitalism provides the solution: he retreats into the world of work, for this 
gives him purpose and also the buying power necessary for conspicuous consumption.  
 Yet as Robert Merton observes, what the American obtains is never quite enough. We are 
trapped in a “cult of success,” Merton writes, the measure of which is financial gain: “Money has 
been consecrated as a value in itself, over and above its expenditure for articles of consumption 
or its use for the enhancement of power. ‘Money’ is peculiarly well adapted to become a symbol 
of prestige” (Merton 1938: 189–90). Yet no amount of money can ever satisfy, for it is the 
struggle for more, and not the acquisition, that defines the American condition. “Americans are 
bombarded on all sides,” Merton writes, 
by precepts which affirm the right or, often, the duty of retaining the goal even in the 
face of repeated frustrations. Prestigeful representatives of the society reinforce the 
cultural emphasis. . . . The family, the school, and the workplace . . . join to provide the 
intense disciplining required if an individual is to retain intact a goal that remains 
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elusively beyond reach, if he is to be motivated by the promise of a gratification which 
is not redeemed (Merton 1938: 190–91). 
 
There is tremendous “ethical work,” Foucault tells us, in learning to adhere to social pressures 
(Schalet 2011). But the American norms associated with success are particularly demanding. 
“Not failure, but low aim, is crime,” Merton notes, so “those who draw in their ambitions” are 
swiftly penalized (Merton 1938: 192–193). As Durkheim writes in Suicide: 
A passion for the infinite is daily presented as a sign of moral distinction, when in fact it 
can only occur in disturbed minds which accord the status of a norm to the very 
disturbance from which they are suffering. The doctrine of progress despite all and as fast 
as possible has become an article of faith (1897/2006: 282). 
 
 When we are constantly exhorted “not to be a quitter” and that “there is no such word 
as ‘fail’” (Merton 1938: 192–93), how are we to react when we do fail? The emphasis on “lofty 
goals,” coupled with the inability to achieve them, is a recipe for disaster. This disaster is 
predicated, Merton says, on three cultural myths: 
1. All should strive for the same lofty goals since these are open to all 
2. Present seeming failure is but a way-station to ultimate success 
3. Genuine failure consists only in the lessening or withdrawal of ambition [. . . .] 
 
In sociological paraphrase, these axioms represent, first, the deflection of criticism of the 
social structure onto one’s self among those so situated in the society that they do not have 
full and equal access to opportunity; second, the preservation of a structure of social power 
by having individuals in the lower social strata identify themselves, not with their 
compeers, but with those at the top (whom they will ultimately join); and third, providing 
pressures for conformity with the cultural dictates of unslackened ambition by the threat of 
less than full membership in the society for those who fail to conform (Merton 1938: 193). 
 
 Though not the first to describe America’s anomic character (that honor goes to 
Tocqueville), Merton made several important contributions. His emphasis on wealth is 
particularly enlightening: “In the American Dream there is no final stopping point. The measure 
of ‘monetary success’ is conveniently indefinite and relative” (Merton 1938: 190). Merton cites 
the work of H. F. Clark, who finds that Americans always desire 25 percent more than their 
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current salary.96 But Americans care far more about becoming wealthy than they do about 
wealth. Upward mobility is an obsessive-compulsive pursuit, like locking and unlocking a door. 
 To achieve wealth is nothing; one must always aspire. Nevertheless, the demand for 
constant growth requires some proof that one is actually advancing. It is for this reason, Robert 
Bellah notes, that Americans cling to the notion of “life stages.” Along with the myth of 
meritocracy, which claims that anyone can advance, the myth of progress reminds us that we do 
in fact advance. Stagnancy is death97, so we are constantly exhorting ourselves to reach the next 
“life stage” lest we become complacent and wither away. 
 These life stages, Bellah explains, are often framed as crises. As the individual moves 
from childhood to adolescence to adulthood, she frees herself from the shackles of normative 
constraint. “Every life crisis, not just that of adolescence,” Bellah writes, “is a crisis of separation 
and individuation, but what the ever freer and more autonomous self is free for only grows more 
obscure” (Bellah et al. 1985: 81–82). Given the highly anomic character of the United States, life 
stages provide an illusion of direction; they “give coherence to the otherwise arbitrary life 
patterns [Americans] seem to be asked to create” (Bellah et al. 1985: 81). But coherence does not 
lead to satisfaction: life stages promote constant growth, and frame stability as a threat to 
freedom. Americans conflate “development” with perennial advancement, as if stability were a 
sign of decay rather than something desirable. Forget Marx! This Eriksonian perspective has all 
the trappings of teleology.  
                                            
96 Contemporary data may be different; this research is over 80 years old.  
97 I would not be surprised if this notion is borrowed from capitalism. Most capitalists claim that the economy must 
grow by several percentage points every year, or else it will flounder. Perhaps this progress imperative has been 
internalized by individuals; thus Americans feel that they must constantly be challenging themselves and growing, 
or else they will become obsolete. We are like Damien Hirst’s shark, moving ever forward, fleeing from death and 
toward the unknown.  
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 On the whole, Habits of the Heart is a brilliant analysis of anomie. It tells the story of a 
nation without direction, without community, and without constraint. Throughout the work, 
Bellah and his colleagues turn a critical eye toward the notion of freedom; their solution—
transcendence through community—is entirely Durkheimian.98 Of special importance is Bellah’s 
conception of the social fact. Though the term does not appear in Habits of the Heart, the 
concept is certainly present. Social facts, Bellah argues, are both necessary and desirable, but 
Americans flee from them like disease. Our allergy to constraint is ironic, Bellah says, because it 
is the only thing that can give us the freedom we so desire. In a personal correspondence shortly 
before his death, Bellah told me: “Freedom can only exist within a system of rules, set by 
authority; otherwise ‘freedom’ just produces the war of all against all which allows no freedom 
whatever.” He distinguished between “negative freedom”—the right not to be coerced—and 
“positive freedom.” The latter notion is so anathema to U.S. culture as to be almost 
incomprehensible: it is “freedom from sin, which means in effect, freedom to do the right thing.” 
This freedom is, in the American view, not freedom at all—it is a moral compulsion. But as 
Bellah and Durkheim both claim, one cannot even begin to be free without the necessary social 
conditions. “Here I think Kant’s ethical philosophy is very important,” Bellah writes. Ethical 
action, to act only if your action can be justified as valid for everyone, or the injunction to treat 
all others (and oneself) as ends in themselves and never as means, leads Kant to imagine a 
society in which everyone does that and so all are free.” 
 Yet as Bellah would readily admit, duty is not simply a religious compulsion, to be 
achieved for its own sake. It is pursued primarily—though not exclusively—as a path to well-
                                            
98 In fact, Bellah cites both Durkheim and Tocqueville (both of whose influence is obvious) toward the end of his 
monograph. Bellah was quite inspired by Durkheim, and published an edited volume of his work called Émile 
Durkheim on Morality and Society (1973).  
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being. In fact, Durkheim “criticizes the Kantian ethics as one-sided on account of paying sole 
attention to duty,” Parsons explains: 
There is, he says, also the element of the good, of desirability. A moral rule is not moral 
unless it is accepted as obligatory, unless the attitude toward it is quite different from that 
of expediency. But at the same time it is also not truly moral unless obedience to it is held 
to be desirable, unless the individual’s happiness and self-fulfillment are bound up with 
it. Only the combination of the two elements gives a complete account of the nature of 
morality” (Parsons 1937: 387).  
 
 But for most Americans, the idea that constraint can be desirable is puzzling at best. At 
worst, it is an oppressive claim that has served to justify tremendous inequality, a claim that has 
held the marginalized in its thrall down through the centuries. Enough!, Americans say, and we 
proceed to rip off the very bandages that hold us together. Everything associated with morality 
becomes an object of aversion; we fear even our own socialization, since it implies that we are 
not wholly in control of our selves. All that is passed on through latent pattern maintenance 
becomes a source of suspicion, so we purge ourselves of norms and values, or at least attempt to 
do so. (In fact, our shared appetite for freedom is itself a cultural norm.) Where, then, do we find 
shared meaning? Where do we find shared constraint? Without these forces, we will inevitably 
experience the twin tyrants of egoism and anomie.  
 Since the social is viewed with mistrust, the individual is forced to turn inward to 
discover meaning. But meaning can never come from oneself, so it has to be arbitrarily invented. 
“Values,” Bellah observes, “turn out to be the incomprehensible, rationally indefensible thing 
that the individual chooses when he or she has thrown off the last vestige of external influence 
and reached pure, contentless freedom” (Bellah et al. 1985: 79–80). 
 Contentless indeed! Our obsession with independence is both vacuous (lacking content) 
and unsatisfying (lacking contentment). And even when Americans do form social bonds, their 
emphasis is always on the individual. Bellah notes the popularity of Buddhist philosophy, for 
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example, which encourages a (rather vague) spiritual connection with all things. Even 
humanism, which champions our social essence, is ultimately devoid of content. The problem 
with these philosophies, Bellah writes, is that they talk about global unity but do not deliver 
concrete suggestions about how to live in society (Bellah et al. 1985: 81). And like most 
associations, they are purely voluntary: one stays with them only if they provide personal 
satisfaction. Social bonds are always means to an end, and any unifying doctrine is merely a 
mask under which hedonism hides: 
We live in a society that encourages us to cut free from the past, to define our own 
selves, to choose the groups with which we wish to identify. No tradition and no 
community in the United States is above criticism, and the test of the criticism is 
usually the degree to which the community or tradition helps the individual to find 
fulfillment (Bellah et al. 1985: 154).  
 
 The perennial search for fulfillment is a consequence of both egoism and anomie. Our 
weak social solidarity—based on voluntary, pleasurable association—gives us no feeling of 
transcendence or social purpose. We seek “fulfillment” in whatever way we can, often appealing 
to religious ideology. (In fact, egoism may explain the unusually high value Americans place on 
religious faith, especially in comparison to other democratized nations.) But fulfillment is also a 
struggle for satisfaction, trying to quench our “unslakable thirst” for pleasure (Durkheim 
1897/2006: 270). The emphasis on “finding oneself,” Bellah observes, is both an important and a 
fruitless task: since meaning is only possible through society, and Americans eschew social 
bonds, their effort will always fail.  
 The important tasks in life must always be done on one’s own. It is the American way. 
Reliance on anyone—parents, friends, institutions—is a sign of weakness. The connection to 
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egoism is clear, but since egoism and anomie always have the same cause99 (Pope 1976: 45–46), 
our allergy to dependence produces both in equal measure.  
 In a fascinating work, historian Barbara Taylor and psychologist Adam Phillips propose a 
radical claim: only kindness can constrain our desire, yet this is precisely what is lacking in the 
modern age. Our failure to engage with one another on a meaningful level—that is, our 
egoism—prevents us from forming collective restraints: 
It is our unkindness—our lack of affection and regard—that makes our desire possible; 
kindness is the way we stop ourselves desiring. . . . Kindness and prohibition are 
inextricable; kindness is our recognition of the forbidden and our refusal of it (Phillips & 
Taylor 2010: 85, 87). 
 
This is egoism in both the Durkheimian and the classical sense. First, the individual is forced to 
turn inward: he cannot expect kindness from his fellow Americans since they are (in Tocqueville 
words) “impotent and unsympathizing.” Instead, he must seek kindness for himself: that is, 
personal pleasure. “In this stark picture,” Phillips and Taylor write, “other people exist for the 
individual only insofar as they are the means, the instruments, of his own gratification. They 
have no significance other than the possibilities for satisfaction that they provide” (Phillips & 
Taylor 2010: 77).  
 The pursuit of pleasure must be seen in this light. The notion that Americans are “greedy” 
or “wealth-obsessed” may be true to an extent, but it is, I think, an inevitable result of social 
deprivation. Just as social solidarity creates mutual dependence, a lack of solidarity forces the 
individual to seek comfort outside of society. We have become exactly what Tocqueville 
warned: proud vessels of independence, floating along in a vast ocean. We are united only by a 
shared secret: that we are sinking. 
                                            
99 And the same cure: tight social bonds which create a “collective life” that “transcends the individual” and provide 
a “corpus of moral rules” (Durkheim 1902/1997: xlii–xliii; Durkheim 1897/2006: 349). 
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 “We depend on each other not just for our survival but for our very being,” Phillips writes: 
The self without sympathetic attachments is either a fiction or a lunatic. Modern Western 
society resists this fundamental truth, valuing independence above all things. Needing 
others is perceived as a weakness. Only small children, the sick, and the very elderly are 
permitted dependence on others; for everyone else, self-sufficiency and autonomy are 
cardinal virtues. Dependence is scorned even in intimate relationships, as though 
dependence were incompatible with self-reliance rather than the only thing that makes it 
possible (Phillips & Taylor 2010: 95–96).  
 
The problem, then, is twofold: not only do Americans lack social constraint—our society 
encourages us to “cut free” of obligations—but we also lack the modern prerequisite for 
constraint: organic solidarity. To be sure, we do have some norms and values in common: our 
collective conscience includes a high valuation of freedom, wealth, and advancement. But these 
are not enough to create what Durkheim is really after: a sense of mutual responsibility 
(Durkheim 1898/1973). It is only through our shared dependence that social facts—moral 
constraints on individual will—can emerge.  
 What dependence requires is not a highly conformist, Gemeinschaft culture. In fact, as 
Durkheim observed in The Division of Labor, individuation is a precondition of dependence. If 
the Gemeinschaft society was based on homophily, Gesellschaft is predicated on mutual need. 
As we perform increasingly specialized functions, the whole social fabric is needed to meet one 
person’s needs. In evaluating to what extent “dependence” is necessary, it may be helpful to 
consider Amy Schalet’s typology of individualism. In Not Under My Roof, a comparison of 
American and Dutch culture, Schalet distinguishes between “adversarial” and “interdependent” 
individualism. In adversarial individualism, “individual and society stand opposed to each other, 
which leaves uncertainty about the basis for social bonds between people and for self-restraint 
within them.” In interdependent individualism, “individual and society are conceptualized as 
mutually constitutive,” so constraint becomes “a matter of course” (Schalet 2011: 18).  
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 What makes adversarial individualism particularly dangerous, Schalet notes, is that it 
requires some “higher authority” to constrain desire. Since cohesion and restraint are not self-
regulative, as they are in an interdependent society, they must be imposed from above. This is 
precisely what Durkheim worried about when he described oppressive state intervention.100 The 
weaker the influence of voluntary associations (like the ancient corporation), the greater the need 
for external regulation.101 In interdependent individualism, this regulation “appears less 
necessary” (Schalet 2011: 19). Unsurprisingly, Schalet pairs this kind of individualism with 
Dutch society, and adversarial individualism with American society.  
 The greatest fear of the adversarial is that “society may overwhelm the individual” 
(Schalet 2011: 79). This notion is captured brilliantly by a popular aphorism of Rudyard Kipling: 
The individual has always had to struggle to keep from being overwhelmed by the tribe. 
To be your own man is a hard business. If you try it, you’ll be lonely often, and 
sometimes frightened. But no price is too high to pay for the privilege of owning yourself 
(Kipling 1967). 
 
Loneliness and fear are nothing compared to the prize of self-determination. This Nietzschean 
view has something in common with the Durkheimian: it sees society as a fundamentally “real” 
force external to the individual. But while Durkheim saw society as a necessary component of 
individuation, Nietzsche argued the opposite. Society became for him, as it is for most 
Americans, a threat that must be resisted at all costs. 
 Let us pause for a moment and take stock of these anomic conditions. Not only are 
Americans (like all human beings) vessels of endless desire, but they are encouraged—no, 
exhorted—to pursue their desire and never abandon it. On top of this, they resist the natural 
                                            
100 See especially his comments in the Second Preface to The Division of Labor (1902/1997). 
101 The decline of voluntary associations in the U.S. was the subject of the much-discussed book Bowling Alone: The 
Collapse and Revival of American Community (2000). Some sociologists feel that Robert Putnam overstated his 
case, but nonetheless, the book is considered one of the most important studies of American culture.  
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constraint that comes from social ties; that it, they reject both the direct and the solidary cure to 
anomie. The American approach, it may be said, is like fleeing from the only doctor who can 
save your life.  
 Individualism, as Schalet’s work attests, is not the problem. It is our style of 
individualism that needs to change. Our freedom is “useless,” Durkheim writes, unless it is 
tempered by fraternal bonds. The individualism of the eighteenth century, whose unfettered 
freedom still plagues us today, will not do. But neither will the conformism of the Gemeinschaft 
society. So it is “a matter of completing, extending, and organizing individualism, not of 
restraining and combating it” (Durkheim 1898/1973: 56).  
 To what extent are we fulfilling Durkheim’s maxim? If Schalet is any clue, we are failing 
most miserably. In the next section, we will extend the “anomic nation” thesis further, analyzing 
it in light of contemporary research.  
 
ANOMIE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN SOCIETY: 
 In an excellent book on anomie and mental illness—perhaps the best companion to this 
thesis aside from Durkheim’s own work—Liah Greenfeld writes: 
Placed in control over our destiny, we are far more likely to be dissatisfied with it, than 
would be a person deprived of any such control: not having a choice, such a person 
would try to do the best with what one has and enjoy it as far as possible. A truly 
believing person would also feel s/he has no right to find fault with the order of things 
created by God, much less to try and change it to one’s own liking—one’s situation in 
life would be perceived as both unchangeable and just. Conversely, the presence of 
choice, the very ability to imagine oneself in a position different from one currently 
occupied or that of one’s parents, and the idea that social orders in general are created by 
people and may be changed make one suspect that one’s current situation is not the best 
one can have and to strive for a better one (Greenfeld 2013: 28).  
 
In no other generation has the presence of choice been more pervasive, or more overwhelming. 
That Fast Company magazine recently dubbed millenials Generation Flux is all too fitting. We 
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are living in a tremendously unstable time, and yet this instability is lauded as a tremendous 
thrill. Members of Generation Flux are no longer constrained by such prosaic tasks as 
“employment.” Instead, we pursue any number of short-term positions, mastering them within 
six weeks and then moving on. As Jean Twenge (2006) notes in the aptly named Generation Me, 
our employment expectations are wildly unrealistic, constrained only by the limits of 
imagination. Nearly all young Americans intend to become actors, athletes, or artists. Each of 
these positions, it should be noted, is associated with fame, fortune, creative exercise, and (in 
theory) a minimal level of grunt work. That many young Americans expect to be famous is not 
entirely surprising: access to fame has certainly increased with the advent of Youtube and other 
social networks. Highly publicized stories, like Justin Bieber’s rise to fame, give the illusion that 
anyone can make it if they have the talent. Nonetheless, most Americans will not end up on 
MTV; instead, they will fill low-wage, somewhat unsatisfying jobs. That they hope otherwise is 
natural, and perhaps even desirable (for one should never give up aspirations entirely102), but the 
fact that they expect otherwise is cause for concern. “If [the anomic] disturbance is profound,” 
Durkheim warns, “it even attacks the principles that regulate the distribution of citizens between 
various jobs; since the relationships between the various parts of society are inevitably modified, 
the ideas that express these relationships can no longer remain the same” (1897/2006: 277). 
Suddenly everyone feels s/he is entitled to the best and only the best, and the notion of having to 
“settle” for a mediocre (read: typical) job is anathema.103 
 Yet in 2013, 35 percent of millennials (ages 18–32) were unemployed (Pew Research 
Center 2013). And of those lucky enough to find jobs, “fully half (49%) say they have taken a 
                                            
102 “Of course, a man does sometimes hope against all reason and, even if it is unreasonable, hope has its joys. So it 
may be that this sustains him for a time, but it cannot indefinitely survive the repeated disappointments of 
experience” (Durkheim 1897/2006: 271).  
103 As an anecdote, an acquaintance of mine recently declined four job offers because they weren’t quite what she 
was looking for. She is now unemployed.  
 104 
job they didn’t want just to pay the bills, with 24% saying they have taken an unpaid job to gain 
work experience. More than one-third (35%) say that, as a result of the poor economy, they have 
gone back to school” (Pew Research Social & Demographic Trends 2012). But miraculously, 
only 9 percent say they “don’t think they will ever have enough to live the life they want,” 
compared to a whopping 72 percent of people aged 35 or older (Pew Research Social & 
Demographic Trends 2012). Clearly, there is a mismatch here between expectation and reality!  
 Unrealistic expectations go above and beyond employment. In 2013, 34 percent of 
millennials (ages 18–32) lived with their parents, and a shocking 50 percent of non–college 
students (ages 18–24) did so (Pew Research Center 2013).104 Yet optimism about housing does 
not seem to reflect this reality. Americans are inundated with imagery of luxurious, exquisite 
homes, at a time when housing is getting more and more expensive. Twenge notes that on shows 
like Friends, characters with low-paying jobs (waiter, etc.) somehow live in well-furnished 
apartments in New York City. (For a more recent example, see HBO’s Girls, in which four 
Oberlin graduates miraculously live in multi-room apartments despite being underemployed.) 
“We’re constantly exposed to people who have more than we do and rarely see those who have 
less,” Twenge writes, “a lack of perspective that’s a formula for dissatisfaction” (Twenge 2006: 
132). Because we often live in class-segregated neighborhoods, the average person has almost no 
confrontation with poverty (unless they’re poor themselves). Yet the media constantly shows us 
people wealthier than ourselves. When we have nowhere to look but up, our expectations will 
inevitably be unfeasible. 
 But millennials are not the only Americans with quixotic aims. When it comes to 
marriage, most Americans have dangerously high expectations. This was not always the case. 
                                            
104 Although the Great Recession of 2008 is partly to blame, it accounts for only a two percent increase (Pew 
Research Social & Demographic Trends 2013b).  
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Marriage was once a practical consideration: the merging of two families for financial reasons. 
But as Foucault (1976/1990) notes, we have seen a shift from the “deployment of alliance” to the 
“deployment of sexuality.” While the deployment of alliance focused largely on familial bonds, 
the deployment of sexuality is a matter of personal gratification. This historical shift, it goes 
without saying, accompanied the rise of individualism and the declining importance of the 
family.105 In the premodern age, marital bonds were anything but romantic; now, romance is 
their sole purpose. A 2013 Pew study finds that 88 percent of Americans believe love is the most 
important reason for marriage. Practical concerns like reproduction and financial stability are far 
less prominent: 49 percent and 28 percent, respectively (Pew Research Center 2014b).106  
 But the linking of marriage and love is precisely what makes the former so problematic. 
Love has become an almost utopian ideal, so marriage—which is appropriate only for the 
deepest, most passionate love—is even further out of reach. In an individualistic culture like the 
United States, this effect is particularly keen. Lacking a communitarian framework, individuals 
cannot count on one another for support; even friendships are ultimately plastic.107 Romantic 
partners become essential for us, for they fulfill all of our unmet social longings. It is here, and 
not in friendship, that we find fulfillment.108  
 Why not friendship? As William Deresiewicz (2009) notes in a brilliant essay, friendship 
means almost nothing in the modern age. “Having been relegated to our screens,” he asks, “are 
our friendships now anything more than a form of distraction?” Up to the nineteenth century, 
                                            
105 Durkheim himself describes this shift in his Second Preface to the Division of Labor (1902/1997): it is the loss of 
familial influence, he writes, that makes professional groups so necessary. Still, family has not completely declined 
in importance—76 percent of Americans still say that family is the most important element of their life (Pew 
Research Social & Demographic Trends 2010). 
106 Obviously, having children is not just a “practical concern.” But the idea that one marries so as to have children 
was, historically, quite practical. During the Industrial Revolution, many families would have eight or more children 
and then send them off to work in factories, thereby increasing the total income.  
107 I mean this in both senses of the word: friendships are mercurial and unstable, but also artificial.  
108 I am grateful to Matthew Edmonds for this point.  
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friendships meant deep, lasting bonds—but these ties, which he calls “classical friendships,” are 
all but extinguished. “Friendship has become the characteristically modern relationship,” 
Deresiewicz writes: 
Modernity believes in equality, and friendships, unlike traditional relationships, are 
egalitarian. Modernity believes in individualism. Friendships serve no public purpose and 
exist independent of all other bonds. Modernity believes in choice. Friendships, unlike 
blood ties, are elective; indeed, the rise of friendship coincided with the shift away from 
arranged marriage. Modernity believes in self-expression. Friends, because we choose 
them, give us back an image of ourselves. Modernity believes in freedom. Even modern 
marriage entails contractual obligations, but friendship involves no fixed commitments. 
The modern temper runs toward unrestricted fluidity and flexibility, the endless play of 
possibility, and so is perfectly suited to the informal, improvisational nature of friendship. 
We can be friends with whomever we want, however we want, for as long as we want 
(Deresiewicz 2009). 
 
Deprived of meaningful bonds, it is no wonder that Americans turn to romance—and particularly 
to marriage—in search of happiness. But the painful irony is that wanting a perfect marriage 
makes such a thing impossible. As Andrew Cherlin notes in The Marriage-Go-Round (2010), the 
American attitude toward marriage presents a terrible paradox: we value marriage above all else, 
and yet we also expect more from it than anything else. So we enter into marriages, “try them 
out,” and then quickly divorce if we’re not satisfied. It is, as Cherlin suggests in his title, a 
vicious circle, and explains why Americans have one of the highest divorce rates in the world.  
 Not all Americans have a positive attitude toward marriage. Indeed, nearly 40 percent of 
Americans say the institution is becoming obsolete. Just over 60 percent of unmarried adults say 
they’d like to get married, and only 29 percent of divorcées say they’d get married again (Pew 
Research Social & Demographic Trends 2013a). This last statistic sheds some doubt on Cherlin’s 
thesis: if Americans are so reluctant to remarry, how can their efforts be called a “marriage-go-
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round”?109 Nonetheless, most Americans do marry at some point in their lives: among those 45 
or older, about 90 percent have been married. And the value of marriage is clear: a whopping 84 
percent of Americans say marriage is a very important, if not the most important, part of their 
lives (Pew Research Social & Demographic Trends 2013a.).  
 Marriage rates have fallen significantly in the past few decades: only 50.5 percent of 
Americans ages 18 and older were married in 2012, the lowest since at least 1920. But this 
should not give us the illusion that love is becoming less important: marriage is decreasing 
because other avenues for expressing love—cohabitation, etc.—are becoming more common. 
Seventy percent of Americans were in a committed relationship in 2012, with many choosing 
cohabitation instead of (or on the way to) marriage (Pew Research Center 2014b).  
 What does all this have to do with anomie? As I have hoped to show, marriage—and 
romantic love more generally—is the avenue through which Americans expect to achieve their 
wildest desires. This would not be such a problem if Americans weren’t also resistant to the very 
thing that makes lasting marriage possible: commitment. This claim is somewhat ironic given 
that 81 percent of Americans view “making a lifelong commitment” as a primary reason for 
marriage (Pew Research Center 2014b). Commitment, in my estimation, entails not only a 
commitment to stay married—for this may well be achieved without satisfying desires. Rather, it 
is a commitment to meet another’s needs even when this requires tremendous sacrifice. Sacrifice, 
a communitarian value, is anathema to American culture: even in the best marriage it may be a 
difficult endeavor. In modern society, Barbara Taylor and Adam Phillips observe,  
The ideal lover or spouse is a freewheeling agent for whom the giving and taking of love 
is a disposable lifestyle option; neediness, even in this arena of intense desires and 
longings, is ultimately contemptible (Phillips & Taylor 2010: 96). 
                                            
109 As marriage expert Stephanie Coontz explains in a personal correspondence, individuals may not remarry but 
still repartner. The act of divorce might sour one’s attitude toward marriage, but not toward relationships in general. 
So the anomic tendency remains.  
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 This is our quandary: we desperately crave intimacy, but this cannot be found in the 
modern relationship—at least not in the modern friendship. It is not given to us by ascriptive 
ties, nor can we earn it through voluntary association. So we turn to romantic relationships, the 
one vestige of amity remaining for us. We do this to feel less alone, to share our lives with 
another, to feel part of something greater than ourselves. Our partners want this just as much as 
we do, but we are unable to provide it for them. Just as much as we dread isolation, we fear 
commitment, obligation, and constraints on our will. Expecting so much, but unable to attain it, 
we are beset with anomie.  
 Unrealistic expectations have also influenced our buying habits. As Tocqueville 
diagnosed, Americans are highly concerned with products; they are a reflection not only of 
status, but identity. Yet as Twenge notes, contemporary Americans take things a step further. We 
do not simply want things for others’ sake—that is, as an expression of status. We really do want 
what others have! And this is, Twenge argues, a new development: we have moved beyond 
“keeping up with the Joneses” (Twenge 2007: 100). Our obsession with stuff has become 
internalized. “In the past,” Twenge writes, “many people wanted a big house to impress people. 
GenMe wants a big house so each family member can have as much personal space as possible, 
consistent with the needs of the individual” (Twenge 2007: 100–101). In contrast, when Werner 
Sombart wrote in 1906 of America’s taste for “bigness,” he remarked: “Being big in quantitative 
terms necessarily goes hand in hand with a high estimation of its success” (Sombart 1906: 12). 
This is no longer (exclusively) the case: Americans really do want more space; impressing their 
peers is merely an added bonus.110  
                                            
110 Still, we may wonder how “new” this desire really is. I highly doubt that even in Sombart’s time, the emphasis on 
bigness was exclusively tied to success. That bigness is even an indicator of success in the first place demonstrates 
its desirability. 
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 Consumption, of course, extends beyond a desire for grandness. It is above all a search 
for the strange. “One thirsts for novelty,” Durkheim writes, “for unknown indulgences and 
sensations that are as yet unnamed, but which lose all their appeal as soon as they have been 
experienced” (1897/2006: 281). The search for novelty is part of what Merton calls 
“considerations of technical expediency” (Merton 1938: 189), which in layman’s terms we might 
call pleasure-seeking. The search for pleasure is immune to institutional means, Merton warns; it 
is a purely utilitarian calculus. 
 One of the most frightening consequences of this, not often discussed by sociologists, is 
the effect on the brain. As Norman Doidge observes in The Brain That Changes Itself (2007), 
technology has given us unbridled access to pleasure, and the changes to the brain are dramatic. 
Dopamine, the neurotransmitter most associated with pleasure, responds primarily to novelty; 
since old stimuli “lose all their appeal,” as Durkheim says, Americans constantly seek new 
sources of pleasure. In the twenty-first century, these include pornography, gambling, and drug 
use (among others). Pornography is especially pernicious, Doidge notes, since individuals can 
expose themselves to thousands of bodies in just a few minutes of online searching. The novelty 
of switching between scandalous images releases a tremendous amount of dopamine111, more 
than the human brain can handle. Our dopamine receptors become quickly overloaded; neurons 
begin to slow the production of new receptors so as to stem the flow of dopamine. In some cases, 
receptors are actually removed from the neuron, a process known as “downregulation.”112 
 The result is grim. Not only are there physical changes in the body (difficulty 
experiencing arousal, for example), but all aspects of life become less pleasurable. Since there 
are fewer receptors for dopamine binding, the brain is literally unable to experience as much 
                                            
111 And in fact, the scandal is part of the pleasure, as Doidge points out.  
112 I am grateful to Avery O’Hara, Elizabeth Cooke, and Dr. Tracie Paine for providing feedback on this analysis.  
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pleasure as it used to. Something as simple as a summer walk becomes utterly quotidian, utterly 
devoid of joy. To maintain the same intake of dopamine, there is only one way to adapt: by 
seeking out even more pleasure. As never before, anomie is impacting on our brains, hijacking 
our neural pathways and making true satisfaction impossible.  
 The increasing difficulty of pleasure is what psychologists call the “hedonic treadmill” 
(Schwartz 2005). As Barry Schwartz writes in The Paradox of Choice, the hedonic treadmill has 
reached new heights in contemporary America, as individuals are exposed to an overwhelming 
array of choices. And the more choices we have, the less we are satisfied. (Hence the paradox.) 
Schwartz’s solution is not to increase social constraint, but to impose arbitrary restrictions on 
choice. He encourages individuals to be satisficers, not maximizers: that is, to choose the first 
thing that satisfies some explicit criteria. When searching for a pair of jeans, for example, we 
might consider only the criteria “tight-fitting” and “under $30.” In the work realm, it might be a 
job that is “less than 40 hours/week” and “not in a cubicle” and “includes dental care.” Though 
their approaches are different, Durkheim and Schwartz agree that some constraint is necessary 
and desirable. 
 Yet as Durkheim emphatically argued in Suicide, constraint cannot come from the 
individual; it must be imposed from without. To limit our options is necessary, and Schwartz’s 
tricks may help us feel less overwhelmed when doing so. But they do not solve the fundamental 
problem, which is the cultural source of desire. To return to Jean Twenge’s research, we are 
confronted with the fact that our generation “anticipates more at a time when it’s more difficult 
to attain even the bare minimum. . . . It’s like a cruel joke—we’ve been raised to expect riches, 
and can barely afford a condo and a crappy health plan” (Twenge 2007: 134). But unrealistic 
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expectations are part of the American way. To abandon one’s wild hopes, as Merton observed, 
would be to resign oneself to a pathetic life.  
 Part of the problem, as Tocqueville noticed early on, is that our emphasis on equality is 
tied to the notion of advancement. “It is the strong egalitarian element in American society,” 
Marco Orrù writes, “coupled with the emphasis on success that fosters anomic imbalance” (Orrù 
1990: 234). Equality is linked to what many have called the “myth of the meritocracy.” While 
Durkheim argued that poverty could “protect” against anomie, this is not the case in 
contemporary America.   When one believes in the possibility of advancement, poverty no longer 
protects; indeed, it becomes irrelevant. Even the poorest may experience anomie, since they 
strive just as much for wealth as other Americans. Only in the United States could a president 
claim, as George Bush did in 2002, that “the low-income home buyer can have just as nice a 
house as anybody else!” (quoted in Ferguson 2010).  
 As Robert Merton observed in 1938, and Thomas Frank confirmed in 2004113, all social 
classes identify with the wealthy, and all want what they possess. As Orrù warns, “Anomie is 
more likely ‘in a society which place a high premium on economic affluence for all its 
members’” (Orrù 1990: 234, citing Merton 1938: 681). Orrù cites Parsons’ concept of 
“universalistic achievement,” which fuses equality and upward mobility:  
The combination [of universalism] with achievement values . . . places the accent on the 
valuation of goal-achievement and of instrumental actions leading to such goal 
achievement” (Parsons 1951: 183, cited in Orrù 1990: 235; see also LaCapra 1972) 
 
To be sure, the combination of universalism and achievement is nothing new. As Friedrich 
Nietzsche wrote in The Birth of Tragedy (published several years before Durkheim’s dissertation): 
                                            
113 Frank’s What’s the Matter with Kansas? argues that the working class largely vote for Republicans (i.e., against 
their class interests) because they identify with the wealthy and aspire to be in their place one day.  
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People should not be surprised when the fruits of this optimism ripen, when a society that 
has been thoroughly leavened with this kind of culture, right down to the lowest levels, 
gradually starts trembling in an extravagant turmoil of desires, when the belief in earthly 
happiness for everyone, when faith in the possibility of such a universal knowledge 
culture gradually changes into the threatening demand for such an Alexandrian earthly 
happiness, into the invocation of a Euripidean deus ex machina! (1872/1999: 58) 
 
 But no society has embraced this “extravagant turmoil” as much as our own. As we 
mentioned above, magazines like Fast Company actually praise the notion of a generation in flux. 
“The next decade or two will be defined more by fluidity than by any new, settled paradigm,” 
Robert Safian (2012) notes. “If there is a pattern to all this, it is that there is no pattern. The most 
valuable insight is that we are, in a critical sense, in a time of chaos.” He proceeds to interview 
various members of Generation Flux, admiring their penchant for instability: 
DJ Patil is a GenFluxer. He has worked in academia, in government, in big public 
companies, and in startups; he is a technologist and a businessman; a teacher and a 
diplomat. He is none of those things and all of them, and who knows what he will be or 
do next? Certainly not him. “That doesn’t bother me,” he says. “I’ll find something” 
(Safian 2012).  
 
 To expect stability from traditional society, Safian argues, “is a trap.” Instead, we must 
bend to the cosmic winds, learning not just to accept, but to welcome insecurity: “What defines 
GenFlux is a mind-set that embraces instability, that tolerates—and even enjoys—recalibrating 
careers, business models, and assumptions. We’re experiencing “constant pressure to learn new 
things and adapt to new situations, and [there’s] no guarantee that you’ll stay in a single 
industry,” Safian writes. “It can be daunting. It can be exhausting. It can also be exhilarating.”  
 Can it? Perhaps. But whether such a life is desirable in the long run is another question 
entirely. Safian glosses over this concern, instead expounding on the pleasures of our chaotic 
age. “If ambiguity is high and adaptability is required,” he says, “then you simply can’t afford to 
be sentimental about the past. Future-focus is a signature trait for Generation Flux.” Part of this 
“past,” which of course Safian fails to mention, is our relationship with family and community. 
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As psychologist Joshua Coleman observes in his book When Parents Hurt (2007), parental 
estrangement is at an all-time high. Coleman is stunned by the frequency of estrangements in his 
clinical practice, and estimates that familial estrangements in general have reached 
unprecedented levels, in large part due to American attitudes toward dependence. 
 “Nostalgia is a natural human emotion,” Safian tells us, “a survival mechanism that 
pushes people to avoid risk by applying what we’ve learned and relying on what’s worked 
before. It’s also about as useful as an appendix right now.” Instead, he says, millennials must 
learn to be quick on our feet, ready to abandon old ways at a moment’s notice. “The quest for 
solid rules is pointless, he says, “since we will be constantly rethinking them.” Importantly, 
Safian takes as his example the shift from agrarian to urbanized society. Although some were 
anxious about the changes, he notes, the anxiety was uncalled for in retrospect: “From those days 
of ambiguity emerged a century of tremendous progress.” Whether we have really “progressed” 
is debatable: as Foucault once said in an interview with Noam Chomsky, the better word is 
“transformation.” Nonetheless, journalists like Robert Safian extoll the merits of instability, 
where “anything settled is vulnerable” and anything chaotic is praiseworthy.  
 In contrast to that view, I submit that our real vulnerability comes from the refusal to 
settle. If that claim sounds overly conservative, I would remind the reader that stability is a 
fundamental human need; to be constantly uprooted from established habits is a recipe for 
mental illness.114 In his chapter on anomic suicide, Durkheim rightly criticizes “these theories 
that celebrate the benefits of instability” (1897/2006: 282). Social change is necessary, to be 
sure, but “the doctrine of progress despite all and as fast as possible” (1897/2006: 282) is 
simply not practical. 
                                            
114 On this point, see Liah Greenfeld’s Mind, Modernity, Madness (2013). 
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 The thirst for progress is perhaps most severe in the United States due to its tremendous 
wealth. To be sure, poverty rates are still quite high—15 percent as of 2012, and 22 percent for 
children—but that does not preclude high aspirations (Pew Research Center 2014a). For no 
matter our income, we have as our role models some of the wealthiest people in the world; this 
places our desires rather higher than those of other nations. Indeed, the wealth gap in the United 
States, among the worst in the world (Fisher 2011), may explain the unrealistic aspirations of 
most Americans. The larger the gap, we may posit, the more likely a country is to experience 
anomie.115 (Of course, other factors, like our cultural emphasis on advancement, may play a 
more important role.) Yet wealth is not only pernicious for its own sake (as an enabler of desire), 
nor even for its symbolic role in upward mobility. It is also, as Durkheim warns, linked to the 
myth of independence: 
Wealth . . . by the powers that it confers, gives us the illusion that we depend only on 
ourselves. By lessening the resistance that things put in our way, it persuades us that they 
can be constantly overcome. And, the less one feels limited, the more intolerable any 
limitation becomes” (1897/2006: 278). 
 
“By exalting the individual,” Durkheim continues, wealth “constantly risks awakening the spirit 
of rebellion that is the very fount of immorality” (1897/2006: 278.). This Mertonian point—in 
which anomie produces deviant behavior—has been confirmed by recent research. A series of 
seven studies, entitled “Higher social class predicts increased unethical behavior,” finds that the 
affluent are more likely to “break the law while driving,” “exhibit unethical decision-making 
tendencies,” “take valued goods from others,” “lie in a negotiation,” “cheat to increase their 
                                            
115 Measuring anomie is notoriously difficult, and I do not attempt to do so here. This is merely an educated guess on 
my part; further research is needed to evaluate this point. Trautmann et al. (2013) do find that the deviant behavior 
associated with affluence (which we discuss below) is higher in countries with a greater wealth gap; this seems to 
provide preliminary support for my claim. But this only shows that the wealth gap makes the wealthy more anomic; 
it does not say whether the same is true for the poor. (I suspect that it is.)  
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chances of winning a prize,” and “endorse unethical behavior at work” (Piff et al. 2012). The 
article’s analysis reveals a clear relationship between independence and anomie: 
Upper-class individuals’ relative independence from others and increased privacy in their 
professions may provide fewer structural constraints and decreased perceptions of risk 
associated with committing unethical acts. The availability of resources to deal with the 
downstream costs of unethical behavior may increase the likelihood of such acts among 
the upper class. In addition, independent self-construals among the upper class may shape 
feelings of entitlement and inattention to the consequences of one’s actions on others. A 
reduced concern for others’ evaluations and increased goal-focus could further instigate 
unethical tendencies among upper-class individuals. Together, these factors may give rise 
to a set of culturally shared norms among upper-class individuals that facilitates unethical 
behavior (Piff et al. 2012, emphasis added).   
 
This quotation is astounding, and deserves a close reading. Wealth, the authors argue, 
encourages “relative independence from others,” which “may provide fewer structural 
constraints.” Here Piff and his colleagues establish a clear relationship between integration and 
regulation (that is, between egoism and anomie). Furthermore, independence creates “inattention 
to the consequences one’s actions on others,” so mutual responsibility is lost. Finally, these 
individuals experience “increased goal-focus,” with a concomitant neglect of socially approved 
means. This is a classic description of anomie!116  
 The authors go on to make an observation: wealthy individuals, because they are often 
trained in corporate finance, are more likely to see “self-interest maximization”117 as their 
ultimate goal. This approach “may lead people to view greed as positive and beneficial”—
indeed, they may “even moralize positive beliefs about greed” (Piff et al. 2012). Summarizing 
from this study and from the discussion above, I conclude that wealth produces anomie for 
several reasons:  
                                            
116 Fortunately, the authors do take note of this connection; they quote Durkheim’s Suicide: “From the top to the 
bottom of the ladder, greed is aroused” (1897/2006: 281). But unfortunately, the authors go on to misinterpret 
Durkheim’s work: “Although greed may indeed be a motivation all people have felt at points in their lives, we argue 
that greed motives are not equally prevalent across all social strata” (Piff et al. 2011). Indeed, as the quotes above 
demonstrate, Durkheim was well aware of this fact!  
117 This term is similar to Merton’s concept of “technical expediency.”  
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(1) It provides increased resources to satisfy desire (expanding the realm of possibility),  
(2) It encourages independence, which creates egoism and a lack of moral constraint,  
(3) It “persuades us that [limitations] can be constantly overcome”118  
(4) It fosters a culture of greed (e.g., by training officials in economics, which emphasizes 
the “bottom line”).  
 
The first is a matter of material conditions (which of course influence the imagination), the second 
is a matter of social solidarity, the third is a matter of habit-formation, and the fourth is a cultural 
consideration. This list is not, of course, exhaustive, but it gives us some idea of the anomie that 
wealthy individuals experience. As Trautmann et al. (2013) note, these results are particularly 
dramatic compared to other countries. But this should come as no surprise, since the culture of 
greed among the American elite is so pervasive (Ferguson 2010). It was, many have argued, the 
cause of the 2008 financial collapse (Piff et al. 2012; Ferguson 2010). Indeed, it would not be 
stretching things too far to say that anomie played a key role in the Great Recession.  
 Wealth is, as Merton points out, only one of the ideals for which Americans strive. 
Because it is easily quantifiable, and allows for conspicuous consumption, it is perhaps the 
most effective status symbol. Yet status is a much more complicated matter; it includes not 
only financial resources but all of the “primary goods” (to borrow John Rawls’ phrase) that one 
might desire. These include rights, opportunities, and prestigious positions. The struggle for 
status—which may exceed class a symbol of advancement—produces tremendous competition. 
This is not a new observation, of course: Tocqueville and Weber both observed it, but Alain de 
Botton’s (2004) research suggests that it is still true today. That Americans are competitive is 
such an obvious point as to be almost banal. But what is the origin of this competition, and 
what is its consequence?  
                                            
118 Durkheim 1897/2006: 278. 
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 The answer to both of these questions is the same. Competition is the inevitable result of 
status anxiety, in which the individual’s worth is measured by prestige. In a society with poor 
integration, individuals do not “feel solidary with a collective existence”119—their egoism forces 
them to turn inward to gain a sense of identity. Individuals find that they must prove their worth, 
not only to others but also to themselves.120 And in the United States, there is no better measure 
of worth than success; specifically, success over others (Sombart 1906). It is fairly obvious that 
not everyone can triumph over others; in fact, only a small minority can do so. Nor can everyone 
have access to status-conferring goods, for these are quite scarce. Egoism leads to insecurity, 
which leads to competition as a means of securing self-worth.  
 But competition also produces egoism, since the conflict between individuals prevents 
fraternal bonds: “It is not good for a man to live, so to speak, on a war footing among his 
immediate companions. The feelings of general hostility and mutual distrust that result, as well 
as the tensions necessarily caused, become distressing conditions when they are endemic” 
(1897/2006: xliii). The distress of egoism, moreover, quickly becomes anomic distress. When 
cohesion is successful, individuals “come together . . . to associate with one another and not feel 
isolated in the midst of their adversaries.” And “in the end,” Durkheim tells us, they “lead the 
same moral life together” (1897/2006: xliv). Shared interests lead to shared constraints, but in a 
highly competitive environment like the United States, this can never happen. Instead, 
individuals forgo socially approved means and focus only on their own success (Merton 1938). 
 The above paragraphs have been highly theoretical; let’s look at some recent data. In 
2011, Sarah Konrath and her colleagues at the University of Michigan conducted a meta-analysis 
                                            
119From Suicide, cited in Nisbet 1965: 66. 
120 On this point, see the concept of “salvation anxiety” in Weber 1905/2005. The Calvinists, who struggled to prove 
they were the “elect” rather than the “damned,” may have been the precursor to our modern status anxiety. But as 
Erich Fromm observes, the obsession with fame—an obvious status symbol—may have emerged as early as the 
Renaissance (Fromm 1941/1966: 66). 
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of empathy among college students. The results are startling. The analysis, which included a 
whopping 72 samples from American colleges, found that “college kids today are about 40 
percent lower in empathy than their counterparts of 20 or 30 years ago,” with the biggest drop 
occurring after the year 2000. Though the authors were primarily concerned with media imagery 
(arguing that portrayals of violence lead to poor empathy), they also felt that “exposure to an 
increasingly hyper competitive social environment” might be responsible (Mozes 2011). 
 Though the evidence is anecdotal, students at highly competitive institutions like the 
University of Chicago have been known to rip out pages from library books so that other 
students cannot access the information. One Ivy League student who visited Oberlin College 
was reportedly shocked to discover that Oberlin has a student writing center. The notion that 
students would willingly help each other with papers was a threat to the competitive spirit. 
Generation Me, indeed. 
 In fact, a study published last year by Jean Twenge provides even more confirmation of 
her GenMe analysis. “In nationally representative samples of high school and college students,” 
Twenge notes,  
values have shifted toward extrinsic (money, fame, and image) concerns and away from 
intrinsic (community, affiliation) concerns. These trends have mostly negative 
consequences, such as lower empathy, less concern for others, and less civic engagement 
(e.g., interest in social issues, government, and politics) (Twenge 2013). 
 
Such trends continued even during the 2007 financial crisis (Park et al. 2014), though not to the 
extent Durkheim would have predicted. Although “wanting a job making lots of money 
continued to increase” during the recession, “the increase in the importance of money leveled 
off, and the increase in desiring to own expensive material items reversed” (Park et al. 2014). If 
competition is a source of anomie (as I have argued), we would expect financial difficulties to 
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have strengthened the competitive drive.121 Yet that does not seem to be the case: longitudinal 
data from 1976 to 2010 finds that “collectivism was high and individualism was low during 
times of economic deprivation” (Park et al. 2014.).  
 Even so, it is clear over the long term that competition is increasing in the United States, 
especially among young Americans. Indeed, as Sarah Konrath observes, “Many people see the 
current group of college students . . . as one of the most self-centered, narcissistic, competitive, 
confident and individualistic in recent history” (cited in Mozes 2011).  
 We live, as I have endeavored to show, in an anomic nation. Our historic emphasis on 
freedom and equality, coupled with endless striving, self-advancement, individualism, wealth, 
competition, and the glorification of instability, have produced tremendous consequences. We 
have seen how this plays out in the realm of employment, friendships, romance, and education, 
to name just a few. Throughout this section, we have largely focused on the cultural causes of 
anomie and their damaging social effects. But as Stjepan Meštrović emphatically reminds us, 
anomie is not only harmful to society; it is “painful to the individual experiencing it and it 
hurts.” If this anomie is not properly addressed, it “eventually produce[s] physical, organismic 
pain” (Meštrović 1987: 571, emphasis added)122. In the next section, we will explore the 
manifestations of anomie in the United States, delving into some of our most pressing social 
problems, including anxiety, depression, school shootings, and solider suicide.  
 
 
                                            
121 This is based on Durkheim’s point that a sudden change in social state produces dysregulation.  
122 As evidence for this claim, consider that Durkheim included a section on the psychological effects of anomie, 
egoism, and altruism in Suicide. Throughout his works, Durkheim uses the following words to describe anomie (this 
list is not exhaustive): anxiety, weariness, disenchantment, unease, agitation, discontent, and groping.  
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Mental Health 
 “No living person can be happy or even live at all unless his needs are sufficiently well 
adjusted to his means,” Durkheim writes: 
In other words, if he demands more than can be provided for him, or even something other 
than can be provided, he will be constantly irritated and unable to function without 
suffering. And an action that cannot be accomplished without suffering tends not to be 
repeated. Aptitudes that are not satisfied atrophy and, since the aptitude for life is only the 
result of all the rest, it is bound to weaken if the others also slacken” (1897/2006: 269). 
 
This quotation appears in a chapter on anomic suicide in Europe, but it might as well have been 
written in today’s New York Times. As Liah Greenfeld observes, “The problem of depression . . . 
[is] unquestionably an American problem—a problem of a particular society. My impressionistic 
conclusion that this was a colossal social problem affecting fearsomely large numbers of people 
was constantly confirmed by statistics” (Greenfeld 2013: 10). 
 Greenfeld is right: rates of depression and anxiety have been skyrocketing. “The World 
Health Organization estimates that depression will impose the second-biggest health burden 
globally by 2020 . . . . Depression will impose a bigger burden than heart disease, arthritis, and 
many forms of cancer on both individuals and society in less than a decade” (Williams & 
Penman 2011: 17). And anxiety is just as bad: “Depression may be exacting a staggering toll, but 
its cousin—chronic anxiety—is becoming disturbingly common too, with average levels of 
anxiety in children and young people now at a point that would have been judged to be ‘clinical’ 
in the 1950s” (Williams & Penman 2011: 17). 
 As Jean Twenge notes in Generation Me, major depression has increased tenfold in the 
past century. Only 1–2% of people born before 1915 in the U.S. had a major depressive episode; 
that number is 15–20% today. Indeed, “some studies put the figure closer to 50%” (Twenge 
2007: 105).  This is absurd, Twenge writes, given that the former cohort lived through the Great 
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Depression and two world wars. But should we really be worried? Perhaps, as some researchers 
claim, we are merely seeing a problem of overdiagnosis. In our individualistic culture, patients 
come to therapy demanding that their suffering be legitimized, and therapists are all too willing 
to comply. This is indeed a problem: Peter Stearns notes that as many as 25% of cases of 
“depression” are just misdiagnosed sadness (Stearns 2012: 25). But as Twenge explains: 
“Researchers have concluded that the change is too large and too consistent across studies to be 
explained solely by a reporting bias. In addition, these studies use a fairly strict definition, 
counting only depression severe enough to warrant medication or long-term therapy. If more 
mild depression were included, the vast majority of young people would raise their hands in 
recognition” (Twenge 2007: 105).  
 The problem is particularly concerning given the traditional American emphasis on 
happiness. Beginning as early as the 1920s, and expanding in the 1950s, Americans felt not only 
the desire but the pressure to be happy. Happiness became tied up with success; it was the most 
obvious outward display of prosperity. “Individuals who were not happy,” historian Peter Stearns 
writes, “had only themselves to blame” (Stearns 2012: 45). In theory, the happiness norm should 
have lead to underreporting of depression, since sadness was shameful and a sign of failure. That 
rates of depression have continued to increase, even as the demand for happiness has grown, is 
truly startling. Stearns concludes: “Even if American memories often played false—suggesting 
less a really disproportionate American disease problem than a particular national self-perception 
issue—the fact that so many people were willing to make the claim, in a happiness culture, was 
in itself very revealing” (Stearns 2012: 24) 
 This is a crisis, and it is shocking that sociologists have not been more vocal. 
Psychologists have certainly had their say, but since psychology is (primarily) a study of the 
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human brain, how could it possibly explain the rise in depression and anxiety, except to say that 
American brains are suddenly prone (as never before) to a whole host of mental illnesses? 
 The discourse is even worse among neuroscientists, who love to discuss the 
“neuroatypical” qualities of a depressive brain, but cannot explain where depression comes from. 
While they acknowledge “environmental” factors (i.e., culture, parenting, life experiences…), 
many seem to think depression is merely “triggered” by these factors, while the root cause is 
genetics. The claim is laughable given that neuroscientists themselves believe in 
neuroplasticity—the notion that the brain changes due to life experiences. If this is so (and it is), 
the idea that depression is biological because “we can see it in the brain” is absurd.  
 I do not wish to be overly critical of psychology or neuroscience, both of which 
acknowledge (though sometimes downplay) the role of social factors. But it is simply 
astounding that the National Institutes of Health spends tens of millions each year on 
depression treatment, with little attention given to its cause. As Liah Greenfeld writes in her 
brilliant work, Mind, Madness, Modernity,   
For those who believe that mental disease is essentially a reflection of physical, 
biological disorder, such declarations [about rising rates of illness]—and the consistent 
statistical findings on which they are based—remain questionable, because what they 
logically imply (an ongoing and environmentally unprovoked change of the physical 
human nature itself) is impossible and, therefore, cannot be true. What this means is that 
the persistence of the belief in the biological causation of all mental disease prevents 
serious (i.e., among other things, massively funded) consideration of alternative, 
nonbiological explanations of mental illnesses, and makes impossible both their cure and 
formation of policies that could arrest the rise in their rates (Greenfeld 2013: 11). 
 
 American approaches to depression and anxiety are individualistic not because the 
individual approach is best, but because we live in an individualistic culture. We must remember 
that funding for projects is largely contingent on one’s ability to cater to dominant values—
research is only “useful” or “valuable” insofar as Americans think it so. It is no accident that in 
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this country, “pop psychology” books are bestsellers, while sociology books are rarely read 
except by sociologists. Yet when it comes to mental health, this is a tremendous obstacle. Not 
every problem can be reduced to the individual; some problems are social and must be seen in 
that light. So while many treatments of anxiety and depression are helpful—meditation, exercise, 
cognitive behavioral therapy, etc.—they are merely a palliative solution. Prescribing them is a bit 
like scooping water from a gushing faucet: the floor may be a bit less wet, but nothing is 
stopping more water from spilling out.  
 This is all well and good, critics will say, but if depression and anxiety are social, how are 
they social? Or more germane to this thesis, how can anomie explain them?  
 New research is beginning to shed light on this question. Depression, it turns out, may be 
related to an unwillingness to give up on one’s goals; the more tightly one clings to quixotic 
desire, the more depressed s/he will be. The historian Peter Stearns writes:  
In the early 21st century psychologist Randolph Nesse advanced an intriguing 
explanation especially for the United States, reminiscent of de Tocqueville’s comments 
on American happiness frustrations in the mid-19th century: Americans are particularly 
eager to set ambitious personal goals but unusually unwilling to admit they’re not going 
to reach the goals—in the culturally encouraged quest for happiness, ‘persistence is part 
of the American way of life.’ Hence, the unusual wave of depression (Stearns 2012: 24). 
 
 A 2009 study, cited in the Economist123, confirms Nesse’s hypothesis. Some degree of 
depression, the study notes, serves an adaptive purpose: it encourages us to drop unrealistic 
goals. Mild depression “evolved . . . as a defense to cope with situations in which a person’s 
behavior is likely to result in wasted efforts, danger, loss, or damage to the body (Keller & 
Nesse, 2006; Nesse, 2000)” (Wrosch & Miller 2009: 1181). These emotions are crucial since 
“disengagement from unattainable goals” allows for “the conservation of resources” (Wrosch 
& Miller 2009: 1181).  
                                            
123 “Mild and Bitter” (2009). The Economist. http://www.economist.com/node/13899022 
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 This is not merely a fringe theory. Indeed, the authors write, “several different theoretic 
frameworks converge upon the idea” that depression discourages quixotic thinking. Studies 
confirm that depression “is associated with more realistic perceptions of the environment,” and 
allows for “the withdrawal of effort” (Wrosch & Miller 2009: 1182).  
 The study itself investigates the long-term relationship between depression and 
disengagement from goals. The authors conclude: “To the extent that they experienced high 
levels of depressive symptoms at baseline, participants became better at disengaging from 
unattainable goals over the next year” (Wrosch & Miller 2009: 1185). But just as depression 
allows detachment from unreasonable goals, so too do unreasonable goals worsen depression.  
 American culture, with its focus on endless self-advancement, is constantly fueling our 
desires; we are told never to give up on our goals!124 “Americans are bombarded on all sides,” 
Merton reminds us, “by precepts which affirm the right, or, often, the duty of retaining the goal 
even in the face of repeated frustrations” (Merton 1938: 191). If depression is supposed to 
protect us against unreasonable goals, we have been inoculated against its effects.125 We 
experience the misery of depression, with all its symptoms—low energy, loss of motivation—
but without the benefits. We find ourselves in a horrible cycle: depression weakens our ability 
to achieve goals, but not our desire to do so. The goals we have set for ourselves do not 
disappear, but loom over us from ever more daunting heights, and we fall further and further 
into melancholy. 
 The study we discussed above has an odd corollary: if depression makes us more 
pragmatic—less likely to waste energy on fruitless tasks—perhaps some depression is desirable. 
Indeed, Durkheim himself held this view: “Melancholy is morbid only when it occupies too 
                                            
124 Sombart 1906: 13; Merton 1938 
125 This is a well-known psychological phenomenon called “attitude inoculation.”  
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much place in life; but it is equally morbid for it to be wholly excluded from life” (cited in 
Nisbet 1974: 266). Yet Americans have done just that. If happiness is a sign of success, sadness 
is an indicator of failure and must be exterminated.  
 The happiness norm reached new heights of institutional legitimacy last year when the 
American Psychiatric Association released the latest Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), a 
gold standard for psychiatric diagnoses. Previous editions of the DSM included a “bereavement 
exclusion,” which meant that “clinicians were advised to refrain from diagnosing major 
depression in individuals within the first two months following the death of a loved one.” That 
exception has been removed. The DSM-5 now advises that psychologists carefully scrutinize 
their patients’ grief in case it appears indicative of a mental disorder.126 The implication is clear: 
get better quick! Return to your happy, stable self or you’ll be diagnosed with depression. 
 The removal of the bereavement exclusion, far from a radical decision, has been several 
centuries in the making. It is the culmination of an obsession with happiness that began as early 
as the Protestant Reformation, and probably earlier. Peter Stearns writes: “In contrast to centuries 
in which people had been urged to humility before God, amid considerable valuation of a slightly 
melancholic personal presentation, a new chorus of advice urged not only the validity but the 
social importance of cheerfulness” (Stearns 2012: 41).  
 No doubt the APA made its decision with good intentions—hoping to “cure” 
individuals of their grief. But their approach may end up turning legitimate sadness into 
depression. Happiness, like wealth and prestige, is a socially imposed goal; to feel that one is 
failing to achieve it—to be told so by a professional—is a recipe for melancholy. In addition, 
the doting concern of psychologists to what is (by all accounts) a normal emotion may teach us 
                                            
126 “Major Depressive Disorder and the ‘Bereavement Exclusion.’” (2013). American Psychiatric Publishing.  
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to lower our grief threshold; we may become incapable of experiencing the standard range of 
human experience.  
 Depression, as I have hoped to show, is merely a keen form of the anomie Durkheim 
described. It is the painful gap between desires and the ability to fulfill them. In other cultures 
(especially those influenced by Buddhism), depression is less of a problem—tremendous value is 
placed on “detachment,” accepting that what we want may never come to fruition. Even in non-
Buddhist cultures, the admonition to produce and then seek out one’s desires is absent. Think 
about that for a moment: in the United States, we tell each other to produce more desires than we 
would otherwise have, and then to follow those desires wherever they lead. When our struggles 
inevitably fail, and we experience depression, we do not give up on our goals. Instead, we shame 
ourselves for not following the happiness norm—that is, we add happiness to our list of goals.  
Our anomic struggle for goal-attainment becomes burdened by our anomic struggle for joy, and 
the two reinforce one another. This is such an obvious formula for disaster that it is no wonder 
the United States has the highest rate of depression in the world. 
 
ANXIETY:  
 Depression and anxiety are twin poisons, their histories hopelessly entangled. As we saw 
above, depression is the result of public failure—the inability to achieve socially valued goals. 
But it is anxiety—and status anxiety in particular—that drives us to complete those goals (de 
Botton 2004). Anxiety teaches us to fear the consequences of failure, and to shame ourselves 
when we do fail (not only for the act of failure, but for the unacceptable sadness that comes with 
it). So it is not surprising that, as depression continues to rise, status anxiety rises with it.  
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 “Anxiety is the dizziness of freedom,” Kierkegaard wrote. As Americans continue to 
advance—achieving unprecedented levels of control over their lives—that freedom will only 
grow more dizzying. This is the paradox of progress: the more power we have, the higher our 
expectations, and the less acceptable our failure. Jean Twenge puts the problem clearly: 
In many ways, there’s no better time to be alive than right now. Think of all the 
advantages we have that earlier generations did not: television, cell phones, better 
medical care, computers, more education, less physical labor, the freedom to make our 
own choices, the ability to move to a more desirable city. These last two, however, begin 
to hint at the underlying problem. Our growing tendency to put the self first leads to 
unparalleled freedom, but it also creates an enormous amount of pressure on us to stand 
alone. This is the downside of the focus on the self—when we are fiercely independent 
and self-sufficient, our disappointments loom large because we have nothing else to focus 
on. But it’s not just us: Generation Me has been taught to expect more out of life at the 
very time when good jobs and nice houses are increasingly difficult to obtain. All too 
often, the result is crippling anxiety and crushing depression (Twenge 2007: 109).  
 
Twenge has it exactly right: we have been taught to expect more—that is, to increase our own 
desires—even as restraint becomes more and more imperative.127 We are setting ourselves up for 
inevitable failure, but given the demands of individualism, that failure is also our fault alone. 
 What is anomie if not the suffering of unbridled ambition? These frustrations of desire, 
coupled with the belief that we are somehow personally to blame, produce inevitable anxiety. 
We are ordered to set impractical goals, saddened by our failures, and then shamed not only for 
the failures but also—in our happiness culture—for our own sadness! How could such an 
equation not destroy the mental health of our nation?  
 Granted, there is something noble in aiming high, even if the possibility of success is 
slim.128 No matter what happens to us in the end, the act of struggling for our dreams can 
                                            
127 Remarkably, this observation parallels almost word-for-word what Durkheim wrote in Suicide: “The state of 
disorganization, or anomie, is thus reinforced by the fact that passions are less disciplined at the very time when they 
need a stronger discipline” (1897/2006: 277).  
128 A favorite American adage goes: “Shoot for the moon—even if you miss, you’ll land among the stars.”  
 128 
provide a sense of movement and empowerment. “Can it be said that action is pleasant in 
itself?” Durkheim asks. Surely: 
But then one must first of all be blind enough not to realize its futility. Then, for this 
pleasure to be felt and to moderate and partly conceal the painful anxiety that 
accompanies it, this endless movement must at the very least always be accomplished at 
one’s ease and without anything impeding it. As soon as it is disrupted, only the anxiety 
remains, with all the accompanying discomforts. And it would be a miracle if no 
insuperable obstacle were ever to arise. In such conditions, one clings to life only by a 
very slender thread and one that can, at any moment, be broken (1897/2006: 271). 
 
Clearly, there is there is something very dangerous about our refusal to settle. Yet even social 
scientists seem reluctant to place the blame on freedom. As Twenge herself claims, “There is 
nothing wrong with individual freedom, of course” (2007: 115). Where is this of course coming 
from? After an entire chapter dedicated to the price of individualism—anxiety, depression, 
loneliness—Twenge ends by asserting that there is “nothing wrong” with freedom, and that this 
is somehow obvious. Clearly there is something wrong with freedom, as her own research 
shows. True, freedom can be healthy when it is balanced by social constraint. But without proper 
reins, it gives way to egoism and anomie. 
 These problems, Durkheim writes, will be not be mitigated by external forces. It is not 
with drugs that we will solve depression and anxiety, but with moral constraints:  
A regulatory force must play the same role for non-physical needs as the organism does 
for physical ones; which means that this force can only be moral. It was the awakening of 
conscience that disrupted the state of equilibrium in which the animal slumbered, so only 
conscience can supply the means to re-establish it. Material constraints would be 
ineffective here: it is not with physico-chemical forces that one can change the heart of 
man. To the extent that appetites are not automatically contained by physiological 
mechanisms, they can only be halted by a boundary that they recognize as just 
(1897/2006: 272, emphasis added). 
 
If there is something disturbing about this notion—that we must subject our desires to 
constraint—it is proof that the opposite norm holds. We are so afraid of even the slightest 
imposition on our will that we are quick to label such a demand totalitarian (or worse, socialist). 
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But Durkheim does not ask that we constrain all of our desires; only that desire is commensurate 
with the ability to satisfy it: 
This relative limitation and the moderation that results are what make men content with 
their lot, while at the same time giving them moderate encouragement to improve it; and 
it is this average contentment that gives rise to feelings of calm, active happiness, to the 
pleasure at being and living which, for societies as for individuals, is a sign of health 
(1897/2006: 274, emphasis added). 
 
 I do not think it dramatic to say that this “sign of health” is missing in American culture. 
Peter Stearns notes that rates of happiness in the United States have not improved in fifty years. 
To be fair, this is true of most Western countries: “Within the most modern societies themselves, 
happiness levels have not significantly improved over the past fifty years, despite the fact that the 
gains of modernity, though not new, have accelerated. Denmark, for reasons no one is sure of, is 
the lone exception” (Stearns 2012: 16). But no other country has comparable levels of 
depression, anxiety, loneliness, and suicide. If anomie is not an exclusively American problem, it 
is a remarkably American one.  
 
CONCLUSIONS: 
 We have chosen to devote the most time to depression and anxiety, since these are ills 
that nearly every American experiences. But as Peter Stearns warns, “It’s vital to remember . . . 
that depression is only the most recent and obvious manifestation of modernity’s promotion of a 
psychological backlash” (Stearns 2012: 24). Other symptoms include schizophrenia and biopolar 
disorder (Greenfeld 2013), as well as older symptoms like mass hysteria (Watters 2011; Stearns 
2012). Though depression and anxiety are crucial topics—and Durkheim mentioned both of 
them in connection to anomie—they only scratch the surface of the anomic crisis.  
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 As Ethan Watters explains in his brilliant work Crazy Like Us, societies typically draw 
from a “symptom pool” of recognized illnesses. This radical claim deserves some elaboration: 
Watters writes that individual disorders are often manifestations of a larger social ill. The vague 
social unease we feel during, say, the modernization process (Stearns 2012: 24) expresses itself 
in different forms depending on particular social circumstances.129  
 Though the effort is subconscious, we each strive to present our social pain in socially 
recognized ways. That women suffered from hysterical paralysis in the 1800s may strike us as 
bizarre—and even suspect—but this is simply a sign that the symptom pool has changed. 
Doctors are quick to tell us that hysteria is not a “real” disease; hysteria has no genetic 
explanation. But as the sociologist W. I. Thomas famously argued, what we take to be real is real 
in its consequences.  Hysteria was common at the time because it was a legitimate avenue for 
women to express discomfort with their social position. 
 What I am getting at is that depression and anxiety may serve the same purpose today. 
Certainly, the two are more complicated—there is much evidence for biological as well as 
environmental causes—but the prevalence of these phenomena indicates that they are part of the 
symptom pool. Indeed, there is no stronger evidence that this is the case than the fact that both 
are over-diagnosed. Nearly everyone who seeks out a therapist will be diagnosed with an anxiety 
or mood disorder, if they so desire. Diagnosis is the cultural means by which we validate one 
another’s pain; not to diagnose would be to deny one’s lived experience.  
 As I have illustrated, anomie is a social problem whose individual expression varies. 
The anomic condition produces symptoms as diverse as anxiety, weariness, disenchantment, 
                                            
129 Recall Dennis Wrong’s phrase: Our psychologies, “far from being fixed dispositions to behave in a particular 
way, are utterly subject to social channeling and transformation and could not even reveal themselves in behavior 
without social molding any more than our vocal chords can produce articulate speech if we have not learned a 
language. To psychoanalysis man is indeed a social animal; his social nature is profoundly reflected in his bodily 
structure” (Wrong 1961: 192, emphasis added). 
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unease, agitation, discontent, and groping. We have already shown how anomie causes 
depression and anxiety; I would like to go further and suggest that anomie could cause many 
other symptoms, depending on cultural factors. Indeed, anomie could probably cause any 
symptom—restless limbs, uncontrollable screaming, haunting by one’s ancestors—as long as 
these are part of the symptom pool.  
 While Durkheim explicitly tied anomie to mental health130, he surely recognized the 
potential for cultural variation. Depression and anxiety may be good measures of anomie in the 
United States, but not in other countries.131 But because they are so prevalent here, and serve as 
legitimate expressions of social unease, they may help us to track changes in the anomic current.  
 
Soldier Suicide 
 The Pentagon is terrified, and understandably so: rates of suicide in the U.S. military 
have been skyrocketing, and no one seems to have an explanation. From 2004 to 2008, the army 
suicide rate increased 80 percent. Though the army suicide rate has historically been lower than 
that of the general population, it surpassed the general suicide rate in 2005 and remains 
significantly higher. Perhaps most troubling at all, more soldiers now die from suicide than from 
war casualties—i.e., suicide is the leading cause of death in American soldiers (Lineberry & 
O’Connor 2012: 871–72). What is going on?  
 The traditional explanation is post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The trauma of war, 
psychologists argue, is troubling soldiers to such an extent that they commit suicide. But this 
                                            
130 Steven Lukes explains: “‘Health’ for man in society is a state where ‘a regulative force’ plays ‘the same role for 
moral needs which the organism plays for physical needs’” (Lukes 1977: 83).  
131 For example, Watters notes that depression (as we conceive it) did not even exist in some countries until 
American therapists introduced it. Indeed, Watters’ thesis is that as our notions of mental health are exported abroad, 
we risk sharing our symptom pool with other nations. Hence the high rates of schizophrenia, depression, PTSD, and 
anorexia in countries that had never experienced those problems before.  
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explanation makes little sense: why would PTSD rates have worsened so much in the past 
decade? Are our diagnoses improving? Perhaps. In fact, “Mental health rates have risen 65% in 
the military since 2000, with 936,000 troops diagnosed with at least one mental health issue in 
that time” (Zoroya 2012). As more funding goes to mental health screening, it is no surprise that 
that reports of mental illness have risen significantly. 
 But does PTSD actually cause suicide? A 2013 study rejects that claim: “Only nine of the 
83 people who committed suicide—about 10%—had been diagnosed with PTSD or reported 
experiencing symptoms of PTSD.”132 Even more startling, combat seems to have no relation to 
suicide risk! “None of the deployment-related factors (combat experience, cumulative days 
deployed, or number of deployments) were associated with increased suicide risk in any of the 
models” (LeardMann et al. 2013).  
 If Cynthia LeardMann and her colleagues are correct, suicide has essentially nothing to 
do with war trauma. There appears to be no correlation between combat experience and suicide 
risk. But surely many of the soldiers who committed suicide had seen war, right? In fact, that 
assumption is false. According to data from the Defense Department, “Nearly 85 percent of 
military members who took their lives had no direct combat history” (Childress 2012, emphasis 
added). The author clarifies: “They may have been deployed by not seen action.” In a June 2012 
speech, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained, “We’re dealing with broader societal 
issues. Substance abuse, financial distress and relationship problems – the risk factors for suicide 
– also reflect problems . . . that will endure beyond war” (cited in Childress 2012).  
                                            
132 Christensen 2013, citing LeardMann et al. 2013 
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 Panetta’s response is unsatisfying: if these problems are indeed increasing, why are they 
particular to the U.S. military? Surely issues like “financial distress” have plagued soldiers for 
decades; why this distress has nearly doubled the suicide rate remains a mystery.  
 A PBS report from late 2012 may provide the answer. The report cites Dr. Elspeth 
Ritchie, former lead psychiatrist for the U.S. Army:  
Ritchie studied the past 10 years of suicides in the Army, and found that bases that 
suffered the most suicides tended to be those where units were deploying rapidly, she 
said. It wasn’t just because soldiers were seeing more combat, she said. Returning 
soldiers have less time or energy to connect with new recruits or those who haven’t 
deployed. The elevated pace also leaves commanders with less time to form personal 
relationships with the soldiers in their charge (Childress 2012).  
 
Several phrases should jump out at once: “deploying rapidly”; “less time or energy to 
connect”; “elevated pace”; “less time to form personal relationships.” The Durkheimian 
analysis is obvious: soldiers are suffering from a combination of egoism and acute anomie. 
Poor social cohesion produces egoism, while rapid change produces anomie. Dr. Ritchie 
essentially admits that egoism is the problem: “The sergeants who in the past took care of the 
new kids are so busy preparing for the next (deployment), there just isn’t the same sense of 
cohesion that we used to have,” she explains. Journalist Sarah Childress carries the argument 
even further: “That loss of cohesion can leave soldiers who aren’t being deployed feeling 
disconnected and without a sense of purpose — one of the risk factors for suicide — in 
positions where firearms are in easy reach” (Childress 2012).   
 Our claim about acute anomie may seem merely speculative, until we consider another 
2012 study. “Notably,” the authors write, “over one quarter of soldiers who committed suicide 
had a diagnosis of adjustment disorder” (Bachynski et al. 2012). Adjustment disorder is the 
psychological term for acute anomie: the difficulty in adapting to a sudden change in social state. 
Though adjustment disorder may not include a sudden increase in desire—as Durkheim’s 
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conception does—it involves the same painful dysregulation. That over a quarter of suicide 
victims were diagnosed with adjustment disorder is shocking, and an even larger number may 
have gone undiagnosed.  
 Given these realities, one might assume that the Pentagon is doing everything it can to 
restructure the military system: building cohesion, lowering the frequency of deployments, etc. 
But the reality is (you guessed it!) far more disappointing. The Pentagon has invested $50 
million in suicide research, but that money is going entirely to mental health. “The goal,” 
Childress writes, is “to make sure every service member is screened for depression or suicidal 
thoughts.” Other tactics include decreasing access to weapons and leavening the stigma of 
mental illness (Childress 2012). 
 It is hard not to become extremely frustrated with the military’s approach. If the lead 
psychiatrist for the military admits that social cohesion is lacking, why not work to increase 
cohesion? If a prominent study finds that soldiers suffer from adjustment disorder, why not ease 
the adjustment process?133 Structural changes are required, not psychological ones. As we have 
shown, PTSD is not the problem. Combat is not the problem. Mental health is not the problem—
or at least, not the source of the problem. The problem is the military structure, and especially the 
high frequency of deployments. The consistent disruption of community, as Childress says, leads 
soldiers to feel “disconnected and without a sense of purpose,” a textbook definition of egoism. 
And the inability to adjust to new circumstances produces acute anomie.  
 “To be shot of anomie,” Durkheim remind us, “a group must thus exist or be formed 
within which can be drawn up the system of rules that is now lacking” (1902/1997: xxxv). Let us 
                                            
133 Some of these changes have in fact been implemented, according to Craig Bryan, head of the National Center for 
Veterans’ Studies at the University of Utah. (Personal correspondence.)  
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draw up that system! Let us provide rules, constraints, communal ties, for our soldiers. If we do 
not, the suicide rate will only continue to grow.134 
 
School Shootings 
 Imagine that tomorrow morning, two students from Oberlin College open fire on their 
classmates, killing several students and professors before shooting themselves. How will the 
Oberlin community respond? Perhaps more important, how will the media respond? Journalists 
will begin by asking two questions: (1) Were the students mentally ill? (2) How did the 
students access weapons? Politicians, in a similar vein, will blame two issues: inadequate 
mental health screenings and easy access to guns. For several weeks, national debates will 
include such topics as the Second Amendment, violence in video games, bipolar disorder, and 
campus security. Mysteriously absent from the discussion will be the social cause of school 
shootings: why more young people are taking their own lives, and the lives of others, on 
campuses throughout the United States.  
 Media reactions are all too familiar, and the predictability of their claims is almost 
comforting. Americans have become accustomed to the notion that all violence can be 
explained, and explained away, by psychological forces. As long as we keep our weapons and 
                                            
134 Intriguingly, Durkheim includes soldier suicide in his analysis, though he blames it on altruism. In his 
introduction to Suicide, Richard Sennett writes,  
In peace-time these warriors experience a deep yearning for the intimacies of camp life, the thrill of co-
operation in combat, even for the disciplinary rules which organize a soldier’s every minute. When not 
making war, this yearning to give oneself to others is frustrated, and likely to drive dedicated professional 
soldiers to despair. At peace, in civilian life, their lives seem empty of meaning. . . . [Durkheim] now has an 
example of the danger of too much solidarity, of that desire for group life which can lead a man to despair 
of his own life (2006: xviii).  
Nonetheless, I am quite confident that altruistic suicide is not the problem here. As Raymond Aron observes, 
“Egoistic suicide tends to be characterized by a state of apathy, an absence of attachment to life; altruistic suicide, by 
a state of energy and passion” (Aron 1967: 34). As all of my sources attest, American soldiers who commit suicide 
identify far more with the former. It is the loss of passion, not its excess, which leads them to take their own life.   
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our minds in check, the reasoning goes, we can prevent these tragic events from happening in 
our own community. 
 But that assumption is false. As sociologist Wilhelm Heitmeyer and his colleagues 
explain in a recent book on school shootings: 
Public and political evaluations of such deeds regularly resort to familiar, ritual 
explanations in order to downplay losses of control. These initial assessments either 
define such crimes as semi-supernatural events, or else they pathologize them. What both 
these variants have in common is that they provide interpretations that exonerate society 
and create detachment in order to downplay the social causes and to return to “normality” 
as soon as possible: An “affliction” is a fateful thing about which nothing can be done, 
and pathological criminals can be isolated from an otherwise supposedly intact society 
(Heitmeyer et al. 2013: 27). 
 
 As an antidote to the American approach, Heitmeyer proposes a “Social Disintegration 
Theory,” which cites the unraveling of the social fabric—not the proliferation or guns or 
disorders—as the chief cause of shootings. Though the word “disintegration” evokes egoism, not 
anomie, it is clear that the latter is Heitmeyer’s concern. In fact, Heitmeyer and his colleagues 
seem to draw their entire argument from Robert Merton.  
 “Normality in modern society,” the authors write, “means that a person strongly 
identifies with the core approved values such as achievement, self-assertion, and upward 
mobility” (Heitmeyer et al. 2013: 33). Young people, being especially sensitive to social 
pressures, are heavily burdened by these expectations. And the students most at risk of 
homicide are those who desire most strongly to fit in—to adhere to unreasonable social 
demands. As Dennis Wrong observes,  
The person who conforms may be even more ‘bothered,’ that is, subject to guilt and 
neurosis, than the person who violates what are not only society’s norms but his own as 
well. To Freud, it is precisely the man with the strictest superego, he who has most 
thoroughly internalized and conformed to the norms of his society, who is most wracked 
with guilt and anxiety (Wrong 1961: 187). 
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The irony is that those who most wish to be normal—to be healthy in the Durkheimian 
sense135—are most likely to experience mental illness. Normality is a socially imposed goal, and 
those who find themselves facing a “goal-means discrepancy” will become abnormal as a result 
(Heitmeyer et al. 2013: 29). Consider the logic: normality produces abnormality; the struggle for 
health strengthens the anomic current.  
 He seemed like such a nice boy. This is the response we hear, every time, from startled 
parents, friends, teachers, and even survivors after a school shooting. But given Wrong’s 
argument, it should hardly surprise us that school shooters “seem normal.” These are people who 
struggle harder than anyone to maintain a front of normalcy—to prove to themselves and others 
that they are successful, well-integrated human beings.  
 Why school shootings? Why haven’t we seen more shootings in the workplace, say, or in 
public parks? As we already mentioned, young people are particularly susceptible to status 
pressure. “During this phase [of their lives],” Heitmeyer and his colleagues note, people “cannot 
predict whether they will one day be successful in their competitive societies. As a result, 
adolescents sometimes engage in bitter struggles for recognition and status during their school 
years” (Heitmeyer et al. 2013: 42). As school-related pressures continue to mount—academic 
success, a flourishing social life—the competitive atmosphere adds fuel to the fire. This tendency 
toward competition, Werner Sombart observes, often leads to anomie. For it is not enough 
simply to succeed—one must be better than one’s peers: “We therefore see in every American – 
beginning with the paperboy – restlessness, yearning, and compulsion to be way and beyond 
other people” (Sombart 1906: 12–13). 
                                            
135 That is, having a “healthy moral constitution” (1897/2006: 273).  
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 The success imperative has only strengthened in recent decades. As we saw in a previous 
section, today’s youth face a weakened economy and grim job prospects. Despite their idealism, 
students know that to succeed will require an unusual degree of skill. Even a 4.0 GPA and stellar 
extracurriculars are not enough. Adolescents “are involved in fierce competition for jobs, status, 
and prestige, and the risk of ‘losing’ and failure is very high for the individual” (Heitmeyer et al. 
2013: 43). We cannot blame culture alone, as Merton would have it, for the anomic conditions 
our students face. To some degree, goals really must increase, yet without the means to achieve 
those goals, more and more young people will fall victim to anomie.  
 Another reason schools are anomic breeding grounds is that they serve as a “transition 
phase” from adolescence to adulthood (Heitmeyer et al. 2013: 41). The shifting nature of identity 
entails a parallel shift in moral constraint, as students move from the highly controlled parental 
environment to the comparative freedom of young adulthood. This shift is particularly dramatic 
in the United States, where the coming-of-age process is fraught with familial tension (Schalet 
2011). American youth gain independence only by casting off their primary ties and asserting 
their individuality.  
 Most school shootings happen at high schools and colleges, and this is no surprise. 
Students in these cohorts gain an unprecedented amount of freedom over their own lives—even 
“helicopter parents” typically recognize the need to relinquish some control to their children 
(Schalet 2011). But the freedom students gain is not often gradual; it occurs all at once. This 
sudden change in social state—from a highly constrained to a highly independent environment—
is a formula for acute anomie.  
 These circumstances, combined with the chronic anomie of status pressure and self-
advancement, are often intolerable. Many who find themselves in this position commit suicide. 
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Others become innovators (achieving social goals through unapproved means) and commit 
homicide instead. But most students employ milder tactics—cheating on tests, sabotaging 
peers, etc. Who, then, is most at risk of suicide and homicide? The answer may indeed be a 
matter of mental health: 
Of course, says Durkheim, these suicidogenic impulses are not embodied in any one 
individual taken at random. If certain individuals commit suicide, it is in all probability 
because they were predisposed to it by their psychological makeup, by nervous weakness 
or neurotic disturbances. But the same social circumstances which create the suicidogenic 
impulses create the psychological predisposition, because individuals living in modern 
society have refined and consequently vulnerable sensibilities” (Aron 1967: 34).  
 
In the final calculus, society is to blame either way. No matter how we begin our lives 
(biologically speaking), social forces influence our psychologies and prompt us toward violence. 
Blaming mental illness, as so many of us do, merely attacks the symptom and not the cause.  
 What about video games? It would be impossible to draw a connection between video 
games and school shootings without setting up a controlled experiment (an asinine prospect). But 
while it is possible that video games play a role, I would like to make several points. First, most 
video games are not played by students, but by young men in their thirties.136 Why are we not 
seeing more mass shootings among that demographic? Second, video games may be a symptom, 
rather than a cause, of anomie. “It is no coincidence,” two sociologists write, “that [Columbine 
shooters] Dylan and Eric spent most of their time on the Internet playing a video game in which 
the main character has ‘practically unlimited firepower, can run and jump with inhuman stamina 
and skill’” (Harriford & Thompson 2008: 173–74). To be sure, such games might provide “a 
new form of anomie” (Harriford & Thompson 2008: 173), but it is more likely that they reflect 
                                            
136 The average age of video game players is thirty. Essential Facts about the Computer and Video Game Industry. 
Entertainment Software Association (2013), p. 2.  
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the anomic condition. The “unlimited” features of these video games may satisfy an existing 
penchant for freedom and radical unrestraint. 
 Can access to weapons explain the prevalence of school shootings? Let us ask another 
question: do guns just leap into the hands of students and begin firing? Of course not. Here the 
old adage that “guns don’t kill people, people do” may have some merit. The proliferation of 
weapons in this country is significant, and certainly makes it easier for students to commit acts of 
violence. But it does not explain the impetus to do so. If the number of guns were really at issue, 
why would individual homicide rates be on the decline even as access to weapons increases? We 
now have nearly 300 million guns in this country, one for almost every American. “Is gun 
violence increasing in the United States?” the philosopher Sam Harris asks. “No. But it certainly 
seems to be when one recalls recent atrocities in Newtown and Aurora. In fact, the overall rate of 
violent crime has fallen by 22 percent in the past decade (and 18 percent in the past five years)” 
(Harris 2013). In fact, Harris notes, mass shootings represent only 0.1 percent of all murders: 
since 1982, a total of seventy shootings have resulted in 543 deaths (compared to 564,452 other 
homicides, not all gun-related).  
 “The correlation between guns and violence in the United States is far from 
straightforward,” Harris reminds us. Only 30 percent of urban households own a gun, versus 60 
percent in the countryside, but most mass shootings occur in cities. Clearly, something other than 
guns is responsible. Harris does not quite take the next step (sociologically), but he does criticize 
the mental illness argument: “If we enact laws that allow us to commit young men who merely 
scare us to mental institutions, we will surely commit thousands upon thousands of young men 
who would never have harmed anyone.” Harris wonders what might have happened had Adam 
Lanza—the Newtown shooter—“been more intrusively engaged by society prior to the attack.” 
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Here Harris (unwittingly) draws a connection between school shootings and the Social 
Disintegration Theory proposed by Heitmeyer and his colleagues.  
 “Rather than new laws,” Harris concludes, “I believe we need a general shift in our 
attitude toward public violence—wherein everyone begins to assume some responsibility for 
containing it.” That attitude is more radical than even Harris supposes: it would require a 
dramatic reworking of the social fabric. But such an approach may be the only thing that will 




III. LOOKING FORWARD: THE SOLUTION TO ANOMIE 
  “These dispositions [toward anomie],” Durkheim writes, “are so inbred that society has 
grown to accept them and is accustomed to think them normal. It is everlastingly repeated that it 
is man’s nature to be eternally dissatisfied, constantly to advance, without relief or rest, toward 
an indefinite goal” (cited in Meštrović 1987: 573). Such an attitude is not only false, but 
tremendously dangerous. As we have seen, the anomic current has already wreaked havoc on the 
mental health and social stability of the United States; untreated, it will only continue to worsen. 
 Ever the reformer, Durkheim proposed several solutions to the anomic crisis. His most 
famous solution—the professional group—appears in his Second Preface to The Division of 
Labor, and it is this remedy that Durkheimians typically cite. But as Stjepan Meštrović observes, 
the theme of anomie is repeated in nearly all of Durkheim’s work, though sometimes without the 
accompanying term (Meštrović 1988a: 836). So the cure for anomie cannot be found only in 
Suicide or The Division of Labor. Rather, it is part of Durkheim’s later vision of a tight-knit, 
humanitarian society.  
 Below, we will consider three of Durkheim’s proposals: sociology as a master discipline, 
professional groups, and global individualism. Though this list is not exhaustive, it should give 
us a clear sense of Durkheim’s struggle against anomie.  
 
1. Sociology as a Guiding Force: 
 Durkheim recognized what his peers did not: that the solution to the modern crisis could 
not be found by moving backward. We must not “lead [individuals] back to the old conformism 
of former times,” Durkheim wrote (1898/1973: 52). As Richard Sennett notes in his introduction 
to Suicide, “Durkheim’s response was not to look backward to a supposedly simpler age; rather, 
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and rather amazingly, he hoped sociology would become a master discipline guiding the public” 
(Sennett 2006: xxi, emphasis added). What would this discipline look like, and how might it 
address the problem of anomie?  
 It must be remembered that at the time of Durkheim’s writing, sociology was an 
emerging field. While sociologists had existed in the past—Comte and Saint-Simon, among 
others—they did not identify as such, nor would most of their pupils have understood the term. 
Durkheim devoted his entire life to legitimizing the field of sociology:  
He served on innumerable university committees, advised the Ministry of Education, 
helped to introduce sociology into school curricula, and in general did yeoman’s work to 
make sociology the cornerstone of civic education. In these years he came nearest to 
realizing his youthful ambition of building a scientific sociology that would be applied to 
the moral reeducation in the Third Republic and at the same time to the development of a 
secular civic morality (Coser 1971: 148).  
 
Durkheim sought not only to establish sociology as a discipline, but to make it “the cornerstone 
of civic education.” Why was such a thing necessary? Surely if the collective consciousness held 
certain moral principles at heart, those were inherently right. After all, “If the ultimate criterion 
of justice becomes the general will, i.e., the will of a free society . . . . [then] every institution 
hallowed by a folk-mind has to be regarded as sacred” (Strauss 1959: 51).  
 That may have been Rousseau’s view, but it was not Durkheim’s. For Durkheim, the 
ultimate measure of justice was social flourishing—the well-being of individuals and of the 
social fabric. Yet how could one know what produced flourishing, Durkheim reasoned, without 
scientific instruction? Durkheim “wanted to devote himself to a discipline that would contribute 
to the clarification of the great moral questions that agitated the age,” Coser writes.  
But such moral guidance, Durkheim was convinced, could be provided only by men with 
a solid scientific training. Hence he decided that he would dedicate himself to the 
scientific study of society. What he considered imperative was to construct a scientific 
sociological system, not as an end in itself, but as a means for the moral direction of 
society. From this purpose Durkheim never departed (Coser 1971: 145, emphasis added). 
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 This was a stunning and highly radical position for Durkheim to take, and it remains so 
today. As far as I know, only one scholar parallels Durkheim’s approach: the philosopher and 
neuroscientist Sam Harris. In his 2010 book The Moral Landscape, Harris argues that values are 
simply facts about well-being, and must be determined through scientific inquiry: 
Questions about values—about meaning, morality, and life’s larger purpose—are really 
questions about the well-being of conscious creatures. Throughout the book I make 
reference to a hypothetical space that I call “the moral landscape”—a space of real and 
potential outcomes whose peaks correspond to the heights of potential well-being and 
whose valleys represent the deepest possible suffering. Different ways of thinking and 
behaving—different cultural practices, ethical codes, modes of government, etc.—will 
translate into movements across this landscape and, therefore, into different degrees of 
human flourishing. I’m not suggesting that we will necessarily discover one right answer 
to every moral question, or a single best way for human beings to live. Some questions 
may admit of many answers, each more or less equivalent. However, the existence of 
multiple peaks on the moral landscape does not make them any less real or worthy of 
discovery. Nor would it make the difference between being on a peak and being stuck 
deep in a valley any less clear or consequential (Harris 2010a). 
 
 In The Division of Labor, Durkheim notes that “among all the elements of civilisation 
science is the sole one to assume, under certain conditions, a moral character” (1893/1997: 13) 
Although “science proper” is a highly inaccessible and therefore voluntary pursuit, everyone is 
required at the very least “not to remain ignorant” (1893/1997: 14). Without some degree of 
education, individuals cannot create a truly moral society: 
The more consciousness remains unenlightened, the more averse it is to change, because 
it does not perceive rapidly enough either the need for change or the direction change 
should take. On the contrary, the enlightened consciousness has learnt how to prepare 
itself beforehand for the way in which it has to adapt. This is why intelligence, guided by 
science, requires to assume a greater role in the processes of collective life  
(1893/1997: 14). 
 
When its members do not perceive the need for change, society cannot progress; it remains 
stagnant and without moral improvement. This is not a relativist position: Durkheim assumes 
that there are better and worse ways to live in society, and these are informed by science. As 
Harris writes, morality is a continuum: “Given that consciousness is related to the way the 
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universe is—it’s constrained by the laws of nature in some way—there are going to be right and 
wrong ways to move along this continuum” (Harris 2010c). Hence Durkheim’s view that moral 
guidance requires “solid scientific training.”  
 Durkheim hoped that sociology would provide that training. Sociology alone could 
“translate into the hard methodology of science”137 principles Durkheim knew were essential for 
well-being: fellow feeling, mutual responsibility, and collective purpose. In the end, sociology 
would become for Durkheim “a substitute for socialist doctrine” (Aron 1967: 79).  
 Sociology, too, could pose a challenge to the anomic crisis. If anomie were a real, 
empirically verified problem, Durkheim felt, it could no longer be ignored. Durkheim’s own 
work as a sociologist constituted a brave attempt to shift the collective consciousness in the right 
direction. This would not be an easy feat: “A sign of a social fact is that it cannot be modified by 
‘a simple decree of the will,’ so ‘to produce a change,’ a ‘more or less laborious effort is 
required’ (Durkheim 1895a: 29/70).”138 But by devoting his life to an exploration of anomie—
along with the related theme of egoism—Durkheim knew his efforts would not be in vain. 
 
2. Geimeinschaft Within Gesellschaft139 
 As we mentioned earlier, a common critique of Durkheim is that he is overly 
conservative—not only does he fear change, critics say, but he wishes to regress to some 
idealized feudal community. This claim rests on a misunderstanding of Durkheim’s work. 
While Durkheim’s predecessor, Ferdinand Tönnies (1887/2011), lamented the loss of 
                                            
137 Nisbet 1965: 25 
138 Stedman Jones 2001: 141. 
139 This is the most important of Durkheim’s proposals (according to Durkheim himself). He notes in his Second 
Preface to The Division of Labor that he intended to write a whole book on the role of professional groups, but 
feared he might never have the time. That preface must therefore be seen as a sketch for a much larger book, 
dedicated entirely to solving the anomic crisis.   
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traditional society, Durkheim praised the modernization process. The shift from mechanical to 
organic solidarity140 was, in Durkheim’s view, a necessary and laudable change. To return to 
the “conformism of former times” would not solve the problem of anomie—indeed, it would 
only “place an obstacle in the way of the unceasing progress of the division of labor” 
(Durkheim 1898/1973: 52). 
 Destroying the Gesellschaft society was not only impossible, Durkheim knew, but 
undesirable. Though Gesellschaft sometimes produced unfortunate results—atomization, 
insufficiency of interaction—it also allowed for the individuation that would create a just, 
modern society. The solution, then, was to create communities even within the isolation of the 
modern world: that is, Gemeinschaft within Gesellschaft. 
 In his Second Preface to the Division of Labor, Durkheim provides the method: “To be 
shot of anomie a group must thus exist or be formed within which can be drawn up the system of 
rules that is now lacking” (1902/1997: xxxv). Since individuals have varying interests, each 
group must represent only a portion of society—it must coalesce around the unique traits of the 
cohort. “Within a political society,” Durkheim writes, 
as soon as a certain number of individuals find they hold common ideas, interests, 
sentiments and occupations which the rest of the population does not share in, it is 
inevitable that, under the influence of these similarities, they should be attracted to one 
another. They will seek one another out, enter into relationships and associate together. 
Once such a group is formed, a moral life evolves within it which naturally bears the 
distinguishing mark of the special conditions in which it has developed. It is impossible 
for men to live together and be in regular contact with one another without their acquiring 
some feeling for the group which they constitute through having united together, without 
their becoming attached to it, concerning themselves with its interests and taking it into 
account in their behavior. And this attachment to something that transcends the 
individual, this subordination of the particular to the general interest, is the very well-
spring of all moral activity. Let this sentiment only crystallize and grow more 
                                            
140 These terms are confusing since, for Tönnies, the shift is from organic to mechanical solidarity. Tönnies sees 
Europe moving from a warm, friendly, and hence “organic” community to a cold, gear-like “mechanical” society. 
Durkheim sees Europe moving from conformity and homogeneity to a state of mutual dependence in which each 
actor fills a specific function (as in an organism).  
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determinate, let it be translated into well-defined formulas by being applied to the most 
common circumstances of life, and we see gradually being constituted a corpus of moral 
rules (1902/1997: xlii–xliii, emphasis added). 
 
This is a classic Durkheimian approach to group membership. First, egoism is vanquished: 
individuals enter into relationship, discover common values, and find transcendent purpose. 
Next, anomie disappears as well: shared values become moral constraints, and the spirit of 
mutual obligation reins in desire.  
 Common ground—the glue of group membership—can be found in a number of ways: 
political ideology, philosophical views, or even geographic location. But only one, Durkheim 
believes, is powerful enough to tackle the egoism and anomie of modern society. It is occupation.  
 Traditional societies, Durkheim notes, were largely agricultural. Since contract labor 
did not yet exist, most families worked together, tending the land as serfs (or overseeing it, if 
they were lucky). Indeed, the family was the locus of group activity, the strongest form of 
communal identity. But urbanization, among other factors, led to the fracturing of the family 
unit. “By losing its former unity and indivisibility,” the family “lost at the same time much of 
its effectiveness. Since nowadays the family is dispersed with each generation, man spends a 
not inconsiderable part of his existence far removed from any domestic influence” (1902/1997: 
xlv). The weakening of domestic influence meant the weakening of regulation in the domestic 
sphere; in modern societies, individuals would have to look to other sectors for moral 
constraint. And none were more fitting—as the division of labor continued to grow—than the 
workforce. In modern society, as so many have observed, the question is not “Who are you?” 
but “What do you do?” Where communitarian identity was once handed down by the family, it 
is now earned in the workplace.  
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 Of course, work is not ipso facto a regulatory agent. It “can only be effectively 
regulated,” Durkheim writes,  
through a group close enough to that profession to be thoroughly cognizant of how it 
functions, capable of perceiving all its needs and following every fluctuation in them. 
The sole group that meets these conditions is that constituted by all those working in the 
same industry, assembled together and organized into a single body (1902/1997: xxxv). 
 
 What Durkheim proposed was the revival of the corporation141, or professional group. 
For thousands of years, corporations had thrived in traditional society—particularly during the 
Roman Empire and the Middle Ages. But they were eventually absorbed into the state apparatus, 
becoming “mere cogs in the administrative machine” (1902/1997: xxxvii). I do not wish to 
explore the ancient corporation in great detail (Durkheim’s own work suffices), but a few traits 
are worth noting. It is these, Durkheim says, that we must adapt and impart to the modern 
professional group. 
 The corporations of ancient Rome were families in themselves. Individuals worshipped 
together, arranged festivities, and even held “a collective columbarium, where, when the 
collegium lacked the means to buy a burial ground, at least it was able to assure for its 
members honorable funeral rites which were charged to the common fund” (1902/1997: xl). 
Let us revel in this quote for a moment: Not only did corporations celebrate together, not only 
did they share spiritual rites, but they paid for each other’s funerals. To imagine such a thing 
today—a mournful procession of dentists or plumbers—is to conjure up a Gary Larson 
cartoon. And yet it was the norm among the Romans.142 “This family style of existence was so 
developed,” Durkheim observes, “that Boissier elevates it to being the main purpose of all 
Roman corporations. 
                                            
141 The term bears no relation to our contemporary one, except in the sense of forming a “corpus” or collective 
institution.  
142 Rome, we must remember, had indoor plumbing.  
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“Even in corporations of workmen,” [Boissier] states, “above all they came together for 
the pleasures of leading a life in common, to find outside their own home a distraction 
from their weariness and troubles, to create a less restricted form of intimacy than within 
the family, yet one less diffuse than that of the city, thus making life easier and more 
agreeable” (1902/1997: xli).  
 
If Rome had found an antidote to egoism, the Middle Ages saw a cure for anomie. In the latter 
period, “precise rules laid down for each trade the respective duties of employers and workmen, 
as well as the duties of employers to one another.” Desire was constrained by a “spirit of 
sacrifice and abnegation,” and traditional reciprocity ensured that “the laborer was protected 
from the whim of his master” (1902/1997: xli, xliii). Professional integrity among artisans and 
merchants emphasized fairness to the buyer and excellence in one’s trade (1902/1997: xlii).  
 As modernity has advanced, corporations have become even more vital as integrative and 
regulative institutions. But they have declined, Durkheim notes, at precisely the moment they are 
most needed. The shift from feudalism to capitalism—and in particular, from agricultural to 
industrial labor—has increased the need for constraint:  
So long as the economy remains exclusively agricultural, it possesses in the family and in 
the village (which itself is only a kind of large family) its direct organ, and it needs no 
other. As exchange is not at all, or only slightly developed, the peasant’s life does not 
draw him beyond the family circle. Since economic activity has no repercussions outside 
the home, the family suffices to regulate it, thus itself serving as the professional 
grouping. But this is no longer so when trades develop, for to live off a trade one must 
have customers, and go outside the home to find them (1902/1997: xlv).  
 
 It is not enough to restore the corporations of the past, Durkheim writes. Nor will modern 
unions suffice, since each union is “a private association, lacking legal authority and 
consequently any regulatory power” (1902/1997: xxxvi).143 To gain legal recognition, 
professional groups must “become the essential organ of public life” (1902/1997: xlv). They 
must serve not only as national institutions, but political bodies from which parliaments can be 
                                            
143 Of course, many contemporary unions do have legal authority, though their power has declined significantly in 
the past few decades. 
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formed. This is a radical point: Durkheim claims geographic divisions are “provincial” and “no 
longer arouse deep emotions within us” (1902/1997: liv). They are destined to falter, to be 
replaced with occupational constituencies.144  
 Professional groups will also serve as a buffer between individuals and the modern 
state. A socialist at heart, Durkheim is wary of state coercion: constraint, he says, must come 
from society, not some authoritarian force. It is only through “a whole range of secondary 
groups” that proper socialization can happen; the state, being “too remote from individuals,” 
cannot accomplish this end (1902/1997: liv). But professional groups can: it is because 
professions “absorb the greater part of the energies of society” that they are such adept 
regulators (1902/1997: lv).  
 Professional groups, Durkheim concludes, are indispensable elements of modern society: 
“If, from the origins of the city to the apotheosis of the Empire, from the dawn of Christian 
societies down to modern times, corporations have been necessary, it is because they correspond 
to deep and lasting needs” (1902/1997: xxxviii). But is this really true? Many theorists have 
argued that what modernity really needs is justice. Marx, for example, calls for the end of 
economic exploitation, while Weber challenges the rule of plutocracy. Though Durkheim 
recognizes these concerns, he does not believe them sufficient. “The system should [be] fair, as 
is fitting,” he says. But he proposes the following thought experiment: 
Let us suppose that the overriding consideration of ideal justice has been finally realised, 
that men begin their lives in a state of perfect economic equality, that is, that wealth has 
completely ceased to be hereditary. The problems with which we are now grappling 
would not thereby have been resolved. In fact, the economic mechanism will always 
continue to exist, as will the various actors who cooperate in its workings. . . . Merely 
because wealth will not be handed down according to the same principles as at the 
present time, the state of anarchy will not have disappeared. That state does not only 
                                            
144 This is, in fact, a shift from plebiscitary to functional representation, so perhaps Durkheim’s point is not so 
“radical” after all.  
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depend upon the fact that things are located here rather than there, or in the hands of this 
person rather than in another’s, but will depend upon the fact that the activity for which 
these matters are the occasion, or the instrument, remains unregulated. Nor will it become 
regulated as if by magic as soon as it becomes useful to do so, unless the forces needed to 
institute that regulatory system have been mobilized and organized beforehand 
(1902/1997: lv–lvi). 
 
Fairness is only half the battle: our well-being also requires a sense of solidarity and restraint. 
And these can only come from human relationships. What good is our justice when we are 
lonely, isolated, anxious, and depressed? Group membership, Durkheim writes, is “a source of 
life sui generis. 
From it there arises a warmth that quickens or gives fresh life to each individual, which 
makes him disposed to empathize, causing selfishness to melt away. Thus in the past the 
family has been responsible for legislating a code of law and morality whose severity has 
often been carried to an extreme of harshness. But it has also been the environment 
where, for the first time, men have learnt to appreciate the outpouring of feeling” 
(1902/1997: lii). 
 
 Fellow feeling, so often lost in the modern era, is revived in the professional group. 
Indeed, all the benefits of Gemeinschaft—warmth, care, and mutual responsibility—are restored 
through it. Durkheim’s solution to the crisis of anomie and egoism, what we might call 
Gemeinschaft within Gesellschaft, presents a happy medium between the security of traditional 
society and the autonomy of the modern age. 
 
3. The Religion of Humanity: 
 Throughout this essay, I have linked anomie with individualism. The individualist drive, I 
have argued, encourages Americans to think only of themselves, and to eschew mutual 
reciprocity in favor of self-advancement. Individualism is the scourge of modern society—
isolating us in our separate spheres and precluding our social solidarity.  
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 But the American conception of individualism is not the same as Durkheim’s. When we 
say individualism today, we mean egoism. In Durkheim’s usage, the two are essentially 
opposites. In a neglected work called “Individualism and the Intellectuals” (1898), Durkheim 
defends individualism against the attacks of the day. Individualism, he writes, “springs not from 
egoism but from sympathy for all that is human.” It encompasses 
a broader pity for all sufferings, for all human miseries, a more ardent need to combat 
them and mitigate them, a greater thirst for justice. . . . Some use it for their personal 
ends, as a means of disguising their egoism and of more easily escaping their duties to 
society. But this abusive exploitation of individualism proves nothing against it 
(1898/1973: 49). 
 
 The problem with Western individualism, Durkheim argues, is that it remains incomplete. 
For too long, we have championed the civil and political rights of the individual—those relating 
to personal liberty and state representation, respectively—but we have neglected to provide 
social rights (cf. Bendix 1996). Only this last group of rights forms the basis of social solidarity; 
the other two, left alone, only serve to divide us. Durkheim puts the problem clearly: 
Our forefathers undertook exclusively the task of freeing the individual from the political 
shackles which impeded his development. The freedom to think, the freedom to write, the 
freedom to vote were therefore placed by them in the ranks of the primary benefits to be 
obtained, and this emancipation was certainly the necessary precondition of all 
subsequent progress. However, quite completely carried away by the fervor of the 
struggle toward the objective they pursued, they ended by no longer seeing beyond it and 
by erecting as a sort of final goal this proximate term of their efforts. Now political 
freedom is a means, not an end; it is not simply useless, it becomes dangerous. It is a 
battle weapon; if those who wield it do not know how to use it in fruitful struggles, they 
soon end by turning it against themselves” (1898/1973: 55, emphasis added). 
 
Divorced from notions of fellowship and mutuality, freedom becomes a toxin. That toxin, 
moreover, produces egoism and anomie. Our freedom must be tempered with solidarity, or else 
the social fabric will dissolve. “It is exceedingly clear,” Durkheim writes, “that all communal life 
is impossible without the existence of interests superior to those of the individual” (1898/1973: 
44). But what might those interests be? Modernity has unmoored us from primary ties—to 
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family, church, and community—as well as to the consensus of values found in Gemeinschaft. 
Every day, “we make our way, little by little, toward a state . . . where the members of a single 
social group will having nothing in common among themselves except their humanity, except the 
constitutive attributes of the human person (personne humaine) in general” (1898/1973: 52).  
 Humanity, then, will be our glue. As the division of labor progresses, and “each mind 
finds itself oriented to a different point on the horizon,” only the human condition will remain to 
bind us together. “The communion of spirits,” Durkheim writes, 
can no longer be based on definite rites and prejudices, since rites and prejudices are 
overcome by the course of events. Consequently, nothing remains which men can love 
and honor in common if not man himself. That is how man has become a god for man 
and why he can no longer create other gods without lying to himself. And since each of 
us incarnates something of humanity, each individual consciousness contains something 
divine and thus finds itself marked with a character which renders it sacred and inviolable 
to others. Therein lies all individualism; and that is what makes it a necessary doctrine 
(1898/1973: 51–52).   
 
 This is Durkheim’s grand vision; this is his kingdom of freedom, his charismatic 
authority. We are like shards of glass, broken off from the whole but also containing a part of 
it—and only through mutuality can we bring those shards together, as is proper, achieving in 
those rare moments a glimpse of the divine. This “religion of humanity,” as Durkheim calls it, 
“fixes before us an ideal which infinitely surpasses nature” (1898/1973: 48). Our dignity comes 
not from the egoist pursuit of difference, but “from a higher source,” one that we all share. “It is 
humanity which is worthy of respect and sacred,” but because each of us contains only a single 
shard, we must come together in relationship. “Impersonal and anonymous,” our collective aim 
“soars far above all individual minds (consciences particulieres) and can thus serve them as a 
rallying point (1898/1973: 48).  
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 Our common goal, then, lies in recognizing that we do not have common goals; that we 
are complex, individuated creatures whose dreams cannot be stilted by the demand for 
homogeneity. To challenge individualism would be to 
prevent men from differentiating themselves more and more from each other, to equalize 
their personalities, to lead them back to the old conformism of former times, to contain, 
as a result, the tendency for societies to become always more extended and more 
centralized, and to place an obstacle in the way of the unceasing progress of the division 
of labor (1898/1973: 52) 
 
Far from egoistic, freedom and individuality have become “the only tie which binds us all to 
each other.” To attack individualism is not just to harm the individual, but to engender “social 
dissolution” (1898/1973: 54). Indeed, the spirit of individualism is the only thing keeping us 
from falling further into anomie! “To take it away from us when we have nothing to put in its 
place is, then, to precipitate us into that moral anarchy which is precisely what we wish to 
combat” (1898/1973: 54–55, emphasis added).  
 In our egoistic American culture, Durkheim’s claim is almost nonsensical. How can 
individuals, pursuing their own separate ends in their own separate fields, cohere? Isn’t this the 
basis of the anomic division of labor, in which atomization destroys social solidarity? Not quite. 
For to defend the individual is also to defend society—a society that encourages pluralism and 
rejects conformity; and in doing so, one “prevents the criminal impoverishment of that last 
reserve of collective ideas and feelings [i.e., humanism] which is the very soul of the nation” 
(1898/1973: 53–54).  
 But Durkheim’s praise of individualism may be a bit more tepid than it appears. Although 
he rejects the “old conformism,” he never quite lauds the loss of traditional society or the tight-knit 
bonds of Gemeinschaft. Instead, his argument is that individualism is necessary because we have 
lost those bonds; it is all that we have left. A close reading of this text reveals a rather melancholy 
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resignation on Durkheim’s part: we have stripped away all of our historical ties, and are left only 
with bare human dignity. Since this is all we have left, we might as well strengthen it, for to purge 
ourselves of this “last reserve” of community would only worsen our anomie: 
This eighteenth-century liberalism which is at bottom the whole object of the dispute is 
not simply a drawing-room theory, a philosophical construct; it has become a fact, it has 
penetrated our institutions and our mores, it has blended with our whole life, and if, truly, 
we had to give it up, we would have to recast our whole moral organization at the same 
stroke (1898/1973: 46–47).  
 
 Durkheim never gives up on the idea of Gemeinschaft. As we have seen, his discussion 
of professional groups indicates that individuals still need traditional community, even in the 
modern age: “To be shot of anomie a group must thus exist or be formed within which can be 
drawn up the system of rules that is now lacking” (1902/1997: xxxv). Can the religion of 
humanity provide some constraint on desire? Certainly: by emphasizing our common humanity, 
it can remind us of the need for mutuality and restraint. But it cannot fully temper our desire—
for that, we need a stronger source of community. 
 
Final Thoughts 
 Modernity has won its prize. In the United States and much of Europe, citizens have 
achieved a freedom unimaginable just a few centuries ago. Our ancestors labored, often at great 
cost, for that freedom. But “quite completely carried away by the fervor of the struggle toward 
they objective they pursued, they ended by no longer seeing beyond it and by erecting as a sort 
of final goal this proximate term of their efforts. . . .We soon had to admit that we did not know 
what to do with this hard-won freedom” (Durkheim 1898/1973: 55). 
 Nonetheless, our freedoms continue to expand, and each constraint weighs on us like a 
shackle to be overthrown. Would it not be lovely, we reason, to cut free once and for all—to be 
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radically unburdened, even from social responsibility? Why not make that westward journey, 
pushing the boundaries, exploring new territory and claiming a self apart from other selves? 
 We could not do it even if we tried. This is our curse and our blessing—that we are tied 
in a vast web of mutuality, and we can never quite untangle ourselves. “So it is not true that 
human activity can be freed from all restraints,” Durkheim observes.  
There is nothing in the world that can enjoy such a privilege, since every creature, being 
part of the universe, is relative to the rest of the universe. Its nature and the way in which 
it manifests this depend not only on itself, but on other creatures, who, consequently, 
contain and rule it. In this respect, there are only differences of degree and form between 
a mineral and a thinking subject (1897/2006: 276). 
 
Yet Americans constantly seek to release themselves from normative constraint—society is a 
demon to be conquered, and liberty is the ultimate prize. What is the point? As the great 
sociologist Robert Bellah observed, “What the ever freer and more autonomous self is free for 
only grows more obscure” (Bellah et al. 1985: 82). Freedom is only a tool, Durkheim reminds 
us—“a means, not an end.” Without proper guidance, “it is not simply useless, it becomes 
dangerous” (Durkheim 1898/1973: 55). 
 That danger, I have argued, has reached a climax in the United States. Our unconstraint 
has produced unprecedented levels of mental illness (notably anxiety and depression), and led to 
high rates of mass violence. Our soldiers are more likely to commit suicide than to die in combat.  
Rates of happiness have not improved in fifty years, despite advances in civil rights, health care, 
and communication technology. These concerns each trace their origins to an anomic crisis.  
 But apart from a few notable exceptions145, sociology has largely abandoned anomie 
theory. Instead, we pursue “empirical” research that claims to be value-neutral, while in fact 
condoning the very social processes that sociology was invented to critique. “It has been 
                                            
145 These include Liah Greenfeld and Stjepan Meštrović.  
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common for [the classical] tradition to be attacked, by the advocates of a ‘scientific’ social and 
political theory, as being rudimentary and speculative, and lacking in scientific detachment,” 
Steven Lukes writes. “What is required, it is argued, is the abandonment of concepts which are 
internally related to theories of the good life and the good society. Evaluations of this sort should 
be kept strictly apart from the process of scientific inquiry.” But such an approach, Lukes warns, 
means accepting our world exactly as it is. It “involves advocating the abandonment of the 
application of models of alternative and preferred forms of life to the critical analysis of actual 
forms. That case has yet to be made convincing” (Lukes 1977: 94–95).  
 I worry, as I approach the end of this thesis, that I have been too pessimistic. Even more 
pessimistic, perhaps, than Durkheim himself. For though Durkheim recognized the perils of 
modernization, he knew that only individuation could solve the anomic crisis. It was not by 
going backward, but by pressing ever forward, becoming more specialized and attaining societies 
of greater complexity, that justice could be achieved. 
 It is easy to feel melancholy about the future. But even our anomic character presents 
some hope—for if society is ever changing, refusing to settle, then perhaps it will not settle on 
anomie. In a beautiful passage from Suicide, Durkheim writes: 
There is a whole collective life that is free and untrammeled; all sorts of currents come 
and go, circulating in every direction, crossing and intermingling in a thousand different 
ways; and precisely because they are in this state of perpetual motion they do not manage 
to settle in an objective form. Today, a wave of sadness and discouragement has swept 
over society; tomorrow, on the contrary, a breath of joyful confidence will raise our 
spirits. For a time, the whole group is pulled in the direction of individualism, then 
another period arrives and philanthropic social aspirations take over. Yesterday, we were 
all cosmopolitans, but today patriotism has the upper hand. And all these tides, these ebbs 
and flows take place without the slightest change to the cardinal precepts of law and 
morality, immobilized in their hieratic forms. Moreover, these precepts themselves are 
only the expression of an underlying life to which they belong; they derive from it but do 
not suppress it. At the basis of all these maxims, there are present and living feelings that 
these formulae encapsulate, while serving only as a superficial covering for them. They 
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would awake no response if they did not correspond to concrete emotions and 
impressions spread out through society. So if we attribute a reality to them, we do not 
imagine that they make up the whole of moral reality: this would be mistaking the sign 
for the thing signified. A sign is undoubtedly something, it is not some kind of 
supererogatory epiphenomenon, and we know nowadays what part it plays in intellectual 
development (1897/2006: 349–50).  
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